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Abstract.
McFague’s contributions to theology span over 40 years.  Does her 
theological project, which aims to reform the Christian tradition, retain the 
coherence and consistency needed to fulfil this aim today? 
Surprisingly, McFague's body of work remains coherent, consistent and 
viable after many years of debate in relation to her own aims and methods 
and the responses of critics.   However her theology can, in places, be 
strengthened in meeting its aim by an integration of more recent research or 
the work of her respondents. 
Developments in her thought over time remain generally consistent with 
her earlier work. Analysis of the basic categories of her thought shows a 
unity of form and content and an underlying conceptual unity.   The models 
McFague advances are consistent as expressions of her stated method and 
aims.  They perform the tasks set for them, if not always by the means she 
describes. Again the importance of the conceptual level proves greater than 
McFague allows.
   
The coherence and consistency of the greater part of her work is weaker in 
its interaction with the Christian tradition.  Her position on this has changed 
most over time.  Work remains to be done on integrating her models with 
traditional ones. Despite her own judgements, this integration is desirable 
to maximise the reform of that tradition as she wishes and for her theology 
most naturally to be seen as reforming rather than revolutionary.
But  overall,  McFague's  work  makes  a  valuable  contribution  to 
contemporary  theology.   She  expounds  coherent,  original  metaphorical 
models  addressing  contemporary  concerns  and  a  coherent  theoretical 
framework  that  has  largely  withstood  the  scrutiny  of  respondents  and 
developments in her field.  Within this framework models may be created 
and assessed in  creative tension with Christian  tradition.   However  this 
relationship with the tradition remains to be deepened, strengthened and 
clarified by future research.
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I. Introduction. 
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Sallie McFague, a brief biography.
Sallie  McFague  was  born  25th May 1933  in  Quincy,  Massachusettes.   As  a 
teenager she attended an Episcopalian Church in Boston and, although she recalls a 
childhood sense of wonder 'that I was alive – and so were myriad other creatures'1, she 
cites reading Barth's Commentary on Romans as being the experience in which she first 
'began to have a glimmer of what the word 'God' meant'2.
Over  the  period  1959-1964  she  completed  a  B.D.,  M..A.  and  PhD.  at  Yale 
Divinity  School  and  Yale  University.3  At  this  point  her  research  interests  were 
particularly  in  the  area  of  literature  and  theology,  with  a  developing  interest  in 
biography.   This  phase  of  her  career  led  to  the  publishing  of  Literature  and  the  
Christian  Life in  1966,  and  at  this  time  she  was  also  editor  of   Soundings:An 
Interdisciplinary Journal. 
In 1959 she also married fellow theologian Eugene TeSelle  (since divorced), 
with  whom  she  had  two  children  (and  two  grandchildren),  and  her  pre-1977 
publications were in the name Sallie TeSelle or McFague-TeSelle.
McFague's  early  theological  influences  were  Barthian.4 Subsequently  'She 
gained a different perspective from the person and thought of one of her teachers, H. 
Richard Niebuhr, with his appreciation of liberalism's concern for experience, relativity, 
the symbolic imagination and the role of the affections.'5
1 Sallie McFague Life Abundant Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril Minneapolis: 
Fortress 2000 p4
2 Ibid. p5
3 The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology  at 
http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/WeirdWildWeb/courses/mwt/dictionary/mwt_themes_909_mcfague.ht
m as accessed 18/3/08
4 McFague describes her early theological development in 'An ‘Intermediary Theology’: In Service of 
the Hearing of God’s Word' The Christian Century, June 25, 1975, pp. 625-629
5 Wesley Wildman 'The Theology of Sallie McFague' 1988 The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of  
Modern Western Theology available online at 
http://people.bu.edu/wwildman/WeirdWildWeb/courses/mwt/dictionary/mwt_themes_909_mcfague.ht
m as accessed 12/07/10
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McFague's Speaking in Parables (1975) marked the beginning of her published 
interest in religious language and its connections to ethical and inclusive living.  In the 
same year,  she  became Dean of  Vanderbilt  Divinity  School,  where  she  had been  a 
Professor of Theology for five years.  She remained Dean until 1980 when she became 
Carpenter Professor of Theology at Vanderbilt, a post she held until 2000.
This period from 1980 saw the publication of McFague's  best  known works, 
following  what  she  describes  as  her  realisation  that  her  theology  'didn't  actually 
function'6  in her life, and that she lacked a vocation.  This vocation she found after 
reading an essay on environmental and nuclear issues and the urgent need for theology 
to address  them, by Gordon Kaufmann.     This led to  the writing of  Metaphorical  
Theology (1982) which set down the basic methodology that her work was to follow. 
Her following work, Models of God (1987), developed further particular aspects of that 
methodology  and  was  awarded  the  American  Academy  of  Religion  Award  for 
Excellence the following year.
A further  development  of  the  themes  of  Models  of  God  and  Metaphorical  
Theology resulted in The Body of God (1993), Super, Natural Christians (1997) and Life  
Abundant (2001), each of which has a strong focus on religious language and belief as a 
motivator for environmental awareness, concern and action.
McFague was Distinguished Theologian in Residence at Vancouver School of 
Theology until her retirement in 2000, and her latest book,  A New Climate for Theology 
was published in May 2008.
6 Life Abundant p5
3
The location and aim of this enquiry.
Sallie McFague's work has been both influential and controversial in a number 
of areas of theology, including environmental theology, the dialogue between science 
and theology, systematics, feminist theology and pastoral theology.  Although her works 
individually have  been widely cited,  engaged with and critiqued,  particularly in  the 
period 1980-1990, there appear to have been few attempts to consider her work, and 
especially her proposed methodology, over time or as a whole (although a few reviewers 
and journal articles have attempted this  briefly for the books  Speaking in Parables,  
Metaphorical Theology  and  Models of God – for these reviews see the bibliography, 
particularly the articles by Peters,  Reynolds, McWilliams and Stenmark).   The most 
thorough engagement with her thought currently available in the literature seems to be 
Shannon  Schrein's  Quilting  and  Braiding (1998)  which  limits  itself  explicitly  to 
McFague's Christology, and compares it to that of Elizabeth Johnson.  
  McFague's publishing career has spanned over 40 years.   This presents the 
opportunity to consider her work as a whole and assess its contribution to theology, its  
internal coherence and development over time, and its continuing relevance, with the 
benefit of there having been time for a full response to her work from the academic 
community and for McFague to develop her work over a substantial period.  
By 'relevance' is meant here, not so much that her theology remains topical in 
the issues it addresses, nor that it continues to be generally of interest to theology (a 
presentation that has been shown to be deeply flawed may still be held to be relevant in 
the sense that some of its elements, or even its mistakes themselves remain interesting 
or  illuminating  for  example).  Rather  relevance  is  understood here  to  mean that  the 
method that McFague develops and presents in her work may itself be said to largely 
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endure the critique of her respondents and stand the test of time, being still  today a 
potentially fruitful and insightful methodological direction for theology to progress in.  
The aim of this  enquiry is therefore to assess whether McFague's theological 
project, which aims to contribute to reform of the Christian Tradition, has maintained 
the coherence and consistency of needed to still fulfil this aim today.
This question will be answered by an examination of the whole of McFague's 
published work and the substantial responses and treatments that this work has received 
from the academic community in the English language with the following subsidiary 
questions in mind.  
- Does McFague's work contain significant internal inconsistencies or change 
position radically over time?
- Is the method that she espouses consistent with the method that she appears to 
actually use in practice?
- Are the products of her theology (her 'models of God') valid and successful by 
the criteria she puts forward by which models may be critiqued in theory and by the 
criteria she herself appears to use to critique other theological models in practice?
-  Have  her  respondents  shown any key aspect  of  her  work  to  be  rationally 
unsustainable, logically flawed or based on false assumptions? 
-  Are  any  key  elements  of  her  methodology  dependent  upon  positions  or 
assumptions that have since been widely rejected?
-  Can  any  areas  of  weakness  in  her  approach  be  strengthened  by  the 
contributions of her respondents or by subsequent developments beyond her work?
In order to address these questions, this project will take the following approach. 
Firstly, Chapter 1 to 3 will examine McFague's position on theological method, 
asking whether this has been consistently presented over time and identifying the ways 
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in which it has developed.  It will also be asked whether subsequent research and the 
views of her respondents’ support or undermine her assertions on method.  
Secondly  McFague's  own  applications of  her  method,  particularly  as  it  is 
expressed in her key models will be critically examined in Chapters 4 and 5.  Significant 
responses to these applications in the literature will be noted, but the main focus will be 
on whether or not these models meet the criteria that McFague herself lays down, and 
whether they are an accurate reflection of her own method.  
Together, these major sections will identify consistent strengths and weaknesses 
of McFague's theological contribution as a whole, and examine any interconnections 
between them.  Finally these findings will be brought together to assess the continuing 
relevance and legacy of McFague's work (1975-2008)7 as well as identify questions for 
further research.
McFague's body of work could of course be approached in many other ways and 
related to the work of many other contributors to theology.  Indeed her work is itself 
very rich in that it engages with a wide range of issues and draws upon the insights of  
many different  disciplines,  within  theology and far  beyond  it.   This  study will  not 
however  attempt  to  address  the  points  of  contact  between  McFague  and  these 
disciplines, nor compare her work to that of others within the theological movement in 
which she is most naturally located: eco-feminism.  Interest here is specifically in the 
coherence and consistency of her methodology and its enduring relevance to theology, 
including systematic theology.8 
7 Her earliest published work, Literature and the Christian Life, does not form part of the same project 
advanced in her subsequent publications.
8 I first encountered McFague's work as part of the dialogue between science and theology, my own 
academic background being partly in the Natural Sciences, particularly Physics and the History and 
Philosophy of Science.  Therefore my interest in her work was initially in the methodological 
similarities and differences that she explores between theology and the natural sciences. This accounts 
perhaps for the  particular focus on methodological issues in this study.
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Method.
This work is dependent upon a defined range of literature as follows:  all of 
McFague's published work (books, journal articles and in a few cases magazine articles) 
available  in  the English language,  based primarily on the bibliography published at 
http://www.vst.edu/pdfs/FacultyCVs/McFaguePUB.pdf as consulted 26/3/06.  Secondly, 
those  responses  that  could  be  located,  again  in  the  English  language,  which  show 
sustained critical engagement  with McFague's  work (works which simply quote or 
follow McFague without critical engagement or cite her in passing are not included). 
These  sources  have  been  identified  from  references  and  bibliographies  in  texts 
consulted  and  online  searches  using  ATLA,  JSTOR,  the  British  Library,  Cardiff 
University Library and a variety of online search engines including Google Books and 
Google Scholar over the period 2005 to 2008.
Analysing  a  body of  work  that  has  been  produced  over  time  as  part  of  an 
ongoing theological and communal conversation itself raises questions of method for 
the  project  here,  namely  the  role  and  relevance  of  parallel  developments  in  this 
conversation, and whether to take a synchronic or diachronic approach.
To  focus  and  define  the  literature  included  here,  consultation  of  secondary 
literature has largely been limited to those sources that directly and explicitly engage 
with McFague's work.  Further, independent literature has been brought in only to shed 
light on specific questions raised by the academic dialogue with McFague, where these 
sources  help to  clarify the issues at  stake,  or  help to  resolve questions  that  are  not 
answered in this dialogue.  This is to avoid introducing into the discussion unnecessary 
controversies  that  fall  beyond  the  scope  of  these  enquiries  and  thus  the  sources 
introduced in this way are those that, it is believed, would be representative of broad 
academic consensus in the relevant fields.  
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This  desire  to  limit  the  scope  of  enquiry  also  leads  to  its  principal 
oversimplification.  That is, throughout, McFague will be contrasted with or seen to be 
engaging with 'Christianity' or 'the Christian tradition'.  It is to be fully acknowledged at 
the outset that Christianity is, both in the present and over time, a highly diverse religion 
(indeed this  point  forms  part  of  the  argument  in  conclusion)  and  that  behind these 
shorthand terms there lie many levels of complexity, controversy and debate.  However, 
where  these  terms  are  used  here,   they  are  intended  to  reflect  the  broad  doctrinal 
similarities that can be held to exist between those historical and contemporary forms of 
Christianity that would broadly affirm the historic ecumenical creeds (the Nicene Creed 
in  its  381AD  form  in  particular),  and  the  theologies  that  have  sprung  from  these 
communities of faith. In the present work then, 'the tradition' may be taken to be for 
example those beliefs that could be found in common in the authorised liturgical texts of 
the  Christian  denominational  churches  –  such  as  the  Roman  Catholic,  Orthodox, 
Anglican9, Methodist, Lutheran and Presbyterian Churches and churches in communion 
with them10.  McFague herself uses the term 'the tradition' as a debating partner and in 
her work this term is similarly broad and undefined11.  However she uses a similar, if 
more generic, description of the origins and limits of 'the tradition', (an origin which she 
clearly views as negative because of its authoritarian and restrictive history), when she 
says,
'The interpretive context within religious faiths has usually been limited to the 
'tradition',  meaning the church or another institution which has set  the interpretative 
9 I am a practising Anglican Parish Priest in the Church in Wales and so this tradition is my tradition. 
Therefore I, like McFague, stand within the tradition, critiquing, viewing and experiencing it from 
within, and so I bring to her texts the perspectives and motivations that this prior commitment 
necessarily involves,
10 And also including those non-liturgical churches such as the Assemblies of God and the Baptist 
Churches whose formal doctrinal statements would be in broad agreement on general common 
theological themes and formulation with the liturgical churches listed.
11 McFague uses the expressions 'Christian tradition' or 'Judeo-Christian tradition' 34 times in 
Metaphorical Theology alone and the term traditional and related ones with great frequency. 
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precedents for what is proper (orthodox) or improper (heretical) religious language.'12
What follows therefore shares McFague's stance in choosing for convenience to 
engage with a caricatured entity painted with a broad brush that is referred to as 'the 
Christian  tradition'  while  being  aware  of  the  many  questions  that  this  begs  and 
complications that this passes over. 
The  trajectory  of  McFague's  own  publishing  career,  meanwhile,  makes  the 
synchronic versus diachronic issue easier to reconcile, since it is generally the case that 
her work moved over time from an exploration of the method for producing models, to 
an  expounding  of  the  models,  cumulating  in  a  further  refining  and  more  detailed 
presentation of the same.  That is, McFague's work progresses in a cumulative fashion 
with  each  publication,  building  on  and  expanding  aspects  of  the  argument  of  the 
preceding one.  Because our investigations will  also move from considering method to 
considering specific models, their  structure may appear diachronic, and much of the 
referenced  material  does  appear  in  a  roughly  chronological  order.   However, 
methodologically  these  investigations  are  in  fact  synchronic,  with  the  material 
presented, in the general case, as if it were all published at the same time.  However, on 
those,  as  we  shall  see,  rare  occasions  on  which  McFague  changed  or  nuanced  her 
position on a key issue over time, these changes are identified and discussed as they are 
relevant.
The structure of the analysis.
The  first  three  chapters  concern  McFague’s  theological  method.   Chapter  1 
discusses the basic positions.  motivations and interests that inform her work and its 
12 She goes on to appear to further define 'traditional' interpretations as coming from the period before 
the rise of 'historical criticism in the last 200 years'.  Sallie McFague Metaphorical Theology: Models  
of God in Religious Language (British edition) London: SCM Press 1983 p3
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aims,  and  the  basic  categories  of  her  thought.   Particular  attention  is  given  to  her 
understanding of 'idolatry' and of 'irrelevance' in religious language, and a clarification, 
drawing on Lakoff and Turner, of the meaning of the term ‘literal’ in this context.  The 
chapter then continues with an analysis of McFague’s understanding of metaphor, its 
properties  and  functions.   During  this  discussion,  McFague’s  interactionist 
understanding of metaphor is called into question.  This is followed by an examination 
of her understanding of parable, and Jesus as parable of God, and the way in which 
these concepts are extended to form the concept of the ‘metaphorical’.  
The inter-relations between image, model, concept and theory which Chapter 1 
begins to identify are expanded upon in Chapter 2 at greater length.  It is at this stage 
that the importance of the conceptual level begins to become evident, as does the highly 
integrated nature of McFague’s theology, with its symmetry of form and content.
Chapter 3 begins the second part of this investigation.  It concerns itself with the 
application of metaphorical  theology in practice.   This chapter  identifies McFague’s 
own criteria for the assessment of models in theology and, as part of this, also examines  
broader questions of the relationship between McFague’s theology and theology more 
generally and historically (an ongoing theme throughout).   Chapter  3  also critically 
examines  McFague’s  views  on  reference  and  epistemic  justification  in  religious 
language, in the light of extensive discussions in the secondary literature, since these are 
relevant both to the aims of models and their assessment.   The relationship between 
McFague’s  models  and  the  context  from which  they  arise,  and  to  which  they  are 
addressed, is then considered.  The assessment criteria identified in this chapter are then 
applied to McFague’s treatment of the model ‘God the Father’, and the essential nature 
of  McFague’s  project  as  an  heuristic,  reforming  Christian  ethical  theology  is 
summarised.
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Chapter 4 then examines three of McFague’s own models, God as Mother, Lover 
and Friend, in the light of the assessment criteria derived in chapter 3 and in the light of 
responses in the literature.  While this assessment is generally positive in terms of the 
models'  ability to meet  McFague's  criteria,  concerns are  raised over the relationship 
between  these  models  and traditional  Christian  models,  particularly in  the  areas  of 
eschatology and Christology.
These  concerns  are  carried  forward  into  chapter  5,  where  McFague's  most 
extensive  exposition  of  a  model,  that  of  the  world  as  God's  body,  is  examined. 
McFague's later work is also examined with regard to the key questions identified.  Here 
the conclusions of chapter 4 are borne out and strengthened, and attention is drawn 
particularly to the relationship between models and concepts, and between new models 
and traditional ones.
Finally  our  enquiries  conclude  in  chapter  6,  where  the  various  consistent 
findings of the preceding chapters are brought together, connections between them are 
identified and a conclusion concerning McFague's continuing contribution to theology 
is drawn, with attention directed to questions for future research which, it is suggested, 
would strengthen the  case  for  her  work being able  to  continue  to  contribute  to  the 
reformation of the Christian tradition in the way that she wishes.
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Chapter 1 – Beginnings:  Motives, metaphors and 
parables.
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1.1 Introduction.
In order  to  asses  the coherence and consistency of  McFague's  theology,  and 
thereby to assess its ongoing ability to contribute to the reform of the Christian tradition, 
her theology needs first to be broken down into its constituent parts and these parts, and 
their relationship to each other need to be explored, both in McFague's understanding 
and in the light of her respondents and subsequent analysis.  
This chapter begins that process by examining the basic positions and interests 
that inform McFague's work.  Of primary interest here is what her theology seeks to 
achieve  (a  move  towards  inclusivity  and  abundance),  and  avoid  (idolatry  and 
irrelevance), and the primary categories in relation to which this theology is worked out 
(metaphor  and  the  metaphorical,  parable  and  Jesus  as  parable  of  God).   These 
preliminary  discussions  provide  the  foundations  for  further  detailed  discussion  of 
McFague's  methodology  in  the  following  two  chapters,  as  well  as  providing  an 
understanding of her intention, against which the relative success of her applications of 
this methodology will be judged in Chapters 4 and 5.
It happens that McFague herself presented her methodology explicitly as the first 
stage  of  her  publishing  career,  and  her  later  works  built  largely  upon  this  base. 
Therefore the published works we are first and foremost interested in at this stage are 
Speaking in Parables,  Metaphorical Theology and Models of God and related articles. 
Where her methodology has changed over time to any significant degree, these changes 
are discussed in the text of the following chapters as they are relevant.
 McFague's  theology,  as  expressed  by  her  writings,  is  a  complex  and 
sophisticated interrelating of factors and considerations.  Her thought is holistic.  As we 
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shall see, she exhibits a high level of interconnection between her ideas, and achieves a 
considerable degree of symmetry between form, method and content.  Her thought is 
not derived linearly, building directly up from a foundation,  rather it is best understood 
using more organic metaphors which keep the whole in view while considering the 
parts.  With this in mind, it is best to begin with a concise summary of central aspects of 
her thought, before moving to examine aspects of it in more detail. 
The following passages, taken from Metaphorical Theology, highlight the main 
features of her understanding of theology.
'We  start  ...with  the  network  of  interrelated  models  that  makes  up  the 
Christian paradigm ...The first and most basic thing to say about this network is 
that it breaks the silence; it makes us articulate about the mysterious...
'The Christian paradigm ...derives from the root-metaphor of the kingdom or 
rule of God, a relationship between the divine and the human characterized by 
disorientation toward conventional securities and reorientation towards security in 
God alone.  Such a relationship is intrinsically tensive and it is, we contend, based 
in the parables and Jesus as parable of God.  The Bible is the classic text modeling 
this  relationship  and  as  such  is  the  foundational  text  for  Christians.   It  is 
authoritative because it models this relationship; Christians have given it authority 
and continue to do so because the divine-human relationship it models impinges in 
profound ways upon their experience of being in the world ... we believe in order 
to understand and we understand in order to believe.13
'The  translations  of  this  root-metaphor  ...over  two  thousand  years  are 
..complex and varied ...[However] personal models of all sorts, though principally 
hierarchical, monarchical, and patriarchal ones, have predominated...
'We can readily see how a pattern of  interlocking models  is  formed:  how 
13  Metaphorical Theology  p138
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multimodel discourse can emerge, how models can be cross-plotted, how models 
can mutually qualify each other, how dominant models covering a wider range of 
language subsume other models under them.  The major models of a theology 
provide the framework for envisioning the whole network with supporting models 
which  lend  substance  and  detail  to  the  total  system.   A theology is  indeed  a 
network, principally a network of dominant and subsidiary models, and it is this 
network as a whole that must finally be judged adequate or inadequate.'14  
These quotations illustrate the basic features of McFague's understanding of 
how her theological method works.  Although she identifies its product as a network, 
to  be judged as a  whole,  within this  network highly related sub-networks can be 
identified.  The four largest of these, the categories of 'images', 'models', 'concepts' 
and 'theory' are terms which will be examined in detail in Chapter 2.  
However there are some themes and categories which can be considered even 
more basic, in the sense that they inform and structure both the form and the content 
of  her  theology  to  a  high  degree  and  thus  recur  regularly  throughout  her 
presentations,  namely  'metaphor'  and  'parable',  and  their  abstractions  and 
methodological outworking as 'the metaphorical' and 'Jesus as the parable of God'. 
These are considered later in this chapter.
But even before these beginnings of McFague's methodology it is necessary 
to identify the underlying motivations that inspire and shape her work.  As with all of 
her thought, it will be seen that, for McFague, ends, as well as means, are closely, 
'organically', related. 
14 Ibid. p139
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1.2 Developing Motivations and Key Concerns.
Sallie McFague's 'career' of theological reflection spans across more than sixty 
years.  In her   book, Life Abundant (2000), she charts the course of this journey from 
childhood, and her first questions about being and non-being, to her present position. 
She says that this journey is marked by four 'conversions'15, from a focus on immanence 
to transcendence, and then back to immanence again, followed by a move away from 
anthropocentric thinking to a cosmological focus, and then finally and most recently to a 
rediscovery of religious experience through 'practising the presence of God'.16
It would, though, be a mistake to see these conversions as negating what went 
before them.  In fact, although a change of emphasis and the addition of new themes and 
insights (particularly the concern surrounding global warming, replacing in large part 
her earlier concern with nuclear weapons) is clearly discernible in her published work, 
this work still shows a high degree of coherence and continuity, as will be demonstrated. 
This  observation  is  in  line  with  McFague's  own  judgement on  her  work.17 Her 
understanding of  theological  method sees it  as a dynamic,  provisional  and evolving 
system, asking and suggesting answers to the questions that are, as she would say, 'of 
our time', but simultaneously being a system that is kept coherent and in continuity by 
stable underlying concepts18.   As a result it is possible to outline her five principal, 
unifying, paradigmatic concerns as follows:
a) In the introduction to one of her earliest publications, McFague says,
'The purpose of theology is to make it possible for the gospel to be heard in 
15 Sallie McFague Life Abundant Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril Minneapolis: 
Fortress 2000 p4
16 Ibid. p8
17 Ibid. p6
18 See Chapter 2 below for a full discussion of the nature and role of concepts in McFague's thought.
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our time.'19
This statement,  as Bromell observes20,  implies that there is, firstly,  a 'gospel', 
something of enduring relevance that can potentially be recognised across contexts, and 
secondly  that  the  recognising  of  this  in  our  time  is  in  some  way  impaired  and 
problematic. 
Her theology is therefore always 'stereoscopic', attentive both to the conditions 
of our experienced reality and culture, and also to the 'root metaphor' of her Christian 
tradition,  'the Kingdom of God'21.   The values that  McFague derives from this  root 
metaphor, exemplified particularly and most completely for her in the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth  understood as  the  parable  of  God,  can  be  summed up as  'inclusivity'  and 
'abundance'.22  Meanwhile, the twin pitfalls of religious language as she sees them are its 
potential  'idolatry'  (where  theological  statements  are  taken to  literally  describe  their 
object) and 'irrelevance' (where theological and religious language fails to connect to 
contemporary concerns, needs, ideas or concepts). 
In short 'the gospel' is both Jesus' message and his example of inclusivity and the 
abundant life, while it is the perceived idolatry and irrelevance of religious forms of 
speaking that prevent this gospel being heard. 
It  will  be  seen  over  the  course  of  these  investigations  that  the  relationship 
between  McFague's  theology and  the  Christian  theological  traditions  is  a  complex, 
evolving and contentious one, but though McFague's understanding of the details of the 
nature of Christianity's theological construction changes over time, a commitment to 
19 Sallie McFague TeSelle Speaking in Parables (British Edition) London: SCM Press 1975 p1
20 David J Bromell 'Sallie McFague's 'Metaphorical Theology'' Journal of the American Academy of  
Religion 61 1993 pp485-503 p485
21 The concept of 'root-metaphor' is discussed in more detail later.  For now it is sufficient to understand 
it as an attempt to distil a network of inter-related idea into one central  and controlling metaphorical 
image, model or concept from which the larger complex of ideas is derived.   
22 Although a whole range of paradigm-defining concepts or 'virtues' are introduced throughout her 
work, e.g. Love, grace, openness, these two are controlling of all the others in that they provide their 
locus (inclusivity) and direction (abundance).  We should note here also that this progression from 
exemplar to metaphorical model to abstract value is a typical signature of McFague’s work.  This is 
explored more fully in Chapter 3.
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this  particular  understanding of  the person and work of Jesus remains an important 
constant. It is also important to the aims of our enquiries that it is noted from the outset 
that McFague desires to place herself  within the Christian tradition, rather than in any 
other relationship to it (e.g. as opposed to only being a critic of it).  Despite many of her 
views on Christianity as it  is  commonly and traditionally presented,  she has set  for 
herself  a  task  that  is  in  essence  apologetic23.   Despite  her  rejection  of  a  Barthian 
theology, she is still concerned with Christian proclamation.  Therefore the relationship 
between her thought and Christian theology more generally is a key point of focus for 
us.   
b)  In her search for a relevant but non-idolatrous way of speaking about God, McFague 
places much emphasis on the important role of metaphor in religious (and all) language. 
For her, metaphor (which is a bringing together of two apparently dissimilar entities and 
their associated meanings  by the recognition of a previously unseen similarity) is held 
not just to  describe reality,  but to  shape and  limit reality as it  is experienced.  This 
shaping  is  held  to  occur  both  at  the  deep,  personal  level  where  available  language 
determines what may be thought,  but also on a cultural level where common metaphors 
influence the ways that society acts.
Consequently, she reasons that the failings, as she sees them, of the Christian 
tradition to make the gospel heard or to make it effective in addressing the issues of our 
time to practical effect, have their roots in its use of language, particularly because of a 
failure to appreciate the nature and usefulness of metaphor.  
23 See in particular her extended defence of a reforming (as opposed to a revolutionary) posture towards 
Christianity in Metaphorical Theology p152-167.  We might also note her own self-designation as a 
Anglican Christian, for example at http://www.vst.edu/main/people/faculty/mcfague as accessed 
8/5/12, 
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c)  As a result of this apparently simple yet fundamental revision to religious language, 
McFague's reworking of the theological project is comprehensive; looking at what is 
asked, how it  is  asked, how answers are framed and communicated,  and with what 
intended purpose.    
However, her approach suggests a natural focus for theology.  In an article for 
Christian  Century,24  McFague  acknowledges  that  answering  'why  are  we  here' 
questions is very difficult.  Instead she suggests that we concentrate on 'here' and ask 
'what is here like?' and 'what is it like to be here?'  She is of course aware that questions 
concerning  the  nature  of  reality  cannot  be  entirely  independent  from  questions 
concerning the ultimate meaning, purpose or origin of reality,  because our beliefs about 
why we and our context exist, will influence how we conceive of ourselves in relation to 
that context and therefore what we perceive that context to be.  Notwithstanding this, 
she  does  at  least  wish  to  suggest  a  change of  focus  from 'why'  to  'what'  questions 
concerning reality.  
d) Therefore, rather than focusing on models of God's relationship with the world that 
are essentially about the nature of God (e.g. God as Creator), she suggests a change to 
models that are principally intended to articulate the nature of the world, in the light of 
God's relationship to it.  Of choosing between competing models she says, 'The question 
is not which is true or false but which is appropriate to our day.'25   
Consequently,  while  there  is,  over  the  course  of  her  work,  an  increasingly 
important role for religious experience in her epistemology, 'experience' is primarily a 
24 Sallie McFague 'Intimate Creation: God's Body, Our Home' in Christian Century March 13-20 2002. 
Although this is a recent article, it makes explicit an approach to religious epistemology that is 
discernible in her earliest work in which she is highly conscious of the limits of human language in 
expressing the nature of divine being. 
25 Sallie McFague Models of God: Theology for an ecological, nuclear age. (British Edition) London: 
SCM Press 1988 p xiii (emphasis added).  The criteria for determining appropriateness, along with a 
substantial discussion of the criteria for the assessment of a theology can be found in chapter 3 below, 
especially sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
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secular phenomenon, and the task of theology is descriptive rather than explanatory.  It 
is about 'the way that the world is' and 'the way that the world should be' rather than 
why in an ultimate sense (for example, in terms of divine agency) it is that way.  
e)   'The way that the world is and should be' has become increasingly of concern for 
McFague.   In  her  earlier  work,  the  exclusion,  conscious  or  unconscious,  of  certain 
groups,  and  especially  women,  from  many  spheres,  and  the  religious  sphere  in 
particular, was the central  concern.   Abundance and inclusivity were therefore to be 
sought through the reconstructing of religious language as it impacted these groups.  To 
this  concern,  time has  added for McFague a concern with the nuclear  capability of 
nations to end life on earth and the more general threat to life (and thus to abundance)  
represented  by environmental  damage.   Thus  the  task  of  'making  the  gospel  heard' 
became more specifically the task of harnessing the power of metaphor to bring about 
the changes of language and,  consequently,  changes of thought,  that  are required to 
effect a change of practice in relation to Creation.  As she puts it:
'The purpose of theology is to glorify God by reflecting on how we might live  
better on the earth.'26'
This  move  from  the  evangelical  to  the  ethical  should  be  seen  as  flowing 
naturally from her understanding of discipleship and the Christian life at many levels. 
For  her,  right  belief  is  only valuable,  indeed only validated,  by right  action.   What 
begins with personal and communal confession must end in transformation at a 'cosmic' 
level.  It is in fact the natural extension of her concern with inclusivity and flourishing 
within particular individuals and sections of society, that this should ultimately emerge 
as a vision for the flourishing of all.
26 Life Abundant p25 (emphasis added).
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McFague's work, for all its increasing vision and development over time, always 
remains a methodologically focussed and consistent project, underpinned by the five 
features  just  noted.   This  focus  is  what  makes  a  contribution  to  such a  broad task 
possible  (and  she  is  always  aware  of  the  necessary  limits  of  one  theologian's 
contribution), and it is also what gives her project both continuity and unity.
McFague herself makes the following statement to this effect:
'I will be interpreting ... through a narrow lens: the little bit I know, the few 
beliefs  I  hold undeniably.   For  many years I  have been aware that  most  good 
(coherent,  interesting,  plausible)  theology  grows  from  a  central  insight  –  one 
possible,  deeply  held  and  thoroughly  embodied  statement  about  God  and  the 
world.'27
Her thinking is held together at a much deeper level than simply that of general 
theme and desired outcome; as the quotes above show; it is united at the level of method 
and always directed at our underlying linguistic constructions of reality.  For example, 
in  Models  of  God, she  says  'blueprints  for  action  are  not  of  central  concern  here...
[rather] changes in consciousness.'28
The main body of  McFague's  work is  made up of  three focused and related 
projects which she followed and published more or less chronologically.  These are:
1.  The development of the method of 'Metaphorical Theology'
2.  The construction and testing of a few specific models using this approach, 
namely God as 
     Friend, Lover and Mother and the model of 'The World as God's Body'.
3.  The extension of the last of these into a systematic theology29.
27 Life Abundant p 11 
28 Models of God p xiii
29 With the publication of A New Climate for Theology in 2008 we could also add a fourth phase taking 
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Each of these projects will be examined in turn, beginning with her principal 
objections  to  some  contemporary  theology,  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  key, 
controlling concepts of 'Metaphor' and 'Parable'.
1.3 Idolatry and irrelevance.
As  mentioned  earlier,  religious  language  for  McFague,  runs  two  risks, 
irrelevance and idolatry.  One may be said to be saying too little, the other saying too 
much.  
Idolatry is the charge that McFague levels against the approach that tries to say 
too much, that which identifies speech  about God with the actual nature  of God in a 
literal  (i.e.  naively  realist)  fashion30.   She  roots  this  objection  both  in  the  Hebraic 
tradition of the God who cannot be depicted by any image and who cannot be named, 
and also in an understanding of God who, as the source and sum of all being, cannot be 
referred to directly or modelled exactly by means of parts of that being31. Further, her 
understanding of language in general, which is a non-foundationalist form of critical 
realism, where language, experience and reality are inextricably bound up, and there is 
no access to uninterpreted reality but only traditioned experience and views of reality, 
would make such an 'idolatrous' theology impossible32.  
She sees this idolatrous tendency not as being innate to the tradition with which 
she engages (arguing that early cultures avoided it by reasoning and speaking much 
in the ten years up to the present.  This period has seen McFague apply a broad critique to the theories 
our society deploys in its self-understanding.  In the light of the discussions that follow in Chapter 2 it 
could be argued that these four stages of her career roughly correlate with the four stages of 
theological construction that she herself argues for, focussing primarily on images, models, concepts 
and theories in turn,  
30 Metaphorical Theology p4
31 Ibid. p194
32 Ibid. p131ff
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more symbolically than we do33), but as deriving from a modern fear of relativism and 
plurality  and  a  loss  of  a  sacramental  mentality  in  contemporary  thought.   (This 
sacramental mentality, she argues, depended upon classical notions of analogy deriving 
from the Procession of Being.  The current age, she contends, is in fact characterised by 
a scepticism 'that anything is related to anything else'.)34  
These positions  can be summarised as  describing  what  she calls  her  'radical 
monotheism'.35  While  this  position  immediately  opens  up  creative  possibilities  for 
theology,  since  it  allows  for  plurality  and  new  language,  it  also  poses  significant 
questions  about  the  status  of  tradition  and scripture,  and the  referent  and  mode  of 
reference of religious discourse which will require clarification later.  These questions 
of relationship to tradition and of the possibilities for truth and reference in religious 
language will  emerge as central.   McFague's  approach also highlights contemporary 
problems in  epistemology and the  philosophy of  language concerning the nature of 
reference  and  the  difficulties  post-modern  culture  has  in  unifying  and  connecting 
thought at a deep level.
 This  charge  of  idolatry  levelled  by  McFague  against  much  historic  and 
contemporary theology has understandably been controversial.  It has also on occasions 
been misunderstood.  For example Helm says:
'Suppose Mr Jones believes that God is literally all knowing.  Why does it follow 
that he must be idolatrously worshipping the proposition  God is all-knowing or 
the concept of all-knowingness?'36 
33 Ibid. p12
34 Speaking in Parables p6  It is important to set this remark alongside her stress in later works on the 
organic interrelatedness of all things.  Although McFague rejects the classical formulation of the 
analogy of being she is in fact keen to assert interrelatedness and a holistic approach over and against 
individualism and reductionism.  Because this organic emphasis emerges later in her work than her 
stress on disconnectedness Peters regards this as a shift from an essentially modernist concern to a 
post-modernist one and there is very likely much truth in this. Ted Peters 'McFague's Metaphors' 
Dialog 27 1988 pp131-140 p140 n49
35 Metaphorical Theology p129
36 Paul Helm 'Review of Metaphorical Theology' Religious Studies 20 1984 pp315-316.  He is followed 
on this point by D J Brommell 'Sallie McFague's 'Metaphorical Theology'' Journal of the American 
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The  confusion  here  is  two  fold,  concerning  the  term  'literal'  and  the  term 
'worshipping'.  McFague uses 'idolatry' in a sense somewhat distinct from its biblical 
root  as  misdirected  worship.   Idolatry  for  her  is  not  directing  worship  towards  a 
statement,  but holding a statement to be true in a particular way – in a way which 
assumes a special  status for the statement,  a status from which other statements are 
excluded. 
Helm is correct in directing attention to the use of the term 'literal' as the source 
of such confusions when he says,
'One suspects that literalism is often conflated with the ideal of objective truth 
about God, and with the possibility of knowledge of such truth.'37
To avoid such confusions here,  the term 'literal' needs a little further exploration.
 While it is true that, as we shall see in detail later, McFague has substantial 
objections to the idea of 'objective truth', this is not the core of her argument against 
what she calls literalism.  A literal statement is not one that refers, over and against a 
metaphorical statement as one that does not refer.  Rather it is probable that McFague 
would agree with Lakoff and Turner's definition of literal (itself later than McFague's 
writings on the subject), in which literal usage is to be understood in terms of semantic 
autonomy.  
A concept can be said to be semantically autonomous to the extent that it can be 
understood without the use of metaphors in their strict sense (and also without the use of 
irony, metonymy and so on).  That is:
'Concepts are semantically autonomous if they are meaningful completely on their 
own terms...Such concepts are grounded in ... experience [and] are not mind free. 
Academy of Religion 61 1993 pp485-503 p495
37 Helm p315
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They are not somehow given to us directly by the objective world.   They are 
instead grounded in the patterns of experience that we routinely live.'38
Lakoff and Turner offer the example of our understanding of a dog in terms of 
four legs, a wagging tail and a cold wet nose as an example of a partially semantically 
autonomous concept. ('Partially' because a dog can also be understood metaphorically 
e.g. as 'best friend'.) 
Thus we can see that literal language is not to be understood as objective, with 
all other language having some other sense (since no language is simply objective), 
rather literal language is language that expresses a concept that 
'can  be  understood and  structured  on  its  own terms  –  without  making  use  of 
structure imported from a completely different conceptual domain.'39
Now 'God' (both in cognitive semantics and in McFague's work), as with all 
terms  that  designate  abstract  concepts,  is  held  to  be  entirely non-autonomous 
semantically and this is crucial.  If the concept 'God' was partially autonomous then it 
would follow that one could construct autonomous (literal) descriptions of God which 
could  not  be  overturned  and  to  which  all  other  accounts  would  have  to  be  held 
accountable  (the  equivalent  of  a  legs,  tail,  wet  nose  description  of  God –  that  is  a 
description of God derived from 'routine experience').
McFague's  desire  to  avoid  idolatry  then,  is  a  statement  of  the  fact  that  the 
linguistic  expression  'God'  communicates  a  concept  which  is  semantically  non-
autonomous ('semantically dependent'), and therefore that literal statements about God 
are methodologically impossible.40
38 George Lakoff and Mark Turner More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor London: 
University of Chicago Press 1989 pp111, 113 
39 Ibid. p57
40 Two confusions are thus to be avoided.  Firstly McFague is not advocating a merely projectionist view 
of religious language because her understanding of literal usage is not predicated upon any stance on 
an objectivist theory of reference.  Secondly the semantic dependency of God is a statement 
concerning our knowledge and language, not God's being.  Since it has no direct bearing upon the 
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Therefore to defend McFague against Helm’s example cited above, one might 
imagine  that  she  would  say that  her  objection  is  not  that  Mr Jones  is  misdirecting 
worship at a concept of all-knowingness. Rather it is just that she wishes to point out to 
Mr Jones that ‘knowing’ when applied to God is not the same ‘everyday’ knowing that 
you or I engage in; the term ‘knowing’ is not semantically autonomous when applied to 
God.  God, lacking it is presumed, the physical neural structures which give rise to the 
human experience of knowing, does not ‘know’ in the same sense that we know.  The 
‘knowing’ that  God  does  is  metaphorical,  in  that  this  is  a  semantically  dependent 
description  of  God’s  activity  and  nature,  a  non-literal  description.   Therefore,  as  a 
semantically dependent description, it cannot be held as an absolute truth in the light of 
which other descriptions may ultimately be judged.41   
The second charge McFague levels against much use of religious language is its 
'irrelevance'.  This perceived irrelevance is multivalent.  Firstly there is the significant 
cultural gap between the biblical source of this language and the current culture.  Terms 
like 'principalities'  and 'demons',  once common currency,  are  so no longer,  and this 
inhibits the appreciation of the meaning of religious speaking in these categories.  On 
this level religious language can be generally excluding42.
Of  much more concern,  however,  is  the case of specific  exclusions  whereby 
neither the language nor experiences of particular groups are taken into account.  For 
McFague the language and experience of women is particularly excluded43.  This is not 
question of God's causal or ontological autonomy from the world, it does not lead, of necessity, to 
pantheism.
41 That is, the term 'knowing' is being used neither univocally or equivocally across the two contexts. 
McFague  would see this as metaphorical, as asserting that knowing both 'is and is not' the same for us 
and for God. We will see later that she prefers this account of similarity in difference to a traditionally 
analogical one, but the point here is that on either account, God talk is not to be understood to be 
literal, in the sense of semantically autonomous.
42 Metaphorical Theology p8
43 Ibid. p162
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solely because of the predominance of masculine imagery and terminology, but also 
because of the inherent patriarchy she perceives within the structures of its thought at a 
conceptual level.  These wrongs of power, dualism and exclusion are precisely what she 
seeks to address.
A second source of irrelevance is that the concerns which theological language 
is directed towards are, again, largely for cultural reasons, no longer the concerns of this 
age.   Questions  of  sin  and  atonement  are  not  nearly  as  significant  in  the  public 
consciousness  as  questions  of  environmental  sustainability,  for  example.   Theology, 
McFague argues, must speak into a context and address the concerns of that context, if 
it is truly to be 'good news'.   To take McFague's own argument and follow it a little 
deeper however, it could be argued that this sense of irrelevance is a product of the 
secularisation of the thought  (if  not always  the practice)  of  western societies.   It  is 
because  the  narratives  and  metaphors  of  historical  Christianity  are  no  longer  so 
formative  in  western  discourse and self  understanding that  the  questions  asked and 
answered  by these  narratives  are  not  the  ones  asked  and  answered  by our  culture. 
Therefore an important part of the task of the theologian is not only the restatement of 
traditional questions in a relevant fashion, but also the identification and interpretation 
of the root metaphors of their cultures and the questions that arise out of them, and in 
turn an attempt to answer these questions using the resources of the Christian Tradition. 
This extension of the task is one that McFague does appear to undertake, if only in the 
latter phases of her published work. 
Meanwhile,  her  use  of  these  differing  senses  of  'irrelevance',  to  mean either 
outdated in terms of world-view, or exclusive to individuals or groups, or addressing 
non-culturally  relevant  questions,  result  in  a  certain  lack  of  clarity  in  McFague's 
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terminology especially  in  relation  to  the  status  of  religious  language  over  time,  as 
Sontag illustrates44.  She frequently uses terms like 'anachronistic', 'not for our day' and 
'outmoded' to dispatch traditional theological motifs, and therefore it can appear in her 
work that 'irrelevant' and 'out of date'' are one and the same.  In her defence, this link 
between relevance and time may be explained (if not quite warranted) by the cultural 
factors above, and therefore Sontag's suggestion that it is to be linked to a presumed 
Hegelian  metaphysic  and  an  unexpressed  theory  of  the  evolution  of  knowledge  on 
McFague's  part  is  unnecessary.   However  Sontag  is  correct  in  cautioning  that  the 
concerns  and  answers  of  the  past  are  not  automatically  to  be  deemed  irrelevant. 
Further, he correctly asserts that our rejection of past interpretative categories: 
 'depends on how these terms are interpreted and reinterpreted...Our crucial terms 
all  too  often  have  no  one  agreed meaning,  so  that  we cannot  respond to  her 
rejection of these categories without a thorough catalogue of all the ways in which 
they have and might be interpreted and reinterpreted. And by implication, is it 
intended that no scheme which reinterprets this classical set of concepts can be 
allowed into any theological perspective?'45
We will see in the course of what follows that past interpretive categories, and 
the concerns alleged to be those 'of a past age', cannot be so readily dispensed with.  In 
this regard, McFague's tendency to conflate 'irrelevant' with 'the past' will be seen to be 
regrettable.  
Meanwhile,  in summary, McFague argues that what is needed in response to 
what she sees as the idolatry and irrelevance of religious language, is a way of religious 
44 Frederick Sontag 'The Metaphysics of McFague' Sophia vol 37 no 1 1998 pp117-139 p123.  See also 
Frederick Sontag 'Metaphysical Non-Sequitur: Sallie McFague's Metaphorical Theology and Imagery 
for God' Asia Journal of Theology 11(1) 1997
45 Ibid. p20-35
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and  theological  speaking  which,  firstly,  is  able  to  unite  disparate  concepts  and 
phenomena in terms of God while avoiding a simple identification between these and 
God, and secondly, a way of speaking which is able to hold together genuine unity and 
radical differences between these disparate elements simultaneously, and thirdly a way 
of doing so that makes its meaning and interpretation as available and accessible as 
possible.  
To aid this accessibility McFague holds that theology should, where possible, 
use 'mundane' imagery, imagery which is as familiar to as great a breadth of human 
experience as possible.  Ultimately of course, any theology that is contextual enough to 
be useful will not be universally accessible in the same way to all, but the point here is  
simply to find a way of speaking which maximises accessibility and relevance.  
Finally,  such  language  is  not  to  be  merely  descriptive  but  should  have 
transformational  possibilities;  an ability to  transform understanding and therefore  to 
motivate and direct action. Such a form of speaking, she argues, is provided by looking 
to metaphor and parable, and it is to each of these that attention is now turned.
  
1.4  Metaphor.
McFague's thinking on the qualities and functions of metaphor inform the whole 
of her theology, lending her early project its name of 'Metaphorical Theology'.
It is important to note from the outset that, in her understanding, the definition of 
a  metaphor  is  not  a  formal,  grammatical  one.   She  rejects  a  substitutable  view of 
metaphor,  that  is  a  view that  sees  a  metaphor  as  an  illustrative  literary  device,  an 
ornamentation.46  A substitutable view would hold that something said using a metaphor 
46 This is of course not an original view but, as Peters notes,  (op. cit. p131) she is heavily dependent on 
31
could,  in  principle,  just  as  well  have  been said  without  the  metaphor,  reducing the 
metaphor to at best a flowery way of communicating and at worst an unnecessarily 
complicated  way  of  stating  something  much  simpler.   Contrary  to  this,  McFague 
follows a view that regards a metaphorical statement as an exemplar, as embodying the 
meaning, indeed being the meaning of what it speaks of.  Metaphors are, she holds, 
unsubstitutable47.  That is, the metaphor is vital to the meaning of what is being said and 
this meaning cannot be restated apart from the metaphor without this meaning being 
changed  and/or  losing  something  in  the  process.   This  derives  from the  following 
understanding of metaphor in terms of its unique properties and functions.
A metaphor, for McFague, is a bringing together of two apparently dissimilar 
entities and their associated matrices of meaning – the web of related information that is 
connected to them – by the recognition and/or creation of a hitherto unseen similarity, or 
correspondence, expressed as the evident use of a term out of its natural context48.  Her 
favoured example is 'war is a game of chess'.49  In this metaphor, two very different 
entities, war and chess, are juxtaposed in a way which is not simple identification. Such 
identification  would  clearly  be  absurd  and  so  does  not  need  to  be  included  in  the 
construction of the metaphor by the inclusion of a qualifier (e.g. 'war is a bit like chess'). 
In contrast, the nature of the construction suggests a degree of  hitherto unrecognised 
similarity despite real differences between the two.
However both war and chess have associated experiences, concepts and images 
of their own; we could say that they have both structure and texture.  For McFague, the 
metaphor functions by using the structure of one domain (usually the better known or 
‘source’) as a 'grid' or 'screen' through which the other (‘target’) domain is viewed and 
the philosophical debates on metaphor in the 60's and 70's. 
47 Metaphorical Theology p50
48 Ibid. p36
49 Ibid. p37
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interpreted.  (Here she is dependent particularly upon the work of philosopher  Max 
Black who uses the image of viewing the stars through a smoked-glass screen with lines 
etched into it.  Some stars are seen through the lines, others are screened out by the 
smoked glass.  The lines allow particular stars and star patterns to be seen that would 
otherwise not be noticed, however the pattern created is not just present in the stars, it is 
dependent upon the lines drawn, and therefore is only really present in the interaction 
between the stars and the screen.)50
Since  the  viewed  domain  is  usually  less  well  known,  the  creation  of  the 
metaphor provides fresh insight by allowing exploration of this domain in terms of the 
features of the better known (while of course certain features are hidden or obscured by 
the application of such a grid).
As an example of an effective metaphor,  I will  use the final image from the 
poem  The Moon in  Llelyn by R S  Thomas.   Though  this  example  is  not  one  that 
McFague uses  herself,  it  is  very much in  keeping with  the  spirit  of  her  work,  and 
provides an economical illustration of it (whereas McFague's own examples are chosen 
specifically to illustrate the subtleties of specific points rather than the general case)
'...Even as this moon
making its way through the earth's
cumbersome shadow, prayer, too, 
has its phases.'51
In this metaphor, the grid is provided by the source domain of 'the moon', and 
this is used to interpret the, in this context, less well understood target domain of the 
50 McFague Speaking in Parables, pp43-44 drawing on  Max Black  Models and metaphors: studies in  
language and philosophy Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1962 
51 R S Thomas, Selected Poems  London: Penguin 2003 p106 originally printed in Laboratories of the 
Spirit 1975
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experiences of prayer.  The image is clearly the juxtaposition of very different entities, 
but rests upon the perceived or intuited point of similarity: that both wax and wane.  If  
this point of similarity results in a 'shock of recognition', then, the metaphor having been 
established, the domains can begin to interact.
The concept of 'moon' carries with it a range of associations.  It has emotive 
texture, evoking images and associated feelings and memories of moonlit nights from 
romantic to chilling,  and this  ambiguity underscores the point of the poem.  It  also 
connects with religious usages of images of light and darkness and of the moon as God's 
creation  set  there  to  'rule  the  night'.52  But  the  moon  also  provides  informational 
structure.  The moon has regular, natural phases, which are entirely normal and to be 
expected.  They are caused by its relationship to the sun, the source of life and light. 
They may wane but they also wax again.  All of these have consequences for the way 
prayer,  faith and disappointment are explored in a poem which seeks to be realistic 
about the negative experiences of struggling to pray, but that also seeks to offer hope, 
comfort and acceptance.
From this brief description and example it is possible to derive many of the vital 
conditions  for  the  construction  of  a  successful  metaphor,  re-presenting  and building 
upon McFague's own observations in Speaking in Parables and Metaphorical Theology.
a) Familiarity – for a metaphor to be effective it needs to incorporate a relatively well 
known entity so that insights from this can be translated to the less well known domain. 
This  criterion  is  strongly  linked  to  one  of  the  meanings  of  what  McFague  terms 
‘irrelevance’, which were discussed above.
52 Genesis 1:3
34
b) Structure – the term used as the source domain must bring with it an understood 
structure which can be applied fruitfully to the target term.  For example it is evident 
that the metaphor 'God is a Rock' introduces a relatively small web of relevant qualities 
associated with rocks, while the statement 'God is a Mother' brings a much wider range 
of experiences and information to bear.  It is also important that this structure is well 
defined, which is why concrete objects ('images') often make for better metaphors than 
generalised concepts.  For instance, McFague criticises John Macquarrie's substitution 
of  'openness'  for  'light'  in  the  metaphor  'God is  light'  on  precisely these  grounds53. 
'Openness' is too vague to be effective.  Its ill defined structure and lack of concrete 
associations make it more likely to confuse than illuminate.
c) Tension  – a successful metaphor is based on difference as much as on similarity. 
Unlike a simile or simple comparison where the emphasis is on likeness, with metaphor 
it is the distance between the domains that provides the useful insights.  Thus there is a 
weakness in her favoured 'war is a game of chess' metaphor in that chess is itself an 
abstraction of war, and so similarities are to be expected and are not novel.  Similarly 
'lions are tigers' is a much less illuminating statement than 'lions are kings'.  
The crucial feature of metaphors for McFague's purposes is their 'is and is not' 
quality.   They  speak  simultaneously  of  connection  and  disconnection,  unity  and 
diversity, similarity and difference and hold these together in active relationship.  Hence 
they offer the possibility of meeting the criteria of uniting entities in a reality that is not 
naively sacramental  and is  distrustful  of any attempt to  unify.   Thus metaphors are 
dialectical  rather  than  dualistic.   They  preserve  the  contradiction  between  different 
entities  and  their  unique  identities  as  well  as  asserting  their  genuine  unity.   This 
53  Sallie McFague Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (British edition) 
London: SCM Press, 1983
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provides a conceptual and aesthetic unity between McFague's method and ethic, uniting 
form and content in a way that is characteristic of much of her work.
This is in accord with her own aspirations, as she says
'Theology should be metaphorical both in content and in method, for if the main 
characteristic of metaphor – its tension – is lost, then Christianity’s root-metaphor is lost 
as well, for it is precisely the inability to possess God’s love that is at the heart of the 
relationship with God exemplified in the kingdom'.54
Our definition and example also highlight some of the properties of metaphors which 
give them their unique status.  Again this presentation, while not McFague's own, is 
consistent with hers and draws out those elements that are significant to our attempts 
here to evaluate her own metaphors later.
d) Expression – metaphors are capable of conveying emotive content in a way that pure 
conceptual or technical language is not.  This is because a well-chosen metaphor uses a 
commonly  experienced  reality  which  will  have  experiential  and  hence  emotional 
associations, but these are placed in an unfamiliar context which causes them to be re-
examined and encourages emotional exploration of the new domain.
e)  Communication – Because a  metaphor  also  uses  the  associated  structure  of  the 
source domain, and 'lends' it to the target domain under consideration, it is capable of 
communication as well  as  expression.   Because this  structure can be applied to  the 
target domain by any or all of tacit, empirical and logical methods, metaphors carry 
cognitive content but can do so in many different ways.  For example the metaphor war 
is  chess  lends  war  the  informational  structure  of  the  chess  game  with  its  highly 
54  Metaphorical Theology p110
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developed system of rules and strategies.  Meanwhile 'prayer is the phases of the moon' 
brings empirical observations of the moon to bear on experiences of prayer.  However in 
both cases, specific, informational claims are being made, beyond a simple appeal to an 
emotional response.
f) New knowledge – A consequence of the unsubstitutablity of metaphors, coupled with 
their  communicative  ability,  is  that  they do not  simply describe  reality  but  can  re-
describe it as the target domain is explored.  In other words, as the new metaphor is 
applied  and  the  target  domain  is  seen  afresh  through  it,  the  target  domain  is  seen 
differently.  This results in a transformed understanding which can genuinely be called 
'new knowledge',  since without the metaphor,  or apart  from the metaphor,  the same 
level  of  understanding,  both  of  the  unknown domain  and  the  connections  between 
domains, would not have been reached.  Thus metaphors have an active epistemological 
function as a path to knowledge, not just as a means to communicate knowledge. This 
new knowledge arises within the speaker or hearer of the metaphor, McFague argues, as 
a largely intuitive process – as a flash of insight, brought about through looking at the 
familiar  through a  new ‘grid’ and therefore perceiving it  differently.   In  this  sense, 
metaphors  may  be  revelatory,  but  it  should  be  understood  that  this  revelation  for 
McFague is not to be thought of as pre-existing knowledge being transmitted to human 
minds  from  beyond  their  consciousness.   Rather  it  is  the  ability  of  those  minds, 
themselves a part of the world, to discover and create new insight for themselves.
g)Transformation of both domains – This is the point at which our presentation here 
departs  from  McFague’s  own  views.  I  have  just  argued  that  metaphor  has  a 
transformative aspect; that is the interaction between domains changes the way that the 
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target domain is seen, this is the purpose of constructing the metaphor.  However, for a 
metaphor to function, indeed for it to be conceived in the first place, a degree of prior 
knowledge of the target domain is required.  (If we knew nothing of war, the metaphor 
‘war is chess’ would become a simple identification of the two with each other, it is our 
prior knowledge of war that supplies the crucial ‘war is not chess’ which is required for 
the  metaphorical  dialectic  to  be  established).   Now McFague argues  that  inevitably 
some of this already known content of the target domain will 'bleed' back into the source 
domain, therefore if we use the metaphor 'chess' for 'war', in McFague's view it is not 
only our understanding of war that is changed, but also, although to a lesser extent, our 
understanding of chess that is influenced by its association with war.  
Now this an important motivator and justification for McFague's iconoclastic 
streak.  On the basis of this theory of metaphor, which Max Black calls 'interactionist'55, 
McFague argues that Mary Daly's assertion that 'If God is male then the male is God56 is 
correct.57  McFague says,
'God has been modelled in masculine images (excluding feminine ones) and, as a 
consequence,  the  notion  has  arisen  that  men  have  godlike  attributes  ...  The 
interactive character of models means that men not only model God, but God in 
return,  bestows  divine  qualities  on  men...  The  way to  make  [the  point]  most 
sharply is  to  state  the obverse:  women do not model  God and,  hence,  do not 
become 'named' by God.'58
This is  McFague's  most  controversial  assertion from the perspective of more 
recent cognitive linguistic studies of metaphor.  DesCamp and Sweetser have applied 
55 M. Black  'More about metaphor', in A. Ortony Metaphor and Thought Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1979.  McFague does not use the term 'interactionist' herself, but follows Black 
closely on the properties of metaphor, so his designation is appropriate for her approach as for his 
own.
56 Mary Daly Beyond God the Father p19 cited in McFague Metaphorical Theology p147.
57 This despite the assertion that Daly's work 'verges on madness' at times! Metaphorical Theology p159
58 Metaphorical Theology pp147, 149
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this approach explicitly to McFague's views on metaphor, and support her position on 
most of the relevant points previously discussed, but they disagree on this one, namely 
'interaction'.59
They say
'Directionality is the observation that the relationship between the two inputs, the 
source and target domains, is not symmetrical. Inferences are transferred in one 
direction only, from the source to the target. For instance, the statement, 'The lamp 
loves the door' does not mean that the lamp is physically close to the door. While 
the language of physical proximity can be used to describe emotional intimacy, 
the  language  of  emotional  intimacy  is  not  understood  to  describe  physical 
proximity. Though there are some metaphors where the source and target can be 
reversed (GOD IS FATHER, FATHER IS GOD), such inversions represent two 
different  metaphors,  not  a  single  metaphor  which  transfers  inferences  in  both 
directions Different inferences are mapped in the metaphorical concept GOD IS 
FATHER (e.g., God provides all I need) than in FATHER IS GOD (e.g., He thinks 
he’s infallible.)'60
Thus, according to DesCamp and Sweetser, the modelling of God as male and 
the modelling of the male as God are two separate processes.  Accepting one does not 
logically entail accepting the other.  DesCamp and Sweetser illustrate this difference by 
representing the two metaphors discussed above diagrammatically:61
59 Mary Therese DesCamp and Eve E. Sweetser 'Metaphors for God: Why and How Do Our Choices 
Matter for Humans? The Application of Contemporary Cognitive Linguistics Research to the Debate 
on God and Metaphor' Pastoral Psychology Vol. 53, No. 3, January 2005 pp203-238 They also 
disagree with McFague on the issue of 'dead metaphors', on which see later.
60 DesCamp and Sweetser p221
61 Ibid.
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(A fuller discussion of this complex presentation follows in Chapter 6. 
At this point all that needs to be observed is the fact that the two diagrams are not 
identical,  illustrating that  the metaphor is  not  simply reversible.   ‘God is  Father’ is 
clearly not simply the reverse of ‘Father is God’.)
Now, DesCamp and Sweetser argue,
'metaphor  at  both  the  primary  and  the  complex  level  normally  involves  the 
suppression of certain features of the target domain.'62 
That is to say that the metaphor deliberately suppresses some beliefs about what it is 
attempting to describe in order to create the comparison.  For example ‘war is chess’ 
requires suppression of many of the features of war that make it so unpredictable, in 
order to call attention to the perceived underlying tactical structure suggested while the 
metaphor is under consideration.
McFague would agree that this suppression of features of the target domain takes 
62 p222
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place.  In fact,  new metaphors are called for, she argues, precisely in order to suppress 
common associations surrounding the term God.  
However this suppression implies that
'The target is considered by means of the categories present in the source domain, 
not vice-versa.'63
In other words, the suppression of the target domain's structure means that this 
structure cannot significantly influence the structure of the source domain, unless a new 
metaphor is formed reversing the process.  That is, when we conceive of war as chess, 
we  do  not  immediately  think  of  chess  as  violence,  messy  and  unpredictable  by 
association, because these are the very features of war that are being suppressed in the 
creation of the metaphor.  In fact, as DesCamp and Sweetser were able to demonstrate 
in controlled experiments, the ‘bleed’ effect is very small indeed. 
This is not to say that the effect of prolonged usage of God the Father as a 
metaphor  for  the  divine  has  had  no  influence  upon  cultural  understandings  of 
fatherhood, only to say that such influences are not the direct, logical and/or automatic 
result of creating the metaphor 'God the Father'.
Instead DesCamp and Sweetser argue that,
'The problem is that the frequent use of GOD IS FATHER puts it into the cultural  
currency,  where  it  can  be  utilized  and  re-worked  in  cognitive  blending.  The 
metaphor  creates  a  rich  generic  space  about  power  relationships  and  positive 
authority – as does the metaphor for God as king—that can be, and is, used for 
other blends... GOD IS ROCK or GOD IS FORTRESS does not mean that we 
deify stones or citadels. It is not the presence of the GOD IS FATHER metaphor 
per se which has led to the deification of fathers; it is the statement’s existence as 
63 Ibid.
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a stable mental concept in cultural currency.'64
Consequently, and this is of considerable relevance in the light of McFague's 
project, 
'changing the metaphors we use for God only works in so far as those metaphors 
begin to exert influence at the level of popular culture. ...The long-used metaphors 
have become cultural currency, exerting influence at pre-cognitive levels.'65
These modifications have several consequences for McFague. Firstly, while they 
support McFague's attempts to break the cultural hegemony of particular models, they 
also contradict any attempts to reject these models entirely, since, I would argue, it is the 
nature of their  use rather than their actual  existence itself which causes the problems 
McFague wishes to solve. This is not to avoid the central thrust of McFague's critique of 
the tradition, which is that masculine imagery predominates almost exclusively, it is to 
question the mechanism through which this domination has occurred.  I would argue 
that  the issue to  be addressed within Christian theology is  the historic  exclusion of 
models that would add insight and include human identity and experience (and that of 
women in particular) more fully by the cultural dominance of models such as 'God the 
Father' and the powerful role these models play in mainstream systematic theologies. 
But this is not to say that any use of masculine metaphors, new or old, for God leads of 
logical necessity to the deification of the male.66
Secondly, it is similarly the case that simply forming new metaphors (such as 
God the Mother) will not in itself immediately rectify the problem.  Pattison makes this 
point in a passing reference to McFague's work saying
'McFague ... proposes different metaphors and models of God as Mother, Lover 
64 Ibid..
65 p223
66 The potential for a hermeneutic recovery and renewed role within traditional Christianity for the 
specific case of 'God the Father' as a metaphor is returned to in Chapter 3.6 below.
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and Friend. These,  she thinks are more suitable for theology in an ecological, 
nuclear age.  Maybe so, but most people alive today who have been exposed to the 
Christian  religious  tradition  have  encountered  God  through  the  images  of  the 
dominant monarchical tradition as contained in the scriptures, creeds, liturgies and 
prayers of the historic churches... Aspects of this tradition have helped to shape 
and perpetuate human shame and it is these that are explored here.'67
Now Pattison is in sympathy with McFague's aims, and is critical of traditional 
Christian metaphors from his own standpoint, but it is clear that he does not regard the 
remedy as being as simple as constructing new models68.  
If  this observation is combined with those just made regarding the interaction 
theory, it can be seen that there is a need to relate new models to existing ones, and in 
the process to reinterpret them, rather than substituting one set of models for an old one. 
Our  existing  beliefs  concerning God are  culturally  entrenched  and therefore  cannot 
simply be replaced, and it is cultural change that McFague is trying to effect.  
It can further be argued that it is likely that this entrenchment is at least in part 
due  to  the  validity  (i.e.  their  being  in  accordance  with  McFague's  own criteria)  of 
existing metaphors in certain situations.  Unless we are willing to chalk their use up 
entirely to historic patterns of male dominance and patriarchy, some degree of validity 
or usefulness must be presumed and consequently identified and preserved.
We have also seen that, due to our rejection of an interactionist position, existing 
metaphors, even if based in masculine imagery, are not dangerous in their consequences 
for  our  understanding  of  the  masculine  in  and  of  themselves  (which  is  fortunate 
otherwise the same undesirable outcomes would apply to the feminine in McFague's 
new female-based  models)  because  they do  not  automatically  or  easily  lead  to  the 
67 Stephen Pattison Shame Cambridge: CUP 2000 p235 
68 This is, however, part of his solution as his remarks on pp305-6 indicate.
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deification of the source of the metaphor.  
Further,  although  suppressed  in  the  formation  of  a  new metaphor,  a  certain 
amount of existing belief concerning the nature of God is required to establish the new 
metaphor in the first place.
Therefore Peters is correct in highlighting the possibilities of reinterpreting and 
re-examining existing beliefs,  a  process he calls  hermeneutical  recovery (and which 
McFague only cautiously allows as a future possibility).  He argues for this by drawing 
on the work of Ricoeur, himself one of McFague's prime sources, saying,   
'Ricoeur especially presses the point that symbols ...  are polyvalent and multi-
leveled  in  meaning,  so  that  to  reduce  the  divine  father  as  McFague  does  to 
'dominance and providence' and 'merit' is to literalize it arbitrarily and to close it 
off.  In  contrast  to  McFague,  Ricoeur's  method  is  to  explore  the  penumbra  of 
connotations of the symbol to draw out further richness of meaning. Among other 
things, Ricoeur stresses the suffering of the divine father who can no longer be 
conceived as “an enemy to his sons; love, solicitude and pity carry him beyond 
dominion and severity.” Thus, the Ricoeur method of hermeneutical retrieval is 
quite different from McFague's metaphorical complementarity.'69
However,  while  this  method  of  retrieval  may  well  be  'quite  different'  from 
McFague's heuristic approach, it may also be possible to combine the two in that the 
process of creating new metaphors casts considerable light upon existing ones.  The 
difference is primarily in that McFague is more interested in exploring new metaphors 
than reworking the old.  This lack of a synthesis and reconciliation of metaphors does 
though remain a significant area of weakness.
To be fair to McFague she does appear aware of this at least in the form in which 
Boeve raises it when he suggests that the metaphor 'God as Father' will be structured 
69 Peters p133
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differently in a post-patriarchal context than a patriarchal one,70  a possibility which 
would be consistent with McFague's own position.
In summary then,  McFague depends upon the interaction theory of metaphor 
which  this  analysis  has  rejected  in  favour  of  a  more  complex  causal  relationship 
between our religious metaphors and our understanding of their source domain.  This 
relationship is one of gradual cultural change in the understanding of that domain (e.g. 
'fathers') brought about by the continued use of a particular metaphorical term (e.g 'God 
the Father'),  rather than a process of a changed understanding  of the domain being 
immediately generated simply by the formation of the metaphor itself.  If God is seen as 
male in the  metaphors of a society, then a society may gradually come to see the male 
as God (or equally possibly, a society that already sees the male as God may choose to 
describe God in masculine terms), but the use of a masculine term for God does not, 
contra McFague, automatically in and of itself affect our understanding of maleness or 
its status.
 Similarly McFague argues that by (for example) using the metaphor 'God is 
Mother',  we not only change our understanding of God but that we also change our 
understanding of 'Mother'.  In rejecting the simplicity of this assertion (and rejecting the 
idea that our understanding of Mother changes automatically and intuitively), we have 
placed enough distance between the two domains (e.g. God and Mother) to allow the 
process of interpreting each of them to be more complex and nuanced, allowing for 
more of an interaction between many sources of insight than McFague herself does. 
The terms 'God' and 'Mother' in our presentation here can be more easily seen as each 
70  Lieven Boeve 'Linguistica ancilla Theologiae' in Kurt Feyaerts (ed.) The Bible through Metaphor and 
Translation Oxford: Peter Lang 2003 p19 cf McFague's discussion of Jesus' use of the term Father in 
Metaphorical Theology p151ff which references Ricoeur's position.  Boeve draws attention to the fact 
that the 'matrix of meaning' associated with a source domain changes over time and that consequently 
the continued use of the same term (e.g. Father) does not guarantee static meaning over time and 
neither does a change in language necessitate a change in meaning, rather a change in language could 
restore a prior meaning.
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being constructed by many contributing areas of meaning than they are in McFague's 
presentation.   This  in  turn  opens  the  door  for  both  the  need and  the  possibility  of 
relating new and existing metaphors to each other.
h)  Limits   - Metaphors,  it  must  be  remembered,  offer  only a  partial  view of  their 
subject.  It is not that a new metaphor suddenly exposes the complete truth, hitherto 
hidden.  Because of the way in which the target domain is viewed through the source 
domain, a certain price is always to be paid for the new insights gained.  By structuring 
what is seen, the grid also determines what is not seen.  In our example of the moon and 
prayer,  the  use  of  an  inanimate  grid  inevitably  screens  out  the  personal,  relational 
qualities of prayer, indeed it may trivialise and misrepresent them if associations with 
talking to the 'Man in the Moon' are introduced!
Metaphors, then, provide limited insight, and this naturally calls for a pluralistic 
approach and the need for multiple metaphors to adequately explore a target domain, 
and its connections to the rest of knowledge and experience.  This may be held to apply 
especially in the theological case if the principal domain is held to be the source and 
ground of all knowledge and experience!
This is similar to our argument above that existing metaphors should be held to 
have value.   Even in a case where a  new metaphor might  be judged to have more 
relevant insights to offer, it must be remembered that the prior metaphor also established 
connections  that  the  new metaphor  cannot.   This  is  again  an  argument  for  relating 
models  to  each  other  since  the  sum total  of  what  may be  validly  asserted  at  least 
theoretically  increases  with  the  number  of  valid  metaphors  used71.   This  is  not  to 
71 This position is supported by A Thiselton  A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion 
MI:Grand Rapids 2002  p166, drawing on Iam Ramsey Models and mystery Oxford: OUP 1964 who 
argues that multiple models are necessary to qualify each other to avoid unwanted meanings being 
draw from metaphors in isolation.  This approach Thiselton traces back as far as Tertullian (Thieselton 
The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text Carlisle: Paternoster Press 2000 
p819)
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presume that such a process of relating models and their insights to each other is trivial 
or even always possible, especially when the number of metaphors in question becomes 
large, it is only to advance the case for attempting doing so.  Therefore here again is an 
argument from the theory of metaphor for retaining a place for traditional metaphors, 
even when their current usage or interpretation is not in line with McFague's theological 
motives and aims.  In short, McFague's own views on metaphor not only legitimate the 
quest for new metaphors, they can also be seen, though she does not seen to realise this,  
to necessitate the retention of traditional metaphors, even if reinterpreted, because the 
insights contained within those traditional formulations cannot be retained precisely in 
any new construction. 
i) Indirectness– Metaphors, it has been argued above, provide genuine insight, but they 
do so indirectly because they see the primary domain not 'as it is in itself' but 'seen as'  
the source domain.  War is not revealed as war in its own essential nature, it is seen as a 
game of chess.  The poem does not offer a direct experience of prayer, only a view of it 
from the angle of the moon.
It is important to qualify the usefulness of metaphor in deriving new knowledge 
of the primary domain, especially in the religious case.   In the case of God, and bearing 
in  mind  the  condition  of  'radical  monotheism'  ('semantic  dependence'),  McFague's 
approach is severely limited in how far what it says about God can actually be held to 
refer to God in God's being.  In the case of war or prayer, we may seek access to a 
certain amount of semantically autonomous data: experience with which to assess the 
accuracy of the comparison on which the metaphor is established.  McFague would 
argue that we have no such access to God and therefore we cannot make any judgement 
about whether or not a metaphor describes what God is really like – indeed she would 
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reject such an attempt as both meaningless and idolatrous.  As the first phase of her 
work progresses she becomes much more explicit in this regard, declaring theological 
models  as  necessarily  'mostly  fiction',72 and  regards  metaphor  as  a  'strategy  of 
desperation'.73 
However,  remembering  the  earlier  findings  concerning  the  interactionist 
approach to metaphor, if the process is seen, contra McFague, as being a several step 
process, the first of which is the creation of the metaphor for God, and the final and 
distinct step being the re-imaging of the world in the light of our metaphors for God, we 
may  not  be  forced  into  such  a  'desperate'  position  regarding  either  ontology  and 
reference, or systematic theology concerning the nature of God.
 We will encounter these fundamental questions of truth and reference again in 
relation  to  parables  in  the  next  section,  and  when  we  look  at  the  construction  of 
metaphorical, theological theories in chapter 2.4,  At this point is should be noted just 
how important this limited and indirect ability to speak of God is to McFague's theology 
and how it  connects  to her  understandings of the tasks  of  theology,  outlined in 1.2 
above.   It  is  precisely  the  indirect  nature  of  metaphor  which  allows  for  multiple 
metaphors to be used, for no one metaphor to assume a specially protected status and 
therefore  for  one  metaphor  to  replace  another  as  more  relevant  and  for  religious 
language to avoid idolatry (always being mindful of the change in meaning resulting 
from the change in metaphor).   
j) Exploration of the source domain – As we have just seen, McFague argues that we 
cannot claim that our religious language is actually descriptive of God, therefore she 
seems to take the position that such language is more a way of re-exploring the meaning 
72 Metaphorical Theology p41
73 Models of God p33.  
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of the terms with which we speak about God.  In other words, she seems to suggest that  
language about God is not to be thought of primarily as  about God at all, but about 
those things which we use to refer to God.  'God the Father' for example is more about 
what we understand about fathers than it is about God for McFague.  Chapter 3 will, 
however, explore the possibilities for diverging from McFague’s position on reference 
to a degree while remaining within the general framework of her thought.  In addition to 
the analysis here, the question of reference will be returned to in more detail in Chapter 
3, where it will be shown that there are possibilities for strengthening claims for the 
ability  of  language  about  God  to  actually  refer  to  God,  even  within  McFague’s 
epistomological framework.  
Her claim that metaphorical religious language may be more about the source 
domain than the target, more about that used to represent God than about God in God's 
Being, and thus more about our world,  our experience and our being is introduced on 
the very first page of Speaking in Parables where she says
'Theological discourse, and especially ‘God-talk,’ during what has been called 
the absence or the ‘death’ of God, is, as we all know, in trouble.  Richard Rubenstein, 
the Jewish Theologian states the problem this way:  'Contemporary theology reveals less 
about  God than it  does  about  the  kind  of  men we are….Today’s  theologian,  be  he 
Jewish or Christian, has more in common with the poet and the creative artist than with 
the  metaphysician  and  physical  scientist.   He  communicates  a  very  private 
subjectivity''74 
 Later in the same book, she quotes Funk with approval:
'...  metaphorical  language brings  the familiar  into  the unfamiliar  context  and 
distorts it, in order to call attention to it anew...'75
74  Speaking in Parables pp3-4 citing Richard L Rubenstein,  After Auchwitz: Radical Theology and 
Contemporary Judaism New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1966 p x
75 Robert W Funk Language, Hermenutics and the Word of God: The Problem of Language in the New 
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Notice that this account of metaphorical language assumes that the purpose of 
constructing a metaphor for God is not to call attention to new features of the nature of 
God but to new features of 'the familiar'.  In other words, when we talk of Mother God 
we are drawing attention to the meaning of the term Mother more than we are of God. 
This claim is difficult to substantiate given the findings of cognitive linguistics 
discussed above, where it was seen that it is in fact the meaning of the target domain 
that is changed by the metaphor, while the meaning of the source domain is largely 
unchanged.  
 Nevertheless, a case can still be made that metaphors can lead to reflection upon 
the source domain despite our rejection of the interactionist position.  That rejection 
centred on the claim that reflection on the source domain was not an automatic, intuitive 
process resulting in a new understanding of the source domain, as it is for the target 
domain.  This is not to say that a full exploration of the source domain is not possible of 
course, rather it is to say that if such a process is to be attempted, it will be a deliberate, 
conscious, rational process.
 Now I have argued that for a metaphor to be successful, it needs to provide 
informational structure from its source domain.  As the metaphor is explored beyond the 
initial  insight  and moment  of  recognition,  that  is  as  it  is  analysed  and its  meaning 
analysed in a more systematic way, the relevant informational structure of the source 
domain needs to be increasingly well worked through and expressed.
If we return to our exemplar metaphors again, we can see that just because War 
is  Chess does not automatically mean that Chess is  War,  it  is  however likely that a 
detailed  examination  of  war  in  terms  of  chess  would  lead  to  a  change  in  one's 
understanding of chess to some degree because the metaphor would only be useful if it 
Testament and Contemporary Theology New York: Harper and Row 1966 p195 cited in McFague 
Speaking in Parables p70n
50
incorporated a significant understanding of the nature of chess, and this understanding 
may need to be developed in particular directions as the metaphor is explored.  The 
creation  of  the  metaphor  itself  does  not  automatically  change our  understanding of 
chess, but we may find ourselves needing to return to and expand that understanding if 
we persist in attempting to articulate the meaning of the metaphor.  
What  is  particularly  significant  about  this  process  is  that  the  more  that 
informational  structure  is  required  of  the  new  metaphor,  the  more  detailed  the 
accompanying elucidation of the source domain's properties needs to be.  (The next 
chapter will  introduce the idea of ‘models’ in McFague’s thinking and these can be 
thought of as roughly equivalent with the products of just such a process.)
While  our  discussion  here  does  not  support  McFague's  apparent  claim  that 
religious language is not primarily about God, it does support the weaker position that 
exploring religious language by incorporating new subjects as metaphors for God does 
involve a deeper exploration of those subjects.
It may also be, though, that the fact that McFague does not regard her metaphors 
as  being  'about  God'  is  one  reason  why  she  is  not  concerned  with  relating  these 
metaphors to existing language that purports to be ‘about God’.  For her, it seems, there 
are more insights to be gained in our understanding of motherhood from exploring the 
metaphor 'God is Mother' than there are insights to be gained into God from an attempt 
to relate ‘God is Mother’ to 'God is Father'.  This is consistent with her stated desire 
quoted above to direct attention more towards ‘what is here like’ rather than ‘why are 
we here’. 
k)  Category  expansion – McFague  does  not  herself  treat  this  aspect  of  metaphor. 
However an understanding of this property will greatly assist in illuminating some of 
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her unorthodox use of language to denote categories containing diverse entities, and 
consequently  the  often  changing  usage  and  meaning  of  terms  in  her  work.   The 
following discussion builds upon a feature of metaphor that she makes the most use of, 
namely that  metaphors  establish  a  bond of  similarity between entities,  despite  their 
apparent (or even evident) dissimilarity.  
Consequently we can see that metaphors allow subjects to be added to categories 
to which they did not previously belong, and to which they do not seem to naturally 
belong.  This can be deduced as follows.  At one level, any classification system must 
allow for some diversity in order to group entities that are themselves unique objects. 
For example even a precisely defined mathematical set such as ‘natural numbers’ does 
not  require  all  those numbers to  be the same,  merely that  they correspond to some 
specified similarity (in this case being a positive integer).  
At the next level of precision, the level of everyday language, a diverse array of 
objects may be grouped under one term.  For example a large variety of structures fall 
into the category ‘house’ and a still larger number under ‘dwelling’.  These need not 
share a single defining or universal property but may be held together in interconnected 
chains with each member of the group sharing points of similarity with some others but 
not with all members of the category.76 
However,  allowing  for  metaphorical  connections  to  be  made  broadens  the 
categories still  further.   For example biblical parables add Christian believers to the 
categories ‘sheep’, ‘fish’, ‘temples’ and ‘coins’.  Clearly these categories understood in 
this  way are  quite  different  from,  for  example,  a  scientific  taxonomic  classification 
(which would not include Christians in the ‘sheep’ category!).  What is important for 
76  For a fuller discussion, including a detailed treatment of some of the distributed mathematical 
calculations performed by a neural network to simulate these category judgements,  see Steven Pinker 
How the Mind Works  New York: Norton, W. W. & Company 1997 and The Language Instinct New 
York: Norton, W. W. & Company 1994.
52
our purposes here is that McFague is comfortable using these expanded, ‘metaphorical’ 
categories quite liberally.  As we shall see, she uses them to classify Jesus as a ‘parable’ 
and as a ‘metaphor’.  She will similarly be seen throughout our enquires to frequently 
use terms like ‘model’ and ‘metaphor’ interchangeably and as if they were the same. 
For McFague this form of what I would dub ‘category expansion’ (she does not make 
reference to this process herself) is a natural expression of the 
'positive  assertion  [that]  metaphors  point  to  a  real,  an  assumed  similarity 
between the metaphors and that to which they refer …actually and concretely (though, 
of course, indirectly)'77
Although  McFague  does  not  identify  this  process  herself  in  her  work,  it  is 
clearly present, and, as we shall see, is fully consistent with her general approach to 
knowledge  and metaphor.   Within  the  boundaries  of  McFague’s  work,  our  analysis 
suggests, two entities may be held to be ‘the same’ if they can be metaphorically linked, 
and as more links are formed, the category becomes broader, and less defined.  We will 
see the process of category expansion take place on a number of occasions in her work 
and given that it is consistent with her, and our, observations on the nature of metaphor, 
these instances can be evaluated positively, despite the lack of terminological precision 
and clarity that sometimes results. 
So in these discussions we have seen some of the properties of metaphors that 
are important to McFague and relevant here, in the light of some more recent research. 
Although I have expressed some doubts about McFague's reliance upon an interaction 
theory of metaphor and as a result we have had reason to suggest that more attention be 
paid to the value of existing metaphors and their relationship to new ones, it is clear that 
the main thrust of McFague's argument holds and that metaphors are suitable tools with 
77  Metaphorical Theology p19
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which a theology might be constructed in the light of her particular motivations, aims 
and concerns.
We have seen that metaphors use a term in an unfamiliar context, and out of that 
interaction with this 'strangeness', this 'other', they may return us to look at the familiar 
with new eyes.  They are transformative by a reflexive process, albeit one that may be 
more complex and less direct than McFague proposes.   It is significant for McFague 
that an analogous, but strengthened, effect lies at the heart of the form and function of 
the genre of Parable, which builds on these features of metaphors just outlined, and 
intensifies them in particular ways.  It is to this that we now turn.
1.5  Parable.
The form 'parable' translates the Hebrew mashal, meaning 'to set side by side', 
and etymologically from the Greek parabolē, 'a placing beside'78  Thus its connections 
to a juxtaposition theory of metaphor are immediately apparent.
Indeed for McFague a parable may be considered, through a process of category 
extension, to be an extended form of metaphor.  She follows Dodd, whom she quotes:
'At  its  simplest,  the  parable  is  a  metaphor  or  simile  drawn  from nature  or 
common life, arresting the hearer by its vividness or strangeness, and leaving the mind 
in sufficient doubt about its precise application to tease it into active thought.'79
This is not to say that McFague limits parable to a particular linguistic form, any 
more than she limits metaphor to such a form.  As we will see,  for McFague, both 
parable and metaphor should be thought of as related ways of approaching a subject 
through a creative juxtaposition of differing entities.   In neither case is  either to be 
78 See McFague's entry on 'Parable' in John M. Sutcliffe (ed.) A Dictionary of Theological Education 
London: SCM Press, 1984 pp252-253.
79 Ibid. p60 citing  C H Dodd The Parables of the Kingdom New York: Scribners 1961 p16.
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thought of as a simply defined linguistic device. 
For  McFague  the  key  distinction  is  that  parables  are  different  from  other 
illustrative narrative forms such as myth and fable in the same way that metaphors are 
different  from mere  illustrations.   Like  metaphors,  for  McFague,  parables  have  an 
unsubstitutable characteristic and similarly share many of the properties of metaphors 
discussed above. She says
'In Max Black’s terminology, the story is the screen or ‘smoked glass’ through 
which we perceive the new logic…parables…operate in the way that metaphor does. …
Metaphors  cannot  be  ‘interpreted’ –  a  metaphor  does  not  have  a  message;  it  is a 
message.  If we have really focussed on the parable, if we have let it work on us (rather 
than working on it to abstract out its ‘meaning’) we find that we are interpreted.'80
She argues that in a pure form, the parable is a rare breed.  McFague identifies a 
few in the Hebrew Scriptures and in Eastern religious writings (the  koans  in Taoism 
would be a potential point of comparison), and in the writing of Franz Kafka81.  Apart 
from these,  for  her,  Jesus  stands  alone  as  the  prime example  of  the  consistent  and 
defining use of the form.
A parable is a metaphor in that it juxtaposes two realities or visions of reality 
(two  'logics'),  and  unites  them  by  a  continuous  plot  located  (usually82)  within  the 
familiar realm.  In so doing it creates a tension between these realities, a tension which 
is worked out within the plot of the parable, as the familiar reality is transformed by the 
breaking in of the 'kingdom of God' – the reality which the parables both exemplify, and 
in an important sense, constitute.
McFague  seems  correct  in  emphasising  the  strong  similarities  between  the 
features of metaphors and of parables and these are many and significant. McFague 
80  Ibid. p 59
81  Ibid. p54ff
82 The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, set in the afterlife, would arguably be an exception here.
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gives an analysis of the features of parables in the light of the features of metaphors and 
shows that the parables are of significant use in constructing a theology along the lines 
she suggests is necessary and appropriate to our time and context.83
The  parables  are  mundane.   They  are  about  concrete,  everyday  realities, 
everyday  situations  and  relationships  of  universal  types.   These  realities  provide 
structure and cognitive content which can be applied albeit it in an unfamiliar way, as 
well as providing accessibility and emotive power.  They illuminate and change our 
perception of everyday life by placing it in a radically different context, creating tension 
through the extravagance of its imagery which heightens the contrast. The parables are 
open-ended and involve their audience at a deep level, which produces the opportunity 
for transformation of understanding.  They are also indirect and limited in what they say 
about God.  God and the rule of God are their theme, and yet these are not specifically 
identified or referred to within the narrative, rather they are 'in the background', whilst 
the  plot  of  the  story  in  its  everyday  context  provides  the  'foreground',  holds  our 
attention.  Consequently, the parables direct us back to our mundane realities with a 
fresh vision and understanding of them, and they do so by affirming the 'is and is not' 
character of their assertions about God and the world, the logic of the kingdom and the 
logic of ordinary existence.  Finally, they require consent on the part of the audience, 
who must engage with the unfamiliarity, the reversal of expectations, and through this 
engagement are asked to come to a decision to accept (and so inhabit) this changed, 
redescribed reality, or to reject it.
The parables are also relevant in their content, providing McFague with another 
source  of  unity  between  form  and  content.   Not  only  do  the  parables  seek  to  be 
transformative of understanding,  and therefore of life,  as a  genre but  are  frequently 
about transformation in their content.  This is often an ethical, social and ultimately 
83  See Speaking in Parables Ch 3 and 4 and Models of God Ch 2
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cosmological  transformation,  re-imagining  the  world  in  terms  of  abundance, 
extravagance and inclusivity.  
This link between the form of the parables as transformative and their subject 
being  transformation  is  an  aesthetic  and  conceptual  link  rather  than  one  of  logical 
necessity; it would be possible for the parables to be transformative but not be about 
transformation, or to be about transformation but not in and of themselves be formally 
transformative.   Thus  we  might  say  that  this  'unity  of  form  and  content'84 is  an 
identification  of  similarity  amongst  divergent  entities,  which  is  not  a  simple 
identification or comparison of 'likeness'.  This is the broad definition of metaphor that 
McFague uses and therefore the similarity is a 'metaphorical' connection in the broadest 
sense.  It is this type of connection that is characteristic of the type of metaphorical 
symmetry exhibited by McFague's thinking and another example of category extension.
The  status  of  the  parables  is  also  significant  in  legitimating  McFague's 
theological project, and in defending the status of that project as authentically Christian. 
She demonstrates that this was the principal mode of teaching, of doing theology, of the 
founder of the tradition in which she works and which she seeks to reform.  
Having set out McFague’s understanding of parables, it can now be critiqued. 
Her interpretation of the genre of parable is dependent upon fairly recent studies in 
biblical scholarship, deriving from the work of  Jülicher in the late 19 th Century, and the 
subsequent  work of  C H Dodd,  Joachim Jeremias,  Robert  Funk and John Dominic 
Crossan from the 1960's on.  In this work, the mainstream scholarly understanding of 
parables has clearly moved away from thinking of them in terms of allegories, or moral 
tales, and towards the metaphorical approach outlined above.
However it must be noted that in the process of deploying 'metaphor' as a tool 
84 A characteristic goal of metaphorical theology, see Speaking in Parables p83
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for understanding parable certain features of the parables are screened out.  This, as we 
have seen, is inevitable, but it is potentially serious when it affects the interpretation of 
such a fundamental component of her theology.  In other words, parables may be ‘seen 
as’ metaphors,  but  this  should  naturally  alert  us  to  the  fact  that  parables  are  also 
therefore  ‘not  metaphors’ and  that  there  will  be  other  complementary  and  perhaps 
contradictory ways of understanding them.
This ‘screening out’ effect is evident in that it excludes from the genre of parable 
certain narratives that are traditionally and biblically regarded as parabolic, for instance 
the Good Samaritan, which McFague excludes on the grounds that it is an 'example 
story'.85  This reading of the story is debatable, but in any case the question at issue is 
whether it matters that the criteria for what is viewed as a parable is identical with the 
traditional classification.  I would hold that it does not matter significantly since her 
criteria are clear and consistently applied.  Far from narrowing the available 'parabolic' 
material, this definition of parable extends it to include many of the sayings of Jesus, on 
the basis that they are also surprising, dialectical statements uniting and contrasting the 
two logics in a transformational way.  Indeed, as we shall see below, McFague extends 
the category of the parabolic to include Jesus himself.
This is possible because McFague's criteria for a text being indeed a parable are, 
as already observed, not formal,  grammatical ones,  and neither are they a matter of 
logical, necessary entailment.  Rather the criteria are an abstraction of the properties of 
metaphor,  a  process  of  category  extension;  seeing  the  parables,  as  if they  were 
metaphors and carrying the necessary caveat that they are therefore also ‘not metaphors’
Now McFague's presentation of how a metaphor works requires there to be two 
poles which combine to form the metaphor.  According to McFague, these two poles 
85 Speaking in Parables p13 In other words she argues that this particular story is simply an example of 
something that could have been said in plain speech, e.g. 'Love your enemy' .  It does not qualify as 
'metaphorical' because it is not unsubstitutable in her view.
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interact and emerge transformed.  However analysis here has modified this scheme by 
rejecting the theory of interaction, and so a problem may arise for method if these two 
poles (or ‘domains’) are not correctly identified.  Like connecting a battery correctly, 
the view of metaphor advanced here, contra McFague, requires clarity as to which pole 
is which, a point of detail that McFague, with her view of metaphor, did not need to 
supply.  An analysis here will demonstrate that even though later research may cause us 
to revise McFague’s view on metaphor, it is still possible for parables to be ‘seen as’ 
metaphors in a way that is consistent with that revised understanding.
In  Metaphorical  Theology  McFague  applies  Ricoeur’s  view  of  metaphor  to 
parable and  identifies the two poles of the parable as being,
'the two ways of being in the world, one which is the conventional way and the 
other, the way of the kingdom.'86
And later:
'The plot of the parable forms one partner of the interactive metaphor, while the 
conventional context against which it is set forms the other.'87
If we take McFague's view and delve a little deeper, we can see that the parables 
are indeed  not simple illustrative stories.
  Confronted  by  a  parable,  I  would  argue  (going  beyond  McFague’s  own 
position),  that  the audience must  'reverse  engineer'  the  parable to  discover  how the 
world would need to be seen, what ‘lens’ or ‘grid’ they would need to look through in 
order to see the world that way. The parable itself does not provide the grid, it is not the 
grid.  Rather the value of the parable is that it invites the construction of such a grid and 
provides a context against which such a grid might be evaluated.  For example, we 
know that shepherds don't leave 99 sheep on the hillside to search for one, we know that 
86 Metaphorical Theology p45
87 Ibid. p 45
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when people find a lost coin they don't throw parties, we know that Samaritans don't 
stop to take care of Jews and so on, so we must ask how would one have to look at the 
world for those things to make sense?
It  is  this  process  that  generates  the  didactic  power  of  the  parables  since  it 
requires the  participation of the audience in constructing the 'glasses of the Kingdom' in 
order to view the world in a transformed way, from a new point of view.  
This can be seen from the fact that if we wrote stories as illustrations reliant 
upon the mundane and expected features of ordinary life they would be very different 
stories.   'You should act  as  Samaritans  and Jews do',  'Finding the  Kingdom is  like 
finding a coin behind a cupboard' and 'I'm the good shepherd who makes sure the 99 are 
OK and leaves the one to its fate.' These could be told as illustrative stories, but they 
would not be parables, because there would be no transformation of understanding, no 
new reality to be observed and understood.
McFague's understanding of how parables operate upon the hearer is rather more 
tied to the interaction theory of metaphor.  She draws upon the idea that constructing a 
metaphor involves  transforming our  understanding of  both its  poles  (and hence  our 
understanding of both ordinary life and our understanding of the kingdom are held to 
interact and transform each other by being placed side by side in the story).  Rather I  
would  argue  that  what  we  are  given  in  the  parable  is  already  the  product  of  the 
interaction of the two domains.  It is for us to extricate from that product the source 
domain (conventional life) and therefore reconstruct the target domain (the life of the 
kingdom).
For comparison,  imagine two overlapping circles  of  colour,  one red and one 
yellow, with the area of overlap being orange.  Now remove the red circle and give the 
remaining yellow/orange circle to another person.  In order to explain the presence of 
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the orange, and discover the colour of the missing piece, they would need to reconstruct 
the red circle.
In the same way, it is because the ‘grid’ or the ‘metaphor’ (the ‘red circle’) is not 
provided that the parable appears opaque in a way that a simple metaphor does not. I.e.  
rather than saying, 'war is chess' (a metaphor), saying 'There was a man who played war 
at weekends on a chequered board in his living room' (a parable).
  Strictly speaking, this implies that the parable is not itself actually an extended 
metaphor – rather it is the product of the application of a metaphor.  This metaphor is 
not explicitly stated but must be discovered or reconstructed by the reader/listener.  
Even  so,  this  slightly  revised  understanding  of  the  functioning  of  parables 
remains entirely in line with McFague's general observations about the ways in which 
the parables reveal and conceal the kingdom; the ways in which the kingdom cannot be 
understood apart from them.  The key insights that the features of metaphor help us 
understand the properties of parable still apply.
As we have seen, parables are of great importance to McFague.  We have also 
seen that her understanding of parable as a genre is based upon a projection of the 
properties of metaphor onto the parables (i.e. parables are  seen as metaphors), rather 
than  her  having  a  strict  definition  of  parable  based  on  a  particular  literary  form. 
Therefore McFague's  understanding of  what  a  parable is  has  been expanded by the 
application of conceptual abstractions from the properties of metaphor (and this process 
has been taken further here in order to demonstrate that it  still  holds in the light of 
subsequent refinements in the literature in the understanding of the nature and working 
of metaphor).  
Therefore it is crucial that McFague is not misunderstood to be claiming that 
61
‘parables are metaphors’ in any simple sense of identification of the two, as if a parable 
were  only  to  be  thought  of  as  an  extended  metaphor  to  the  exclusion  of  other 
understandings .  Rather, because parables may be ‘seen as’ metaphors, the link between 
parable and metaphor may itself be seen as a metaphorical one.  In other words, she 
constructs the metaphor ‘a parable is a metaphor’ in the same sense that ‘war is chess’. 
Again the symmetry of form and content in her work can be seen, as she is using her 
understanding of metaphor itself as a metaphor for understanding the parables.
 This, however,  is  a consistent methodological move in McFague's  work – a 
move  of  increasing  abstraction  as  particular  examples  are  drawn  together  and  are 
abstracted into metaphors (just as particular parables are drawn together and abstracted 
into an account of what a parable is, with this account being a metaphor both in form 
and in content).  These metaphors then act as ‘models’, which are themselves expanded 
into ‘concepts’ and ‘theories’.88 (In this case she constructs a model of what a parable is, 
and then abstracts the concept of ‘the parabolic’ and advances a theory of the nature and 
working of parables that ties all these things together.)
This  method  will  be  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  next  chapter.   In  the 
meantime we will look at two further examples of this process as McFague expands her 
understanding of  parable to  include  the  person and work of  Jesus  and expands her 
understanding of metaphor into the concept of the 'metaphorical'. 
1.6 Jesus as the parable of God.
'I  believe in Jesus, the strange,  enigmatic prophet who lived two thousand 
years ago, as the Christ of God.  In his life and death I learn who God is, and I 
88 These terms are defined and explored in detail in chapter 2.
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learn that the God revealed here is incarnate also everywhere else.'89
This quotation, from her later work, shows the confessional nature of McFague's 
theology.  At this later point in her career, as in her early writings, she sees herself as 
working within  the  Christian  tradition  and remaining within  it  despite  being  highly 
critical of much of that tradition.  Some of the reasons for this are undoubtedly personal 
and  experiential,  however  there  are  also  reasons  intrinsic  to  her  understanding  of 
theological task and method which make Jesus its ideal subject matter.  It is likely that 
the  high  degree  of  metaphorical  consistency  between  her  Christology  and  other 
theological concerns has been a factor in her adherence to Christianity, even when the 
history and current state of that tradition has been far from her ideal.  Whether or not 
she has given full attention to what constraints remaining within this tradition might 
place  on  theology is  something which  has  flagged up questions  regarding her  own 
approach.  We will continue to revisit these questions.
McFague claims that the Christian tradition is opposed to Cartesian dualisms of 
mind,  body and spirit90.   Choosing instead to view each of these dualisms as being 
dialectics  instead,  and  re-imagining  them  through  her  understanding  of  metaphor, 
McFague deems them all to be 'embodied', and identifies ‘embodied’ with 'metaphorical' 
since both are concerned with the connectedness and unification of disparate entities91. 
This enables her to see human life as embodying, incarnating, metaphor itself because 
to be human is to bring together in one entity the tensions between spirit and body and 
so on.   Clearly then,  the  metaphor  of  the  incarnation  will  be,  for  her,  the  ultimate 
metaphor.
In the preceding pages we have seen how Jesus' characteristic genre of parable is 
ideally suited, both in form and content, to her understanding of a theology based on 
89 Life Abundant p 20
90 Metaphorical Theology pp76, 146
91 Super, Natural Christians p75
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metaphor as a result of her 'radical monotheism' (her view that any language that claims 
to  describe  God  is  idolatrous,  and  that  God is  radically  other  to  anything  that  our 
language can be used to describe).   With regard to the scriptures from which these 
parables spring, McFague has a relatively low regard for their status92.  She sees them as 
functioning  as  a  classic  text,  as  examples  of  the  theological  method,  including  the 
metaphorical  method,  but  not  as  providing  concrete  norms  for  theology,  or  an 
authoritative application of the method93.  Metaphorical theology, while taking scripture 
seriously as a potential fund of images, models and concepts, could, on her presentation, 
proceed relatively unscathed without much of the narrative of scripture.  The same is 
not true, for McFague, of the narrative of Jesus.
This  is  not  only  because  a  text  (e.g.  a  parable)  cannot  be  fully  understood 
without  attending  to  its  author,  but  because  her  Christology  is  integrated  with  her 
method in a way that allows the nature and interpretation of Jesus to function as an 
exemplar rather than just an illustration.  In other words, for McFague, the meaning of 
Jesus is not exhausted by his teaching (although he cannot be understood without it), 
instead his meaning is inherent to his being.  Like a metaphor, Jesus is unsubstitutable 
and therefore McFague is able to assert that Jesus is himself a metaphor (and therefore 
also 'is not' a metaphor – we must remember that McFague is reaching for metaphorical 
similarity here, not definition or identity). Again it is not a simple identification that is 
being claimed, but rather a metaphorical connection between two very different entities. 
For McFague, Jesus’ meaning is abstracted, conceptualised and applied to all humanity 
and ultimately to the cosmos.  He is not unique in his ontology, but is the paradigmatic 
example by and through whom we see the true nature of the world in its relationship to 
God.  It is not that God is only incarnate in Jesus, rather that Jesus allows us to see 
92 In comparison to a traditional Protestant understanding of the inspiration and infallibility of Scripture.
93 Metaphorical Theology p54ff
64
God's  incarnation  in  all  things  by standing as  a  metaphor  for  that  universal  divine 
indwelling.  His status is as the source domain of a metaphor relating to the whole of 
creation  and  transforming  our  understanding  of  it,  rather  than  his  being  a  merely 
illustrative example of a universal truth.  Without him, she holds, we would not see this 
universal incarnation and therefore it would not exist for us  McFague explicitly rejects 
a  view  that  sees  Jesus  as  the  paramount  example  of  a  universal  phenomenon  of 
sacramentality  based  on  the  procession  of  being94.   Nevertheless,  Jesus  makes  a 
'sacramental' conception of reality possible again, albeit in a metaphorical sense. He re-
describes reality by his advent.  Creation is reinterpreted by and through Jesus, rather 
than Jesus being interpreted in light of the creation.  He is parable in her expanded sense 
of the term, and not simply illustrative story.
This last statement recalls the features of parables which allow them to interpret 
their  listeners  by re-describing their  reality,  turning it  inside out.   It  is  therefore no 
surprise that Jesus is understood by McFague as 'the parable of God'. 
In this, she is dependent upon Leander Keck who she quotes thus:
'Just as a parable does not illustrate ideas better stated non-parabolically, and 
so become dispensable,  so Jesus is  not  merely an illustration for the kingdom 
which can be more adequately grasped apart from him – say in mystic encounters 
or in abstract formulations.  His task was not to impart correct concepts about the 
kingdom but  to  make  it  possible  for  men  to  respond  to  it...He  not  only tells 
shocking stories but leads a shocking life towards a shocking end.  Just as the 
parables  have  familiar  elements  in  unfamiliar  plots,  so  Jesus'  life  has  familiar 
features of Palestinian life in startling juxtaposition.'95
94  Ibid. p11-20
95 Leander Keck A future for the Historical Jesus: The Place of Jesus in Preaching and Theology  
Nashville: Abingdon Press 1974 pp245-246 quoted in McFague Speaking in Parables p82
65
'Jesus as a parable of God' functions for McFague in several ways.  He serves as 
the example  par excellence  of her method, embodying the same type of metaphorical 
coherence  for  McFague as  we saw that  she had constructed  between metaphor  and 
parable.   In terms of  form, his  life functions metaphorically in that it  itself  exhibits 
tension and indirectness resulting from a subversion of the mundane fabric and structure 
of life.  In content, his life models a radical egalitarianism, a critique of power and an 
universal  inclusivity,  an  abundant  love  and  a  picture  of  human  flourishing  (with  a 
cosmic, eternal dimension added by the resurrection appearance narratives).96   Jesus is 
seen  as  the  embodiment,  the  incarnation,  of  metaphorical  theology  as  well  as  its 
defining practitioner.   Therefore he provides both formal and material continuity for 
theology.97  Thus Jesus, understood and re-imagined through the ‘grid’ of parable and 
metaphor functions as one crucial locus of her theology. She is able to claim that the 
founding figure of Christian faith is (metaphorically!) both a parable and a metaphor, 
not only in what he said and did, but in who and what he was.
To analyse this beyond McFague’s own presentation now, we should note that as 
a ‘parable of God’ Jesus must be regarded as unsubstitutable.  This is partly a theoretical 
assertion based on the properties  of  metaphors  and their  application,  but  it  receives 
support from the metaphorical character of his life and teaching.  This unity of life and 
language itself embodies McFague's basic motivating contention, namely that language 
powerfully controls both being and doing.  
Meanwhile the overarching, recurring theme of embodiment links both to her 
understanding of the human person as 'a body that thinks'98 and her epistemology which 
is  based  on  coherence.   This  coherence  is  to  be  understood  as  being  both  within 
knowledge and between knowledge and life as it is experienced and lived out.  In short 
96 We will see in Chapter 2.3 how these concepts are derived. 
97 Models of God p46
98 Speaking in Parables p15 
66
'coherence  of  life'  is  the  ultimate  criterion  of  epistemic  justification  in  her 
epistemology99 as well as, when interpreted ethically, her ultimate motivating concern. 
Something is 'true' for McFague when it is able to establish a metaphorical similarity 
between 'how the world is' and 'how the world should be', between 'how life is lived' and 
‘how it might be lived in all abundance’. 
By placing her model of theology in symbiotic relationship with the 'historical 
Jesus' as attested in the gospels, he is seen simultaneously as the origin, example and 
confirmation of her theology,  Jesus has become the reference point, the key metaphor, 
the cornerstone.  As Jesus is the root-metaphor of his tradition, he is unsubstitutable to 
it, for to change a root-metaphor is to create a new paradigm, a new tradition.  For these 
reasons McFague could not do Christian theology at  all  without him.   However,  so 
integrated is he into her approach that it is virtually inconceivable that she could have 
any chance of articulating a publicly accessible (and consequently 'relevant') discourse 
(one that was not based entirely in her own religious experience) without him.  Hence 
Jesus plays an important role in controlling and disciplining her theological reflection 
and model forming.  As she herself says,
'...the theologian is constrained to return to the paradigmatic story of Jesus for 
validation and illumination100.'
The unsubstitutability of Jesus is controlling in a particular way.  It is not that it 
illustrates what would otherwise still be independently derivable principles that can be 
applied  to  all  space  and  time.  Rather  we  are  offered  a  way  of  seeing,  a  way  of 
interpreting,  a  particular  place  and  time,  a  particular  context.   Although  itself  an 
interpretation  of  Jesus,  its  purpose  is  not  primarily  to  be an  interpretation  of  Jesus 
(making  claims  about  the  actual  reality  of  Jesus),  but  as  a  means  of  interpreting 
99 See chapter 2.5
100Models of God p48
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ourselves and  our experience which cannot be interpreted in this particular (and, she 
holds, especially desirable) way apart from Jesus.
'What is being sought is not primarily the validation of the story of Jesus as 
having  [certain]  characteristics  but  illumination  of  our  situation  by  that 
paradigmatic story.'101
In other words, as much as Jesus stands as a metaphor and parable for God, it is 
more important for McFague’s project that he stand as a metaphor and parable for us 
and for our lives, if those lives are to be lived ‘right’, that is in such a way as to bring  
about abundance for the whole of creation.
The  interpretation  of  Jesus  as  parable,  then,  is  consistent  with  her  theological 
approach at the level of its motivation, the level of philosophical understanding of the 
nature of theological language, and at the level of its intended outcome, as well as at the 
levels of form and content.
It is clear, however, that in presenting Jesus as a parable of God, McFague has 
moved beyond formal or literal definitions of parable and has abstracted a  concept of 
parable from her  model of it and then identified commonalities between this concept 
and the life of Jesus read in the light of that concept.  From this conceptual similarity 
she has then formed a concrete model of Jesus to form a Christology which is coherent 
to a high degree. 
The following section will now look at this process again, carried much further, 
as we see how the concept 'metaphorical' derives from the model 'metaphor'.
101Models of God pp49-50 
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1.7  'Metaphorical'.
For  Sallie  McFague,  not  everything  that  is  grammatically  a  metaphor  is 
'metaphorical' and not everything that is metaphorical is grammatically a metaphor (just 
as not everything that is called a parable is a parable by her definition, and some sayings 
not usually identified as parables have become so for her).  This is not a 'lack of clarity'  
in the use of terminology as Peters argues102, rather this distinction is clear in her writing 
from the use of the word 'metaphorical'.  For example, while discussing a line from 
Dante's Divine Comedy she says,
'This  is  technically  a  simile  not  a  metaphor,  for  it  has  the  'as  ...  so' 
construction;  but  that  is  really  incidental,  because  metaphorical  power  is 
present.'103 .
To understand the reasoning here we need to return again to her understanding of 
metaphor, and observe some key points that she makes in Speaking in Parables, and set 
these in a broader context in subsequent research.
Lakoff and Turner note two variants of the 'It's All Metaphor Position'.104 The 
first is the weak position, which they state thus:
'Every linguistic expression expresses a concept that is, at least in some aspect, 
understood via metaphor.'105
Given  the  prevalence  and  importance  of  metaphor  in  human  reasoning,  this 
position is probably correct. 
From this it may also follow that 
'every linguistic  expression of  every language is  understood via  metaphor,  at 
102 Peters p132
103 Speaking in Parables p49 (emphasis added)
104 Lakoff and Turner p133-5
105 Ibid. p134
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least in part.'106
However there is also a second, strong form that McFague seems to argue for, 
(though not consistently as we shall see).
Lakoff and Turner state this as, 
'Every aspect of every concept is completely understood via metaphor.'107
This results in a view of language as a closed system (a position that McFague 
argues for) where every concept is only understood in terms of other concepts and is not 
grounded in any way.
However  Lakoff  and  Turner  argue  that  our  primary  source  domains  are 
semantically autonomous, and are grounded in our concrete experience, and are thus not 
themselves understood completely metaphorically.  McFague also wishes to ground her 
religious metaphors in 'first order' experience.  Indeed she seeks to do this in two ways,  
firstly what she wishes to express is 'primary' religious experience, and secondly she 
wishes to do so using images that are 'basic'.108 Therefore it has to be asked whether 
McFague  is  advocating  the  strong  theory  at  all.  This  question  can  be  clarified  by 
looking  at  precisely what  McFague calls  'metaphorical'  and  how she  sees  language 
working.
Language works, McFague insists, by connecting pieces of knowledge together, 
by  spotting  patterns,  likenesses  amongst  the  dissimilar.   Language  orders  reality, 
grouping it into categories.  Thus the term 'chair' does not refer to any specific entity in 
and of itself; it is not a proper name.  Rather it defines a category into which an infinite 
number of potentially radically different objects, which are judged to share some of a 
number of similarities in form or function, may be placed.  
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
108 See section on 'Image' in chapter 2.
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McFague calls this process of categorisation 'metaphorical' and therefore regards 
all language as metaphorical.  However here she is straining the bounds of what can be 
termed  metaphorical  without  causing  confusion.   The  claim  that  all  language  is 
'metaphorical' cannot be seen as a claim that all language is of an identical type.  There 
is clearly a distinction to be drawn between the process of conceptual categorisation of 
experienced  entities  by  perceived  similarities,  and  the  cognitive  reunderstanding  of 
concepts  by  the  introduction  of  structure  from  another  source  domain.   Thus  the 
statements 'this is a rock' and 'God is a Rock' are of a different type (it is just that in 
certain senses they are 'metaphorically the same' in that certain points of illuminating 
similarity between the two processes may be identified when categorisation is 'viewed 
as if' it were metaphor).  
The  key  to  this  confusion  is  McFague's  failure  to  distinguish  between  the 
comparative  and  juxtaposition  theories  of  metaphor.   It  is  a  case  of  the  category 
expansion process, that was identified above, running amok, and the resulting lack of 
category  definition  overwhelming  the  technical  distinctions  that  could  otherwise  be 
made.  The normal process of categorisation is comparative. It rests upon similarities 
that would be evidently held to exist in quite independent descriptions of the entities 
concerned, without any reference to the other.  These similarities are then noted after the 
fact and the two are independently assigned to the same category.  These categories are 
Lakoff and Turner's experientially grounded, semantically autonomous source domains 
(or 'literal language' as I have defined it).  
In contrast the process of understanding a domain in terms of another domain is 
juxtapositive  (what  Lakoff  and  Turner  call  'metaphorical'  as  opposed  to  ‘literal’). 
Although McFague is unclear on the point, and a certain license has been allowed thus 
far,  she  is  not  free,  by  her  own  understanding, to  class  the  process  of  metaphor 
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formation as comparative, as spotting a thread of similarity rather than creating one. 
Crucial  for McFague is  the belief  that a metaphor is  created in a  moment of novel 
recognition of similarity  despite  jarring difference,  and that  subsequent  similarity is 
constructed as the structure of the source domain is projected onto the target.  Thus the 
similarity resulting from a metaphor is exactly  not the form of similarity that can be 
drawn between independently described entities.  The point of a metaphor is that the 
description of the target that results is one that cannot be independently derived. The 
description results from the juxtaposition of the two entities in question, rather than 
from a direct comparison between them.  To allow the direct comparison would be to 
readmit the notion of the 'analogy of being'  since it  would depend on the points of 
comparison (say between 'God'  and 'Mother')  as  being actual,  ontological,  as 'being 
there',  as  opposed  to  these  similarities  being  constructed  by  the  formation  of  the 
metaphor; seeing one ‘as if’ it were the other.
Calling  both  the  process  of  comparative  categorisation  and  the  process  of 
metaphorical  juxtaposition  'metaphorical'  is  technically  and  conceptually  within 
McFague's understanding of what 'metaphor' may mean when abstracted (since there are 
both  similarities  and differences  between  the  two processes  and so,  if  the  category 
‘metaphorical’ is sufficiently expanded, both can be accommodated within it),  but it 
does not add clarity to her work, since it  itself  reads as a categorisation of the two 
processes  as  'the  same'  rather  than  an  'is  and  is  not'  metaphorical  exploration  and 
creation of similarity in difference.
McFague  is  elsewhere  highly  aware  of  the  need  for  differentiation  between 
forms and uses  of  language.   Consequently she terms  ordinary speech,  that  is,  that 
which  she  takes  to  be  literal  speech,  as  consisting  of  'dead  metaphors'.   'Dead'  for 
McFague  means  'devoid  of  metaphorical  power',  this  power  being  related  to  a 
72
metaphor's  ability  to  generate  new  knowledge,  to  express  emotive  content  and  to 
provide a shock of recognition coupled with a shock of difference or unfamiliar context. 
So  the  claim  that  everything  is  metaphorical  is  sweetened  by  a  qualifier.  
However,  here  again  later  studies  of  metaphor  call  into  question  McFague’s 
position.  DesCamp and Sweetser, for example, reject the idea of dead metaphors, as do 
Lakoff  and  Turner.   They  have  shown  convincingly  the  powerful  role  that  these 
'conventional' metaphors play in shaping human understanding, and argue that the view 
that such metaphors are dead comes from two mistakes.  Firstly, an assumption that 
'Those things in our cognition that are most alive and most active are those that 
are conscious.'109
and secondly, a failure to differentiate between metaphors which are active at the 
automatic,  unconscious  level  and  those  statements  that  have,  for  historical  reasons, 
simply ceased to be metaphors (they offer the example of the term 'pedigree', once an 
image-metaphor based on a crane's foot and now no longer carrying this sense).
Thus we can see that McFague's concern that metaphors such as 'God the Father'  
have become dead metaphors, in that they are not recognised as metaphors, may be 
judged to have missed its  target.   The same is  true of her recommended remedy of 
supplying new metaphors to remind us that the old ones are indeed metaphors.110  The 
issue is not fact that the metaphor 'God the Father' for example is 'dead' in the sense that 
it is simply not seen as a metaphor.  Rather the issue may be that, through the hegemony 
of  its  usage,  it  has  become  so  basic  to  religious  thought  that  it  informs  it  at  the 
subconscious level.  This strengthens our earlier case for the necessity of hermeneutical 
recovery – this basic information has become so central to Christian self-understanding 
109 Lakoff and Turner p129. They continue 'On the contrary, those that are most alive and most deeply 
entrenched, efficient, and powerful are those that are so automatic as to be unconscious and effortless.'
110 Sontag identifies McFague's argument on this point as a non-sequitur and his case is strengthened by 
our findings here.  See Sontag 'Metaphorical Non-Sequitur'   Scottish Journal of Theology  Volume44 
Issue 1 February 1991 pp1-18
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that simply to replace it with another metaphor which is unsubstitutable in meaning with 
it seems unlikely to achieve McFague’s ultimate goal of changing the way her audience 
thinks.
On the other hand, despite the ongoing and deep cognitive role of conventional 
metaphors, there is still a case to be made for  new metaphors as a way of  extending 
human  knowledge.   This  ability  is  what  McFague  terms  'metaphor  as  human 
movement'.
'Movement' in this sense is the ability to make novel connections, the ability for 
knowledge to progress.  It is the ability of the human mind, itself a product of nature, 
'being of one substance' with creation, to discover and express the underlying unity of 
all  that  is  at  the  level  of  a  subject-subject  relationship,  through the  construction  of 
dialectics connecting known and unknown, what is with what it might be.111 
A metaphor is capable of such movement if it has the properties outlined above 
in  Chapter  1.2.   Possessing  these  characteristics  means  being  'tentative,  relativistic, 
multi-layered, dynamic, complex, sensuous, historical and participatory.'112
However, though McFague does not make this observation herself, it should be 
noted  that  this  is  the  'metaphorical'  categorising  approach  just  discussed  above,  a 
process  of  category  expansion.   Just  as  we  can  create  the  categories  ‘house’ and 
‘habitable’ through which to connect a range of objects together metaphorically, so we 
can create the category 'metaphor' and ‘metaphorical’ which hold together diverse forms 
of  language which  are  related  in  certain characteristics  that  they display.   It  is  this 
broader, expanded category, rather than a strictly, technically defined one that McFague 
generally refers to as 'metaphorical'.  
However, she does extend this abstracting process still further.  Over the course 
111 Speaking in Parables p 56. See also Sallie McFague Super, Natural Christians: How We Should Love  
Nature  (British Edition) London: SCM Press 1997 Chapter 1. 
112 Ibid. p62
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of her thinking,  the properties of metaphor in language and cognition are placed in 
another  context,  the  context  of  human  experiences  and  values,  where  they  become 
metaphorically identified with her ethical values of social revolution, and a unifying 
vision across barriers of gender, culture, sexuality and ultimately, species.  Therefore 
many diverse forms of language, activity, ideas and even people may be denoted as 
‘metaphorical’  in  McFague’s  usage  because  they  are  all  connected  by  themes  of 
unifying difference.
Again,  McFague  does  not  differentiate  between  them,  but  there  is  clearly  a 
distinction to be made between in the one case,  the unitive power of a metaphor in 
language, in another case, the philosophical uniting of mind and body, and in a third 
case  the  social  process  of  uniting  different,  and  sometimes  opposing,  groups 
(male/female, gay/straight etc.). It appears that what is occurring throughout her thought 
is that the metaphorical method is being applied across these different categories and 
these categories are  expanded as hidden similarities are  being drawn out.   We have 
already  seen  this  process  of  category  extension  (which  may  itself  be  deemed 
'metaphorical') in relation to the parables and to Jesus.   
But despite jarring dissimilarity, our analysis suggests that for McFague these 
diverse cases share more than a passing semblance or a purely imaginative creation of 
similarity, we might say, like spotting faces in clouds.  She seems to imply that these 
similarities  can  be  held  to  exist  at  a  level  between  aesthetic  symmetry  and  logical 
consequence, due to the basic nature of metaphor in language and human knowing.  
In short, McFague asserts that all knowing is metaphorical in the broadest sense 
in that it involves the interconnection of disparate and diverse mental phenomena.  But I 
would argue that just because 'all' knowing is metaphorical, this does not imply that all 
knowing is of an identical nature.  In effect the term 'metaphorical' is being used here to 
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mean  ‘unitive’,  in  the  sense  that  a  metaphor  unites  while  preserving  concrete 
differences.  All knowing may be metaphorical in this sense, but not all knowing is the 
same, and there is no contradiction here because McFague's position is to be understood 
in  the  light  of  the  identified  properties  of  metaphor,  not  as  an  absolute  or  literal 
statement.  That is, McFague would be likely to say that knowing both ‘is’ and ‘is not’ 
metaphorical.   The  differences  must  be  asserted  along  with  the  similarities.   The 
metaphorical approach must not be absolutised or allowed to become the only way of 
thinking about language or knowledge.  It is simply one way of looking at these things, 
seeing knowledge and language as if they were 'all metaphor' with this statement itself 
seen as being a metaphor.  But it is this particular way of 'seeing as'  that both results in 
the particular kind of unity found of McFague's thought and also gives it its character.  It 
also gives her approach its name: Metaphorical Theology. 
1.8 Summary.
This  chapter  has  begun  to  put  together  the  basic  elements  of  McFague's 
theology,  having  first  considered  the  general  context  and  motivation  in  which  this 
theology  is  constructed.   We  have  seen  how  McFague  is  concerned  to  promote 
inclusivity and abundance, while avoiding idolatry and irrelevance.  
This she seeks to do by use of metaphor and parable.  The primary,  relevant 
features of good metaphors have been identified as familiarity, structure and tension, 
and the main property of metaphor itself has been identified as its unsubstitutability and 
therefore its ability to generate new knowledge indirectly.  This discussion has, however 
modified McFague's understanding of metaphor by rejecting an interaction theory of 
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metaphor. Our attention has been directed towards the relationship between McFague's 
models of God and other images, models and concepts within the Christian traditions as 
a point of potential debate. 
Two  stages  of  abstraction  have  been  identified  underlying  McFague's 
understanding of metaphor.  It has been noted how both the parables, and the person of 
Jesus may be understood in the light of these.  This chapter concluded by examining the 
process of category expansion that leads McFague from a discussion that begins with 
the concrete cases of the unique features of metaphors in language right up to a broad 
categorisation  of  almost  everything  as  ‘metaphorical’.   The  final  two  sections  (the 
analysis of parable and Jesus as parable) should be seen as examples of this overarching 
process  of  category  expansion.   While  this  process  does  not  give  McFague's  work 
forensic technical precision when it comes to consistent use of terminology, it does give 
her work a much broader conceptual unity and allows her insights to be applied to wide 
ranging themes within the Christian tradition and beyond.  
Throughout, attention has been drawn to the unity of form and content that has 
been  shown to  result  from the  application  of  such  a  process.   This  unity  is  to  be 
expected since it is a feature of metaphor that what is seen is inevitably coloured by the 
interpreting model through which it is 'seen as'.  That symmetries exist then, is not in 
itself surprising, what is more significant is the degree to which they are present and the, 
at  times remarkable, degree of coherence generated,  especially that held together by 
McFague's Christology.  
Although  McFague  does  not  herself  give  consideration  to  the  process  of 
category expansion, it will be seen in the following chapter that this process is not an 
uncontrolled or random one.  Instead it will soon be seen to be the result of a process 
that McFague does describe and advocate, whereby a successful model, deriving from 
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initially suggestive  images,  and their related  concepts are deployed systematically to 
form a coherent and productive  theory.  For this to be seen more clearly, these terms 
need to be unpacked in more detail.   It is to this that we will turn in the following 
chapter.
Meanwhile, the early indications of the analysis so far are consistent with the 
view that McFague's theology is very largely consistent and coherent internally and over 
time in its most basic elements.  At the same time, questions have been posed about the 
details of her presentation in certain small areas.  It remains to be seen later to what 
extent  these  points  become significant  for  her  theology in  its  subsequent  stages  of 
development and application.
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 Chapter 2 – Means and ends:  
Constructing a metaphorical theology
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2.1  Introduction.
The preceding chapter ended by mentioning categories of image, model, concept 
and  theory  which  as  will  now  be  seen  are  basic  to  McFague's  understanding  of 
theological  method.   The  overarching  quality  described  as  'metaphorical'  was  also 
examined.   This chapter  will  examine each of these fundamental categories in  turn, 
explaining what they mean in her usage, showing not only what McFague regards as the 
nature of each, but how she says they should be interrelated.  It will also begin to show 
how  McFague  employs  these  categories  in  her  own  theology,  in  relation  to  her 
understanding  of  the  metaphorical  and  of  the  Christian  tradition.    While  a  fuller 
discussion of each of these categories will follow below, a short definition of each is 
given here, since McFague can be seen to use these terms in two different but related 
senses, with the second being an extension, a generalisation of the first.
Firstly, McFague introduces image, model, concept and theory as stages in the 
process of constructing language about God.  This she does explicitly.113  In this case, an 
image is a particular example of what is being proposed as a vehicle for theological 
discussion (a particular father, or mother, or rock etc.). In relation to God-talk, a model 
is generalised from a number of images, for example forming an account of motherhood 
drawn from but generalising upon, the more concrete images of mothers.  From this 
model, a  concept of associated abstract properties can be constructed, for example a 
concept of motherliness.   Together, the whole system of images, model and concepts 
could be related together and to other models and so on and the system applied to a 
wider range of issues at the level of a theory, e.g. a theory of the Motherhood of God.
However, McFague in typical fashion seems to be deploying this process more 
113 Sallie McFague Metaphorical Theology: Models of God in Religious Language (British edition)  
London: SCM Press 1983 pp14-27
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generally, leaving the specific case of the construction of language about God behind 
and applying the approach in other areas.  She makes little specific reference to this 
process114, but it may be clearly seen to underlie her approach to many subjects other 
than language about God, including her understandings of metaphor in general and of 
parable as they were presented above.
 The four categories, and especially image and model are extended and in the 
general case the terms image, model, concept and theory are place-holders, denoting 
particular functions and roles within a methodological scheme.  They are like roles in a 
play that may be played by a number of different actors.
This can be seen as follows: An image in this sense is no longer only a mental 
or physical image, literally understood, but has come to stand for any concrete example 
of a phenomenon.  An image is therefore any typical case that informs a more general 
type or class – so for example, if metaphors in general are under discussion, then an 
'image' in this context is a particular metaphor, such as the example used here, namely 
'War  is  Chess'.   When  considering  parables,  individual  parables  would  function  as 
images of what parables are.
Meanwhile, a  model is a generalised, but still concrete, idealisation of a set of 
images into a hypothetical, ordered account of the class.  For example in the case of 
McFague’s understanding of the function of metaphors in language in general (not just 
in language about God), the properties of certain specific metaphors are generalised and 
a hypothetical account of the nature of metaphors in general is constructed.  Likewise 
the features of particular parables are generalised into a model of parables.    
114 The closest she comes to an acknowledgement of this process is in Metaphorical Theology in a 
passing reference to 'the movement from parable to conceptual thought' (p26).  In this case we could 
read her as if she were saying ‘movement from a images and models of parables to conceptual thought 
about them’ without doing violence to her meaning.  McFague is primarily interested in presenting 
particular, applied cases of her approach – applied to ‘the Kingdom of God’ or to ‘the person Jesus’ 
for example – rather than outlining a general way of approaching knowledge and understanding . 
However she gives sufficient examples of her method in application for us to be able to generalise on 
her underlying method with confidence.   
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A concept is a higher level abstraction, a further degree of generalisation that 
separates  the  qualities  of  a  model  from  their  particular  concrete  expressions  and 
applications.   For example on metaphors,  the concept of what is metaphorical is  an 
abstraction of qualities derived from the model of metaphors and the fund of specific 
examples which feed these models.  The concept of metaphor is therefore the abstracted 
properties of metaphors, such as 'unification', 'creative tension', 'is-and-is not-ness' etc. 
In the same way, a concept of the parabolic can be derived, having similar features115. 
McFague's  usage of the term  theory is  more conventional – an overarching, 
systematic account of a phenomenon116, bringing together image, model concept and 
theory into a unified explanatory scheme – a theory of metaphor, or a theory of parables. 
Although  these  four  are  presented,  both  here  and  in  McFague's  writing,  as 
discrete categories, namely 'image', 'model', 'concept' and 'theory', it is important to note 
that she understands these as points on a continuum which simultaneously exist in a 
characteristically  symbiotic  interrelationship.   She  expresses  this  in  the  following 
passage  which  gives  her  clearest  statement  of  the  relationship  between  these  four 
categories in her thought:  
'Images 'feed' concepts; concepts 'discipline' images. Images without concepts 
are blind; concepts without images are sterile. In a metaphorical theology, there is 
no suggestion of a hierarchy among metaphors, models, and concepts: concepts 
are not higher, better, or more necessary than images, or vice versa. Images are 
never free of the need for interpretation by concepts, their critique of competing 
images, or their demythologizing of literalized models. Concepts are never free of 
the need for funding by images, the affectional and existential richness of images, 
115 Note that therefore that although McFague does not observe this herself, what she is in fact doing is 
unifying metaphor and parable at the level of the concept – that is they are the same because they are 
conceptually similar, not because they share common concrete properties or can be modelled in the 
same way.  This typical feature of her thought will be seen to reoccur consistently.
116 Metaphorical Theology p 26
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and the qualification against conceptual pretensions supplied by the plurality of 
images.  In  no  sense  can  systematic  thought  be  said  to  explain  metaphors  and 
models so that they become mere illustrations  for concepts;  rather,  the task of 
conceptual  thought  is  to  generalize  (often  in  philosophical  language,  the 
generalizing language), to criticize images, to raise questions of their meaning and 
truth in explicit ways.'117
As she says, all four levels of understanding are required; theories and concepts, 
although  structurally  dominant  in  the  framework  of  epistemic  organisation,  cannot 
dispense with images or models without losing much insight along the way118, a fact that 
derives primarily from the unsubstitutable nature of metaphors as remarked upon in the 
previous  chapter.  It  can  be  said,  therefore,  that  the  relationship  between  the  four 
categories is a relationship of both continuity and genuine difference, continuing, as 
McFague might say, the 'metaphorical' motif that seems to be omnipresent in her work.
The direction of progression from image to theory is important in that this is 
essentially the direction in which McFague wishes theologies, including her own, to 
progress (from primary religious experience to systematic theology),  but there is  no 
hierarchy of value in this progression.  Rather, 
'The overall goal of interpretation is to  return to the experience the primary 
language expresses.'119
This primary language is the language of the 'image'.
2.2  Image.
117 Ibid. p26
118 We should understand her remark that there is no 'hierarchy' in the passage quoted to refer to a 
hierarchy of value or importance, not hierarchy in terms of their place within an epistemic scheme – 
theories and concepts exist at a 'higher level' in that they order the models and images below them, but 
this higher place does not imply a higher value.
119 Metaphorical Theology p121 (Emphasis original)
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As this  discussion began with McFague’s use of the term ‘image’,  and later 
‘model’,  it  is  worth  briefly  revisiting  the  nature  of  McFague’s  ‘metaphorical’ (or 
‘category extended’) use of terms in general.  As will be seen, McFague uses the term 
image both in its basic sense of ‘a pictorial representation’ but also in the sense just 
noted as ‘an exemplar of the particular class or phenomenon under consideration’.  We 
have already seen that she has a similarly broad usage of the term ‘metaphor’.  It should 
be noted, therefore, that in what follows, she is able to refer to a metaphor as ‘an image’ 
(when it is being used as an example of a general case) and as a ‘model’ (when it is 
being used to represent an account of the features of that general case).  ‘Image’ and 
‘model’ are on a continuum and a metaphor may be functioning as either an image or a 
model depending on the role it is playing.  It is not McFague's intention to create a sharp 
divide between them and no such divide need be created.  
Images  are  for  McFague,  in  the  first  instance,  the  language  of  worship  and 
religious  experience.   As  such  they  are  the  most  subjective  form of  language  and, 
because of this, the most evocative, emotional form. They are created temporarily to 
express a moment of insight, with which the image is inextricably bound up, but are not 
intended to convey complex, structured knowledge, and are effective largely by weight 
of numbers.  Thus:
'In many Old Testament psalms the psalmist will pile up metaphors for God in 
a riotous  melee,  mixing 'rock',  'lover',  'fortress',  'midwife',  'fresh water',  'judge', 
'helper', 'thunder' and so on in a desperate attempt to express the richness of God's 
being.'120
This 'desperation' is not to say that images are unimportant. Quite the opposite. 
By expressing religious experience, however partially, images are crucial for McFague 
120 Metaphorical Theology p24
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because they root theology in human life  as  it  is  lived and experienced.   It  is  also 
fundamental  to  her  argument  that  these  images  do  not  merely  illustrate  religious 
experience but in an important sense constitute it. The images of a tradition are its most 
basic resource and they fund all its thinking, shaping religious experience as well as 
being  shaped  by it.   They are  the  closest  equivalent  that  religious  and  theological 
thinking has to an experimental basis.
McFague's understanding of the relationship between religious experience and 
imagery should not be understood as a direct cause-effect relationship however.  She 
would surely be open to the position Bisschops advocates in arguing that pre-existing 
religious beliefs shape what is seen, determining religious experience as well as being 
determined by it.121  This only strengthens McFague's argument since it  stresses the 
unsubstitutability  of  religious  images  in  a  tradition,  and  also  strengthens  the  link 
between a new 'way of seeing' and new religious beliefs that is a consistent theme of her 
work.  
Bisschops  also  indirectly  provides  a  further  example  of  the  importance  of 
traditional images.  As he demonstrates, religious imagery, and especially eschatology, 
is often very much contrary to our experience, a point that McFague herself stresses in 
later work.  In this sense the unsubstitutability of, for example, the parables can again be 
seen.  They embody a way of life that cannot be directly derived from experience.122
We saw in the previous chapter that McFague regards images as 'basic', deriving 
from concrete experience, and thus being accessible.  Because she does not make clear 
distinctions between the role of terms in language and in cognition, between religious 
121 See Ralph Bisschops 'Are religious metaphors rooted in experience?' in Feyaerts (ed) The Bible  
Through Metaphor and Translation Oxford: Peter Lang 2003 p114
122 We should note though, along with Bisschops (p117 n5), that 'experience' is a term that is 
underdefined in the literature, and hides a number of complexities and problems.
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experience  and  other  types  of  experience,  and  between  the  religious  practices  of 
theological systematic reflection and worship, it is hard to pin down the precise meaning 
of this claim concerning images.  In the light of the later research considered in the 
previous chapter, it can be said that images are semantically autonomous terms123, and 
thus the claim that such terms are basic becomes a claim that autonomous terms are 
basic to cognition.  Therefore McFague's insistence on the unsubstitutability of images 
would equate to a claim that visualisation is not just a necessary though dispensable first 
step  in  cognition:  rather  it  is  intrinsic  and necessary to  it.   This  question  must  be 
regarded as an open one in current research, but a tentative affirmative is provided for 
the case of the necessity of visualisation, even in the highly abstract world of quantum 
theory by Miller.124
Bisschops  makes  an  important  distinction  where  McFague  does  not  which 
impacts upon this question.  He draws a distinction between source-related experience 
and target-related experience.  That is, experience which informs the source domain of 
the metaphor (the ‘King’ in ‘God is King’) as opposed to experience which provides the 
pre-existing structure of the target domain (the ‘God’ in ‘God is King’).   Religious 
experience is target-related he argues. Religious experience is held to be experience of 
the target domain of religious metaphors, it is experience of God rather than of Kings, 
Lords or Rocks etc.  This is important because it could be seen to weaken McFague's 
case for the importance of religious experience, especially in giving rise to  religious 
language.   The  experience  that  matters  for  McFague's  models  is  primarily  source-
related,  it  is  precisely experience of  Lords,  Kings and Rocks.   However,  it  may be 
argued for her, on behalf  of her own approach, that target-related experience is also 
123 That is, they draw their meaning entirely from common experience and do not need to draw in 
knowledge from other domains through the use of metaphors.  See the discussion above p24 and 62.
124 Arthur I Miller 'Imagery and Metaphor: The Cognitive Science Connection' in Zdravko Radman (ed.) 
From a Metaphorical Point of View: A multidisciplinary approach to the cognitive content of  
metaphor. New York: Walter de Gruyter 1995 p199-224
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important for her method since it offers possibilities (which she does not explore in 
detail)  for  grounding  the  reference  of  religious  models  and  assessing  their 
appropriateness, and therefore may guard against charges of pure projectionism.
Now, as noted at  the beginning of this chapter,  McFague herself uses the term 
'image' (and indeed the terms model, concept and theory) in a specific and distinct sense 
which  is  not  necessarily  its  common  usage.   In  each  case,  her  understanding  of 
metaphor as  omnipresent  in  language colours  and informs her  understanding of  the 
term.  This can,  however, lead to a degree of apparent inconsistency of usage.   For 
example, the terms 'metaphors' and 'symbols' are frequently used interchangeably with 
'images'. However symbols are not themselves metaphors, as McFague herself argues. 
Following this  argument  through will  help to clarify her  understanding of  imagistic 
language and its use in a theological context. 
The account of symbolism that she explicitly rejects in Metaphorical Theology125 
is  a  sacramental  one.   The  sacramental  understanding  is  predicated  upon  the 
metaphysical assertion that,  beneath the radical and genuine differentiations between 
phenomena, everything is connected and forms a unity because it derives its being from 
God.  On this understanding, linguistic symbols are closely tied to their referent, and, by 
virtue of the participation of all being in the ultimate Unity of Being, are able also to 
stand for other entities, crucially including God.  Sacramental symbolism is different 
from the metaphorical seeing of A 'as' B.  Instead it sees A and B as parts of a whole 
related to each other by analogy.  Thus its emphasis is on underlying harmony rather 
than diversity.
McFague argues against this understanding, because she sees it as inappropriate 
for  our  time.126  It  is  important  to  state,  though,  that  McFague is  only rejecting  an 
125 p12-16
126 Metaphorical Theology p13
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ontological basis  for analogy within a Procession of Being. She is  not  rejecting the 
linguistic or cognitive usefulness or distinctiveness of analogy.  In these cases however, 
she would simply subsume analogy into the broad category of the metaphorical, whilst 
warning that analogies do not stress the diversity in unity she would desire.127
Still, this rejection of classical analogy has drawn criticism from other scholars, 
for example from Begley, who finds metaphor incapable of proving a particular point of 
view, and thus of correcting theological error.  
He says
'while metaphors do have cognitive meaning, one cannot validly argue from them 
to further conclusions.'128
He also differentiates analogies from models and, crucially, claims that analogies 
are 'literal', in contrast to metaphors.
Following Aquinas, Begely offers the following account of metaphor,
'Aquinas examines a few examples of metaphor in Scripture - God is rock/ God is 
a lion. He comments that they are metaphors because it is 'part of the meaning of 
'rock' that it has its being in a merely material way (as does also a lion) so these 
predicates cannot be applied literally to God'. On the other hand, each expresses a 
truth about God, that God is strong (as in the case of 'rock') and courageous (in the 
case of 'lion'). Neither is simply true - true in all respects - but each is true in some 
respect...all words used metaphorically of God apply primarily to creatures and 
secondarily to God. When used of God they signify merely a certain parallelism 
between God and the creatures.'129
This he contrasts with analogy thus:
127 This is the substance of Schaab's reading of McFague on metaphor and analogy.  See Gloria Schaab 
'Of Models and Metaphors' Theoforum 33 2002 p213-234 esp. p231
128 John Begley 'Metaphorical Theology' Pacifica 6 1993 p49-60 p56
129 Begley p 55.  Contrast this with Boeve, op. cit. p24.  Boeve demonstrates that, from a cognitive 
semantic approach,  Aqunias' analogies are in fact examples of metonymy. 
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'Words which signify pure perfections such as 'life, goodness and the like' can be 
predicated  properly  or  literally  of  God.  However,  they  are  not  predicated 
univocally  but  analogically  of  God  and  creatures.  If  they  were  predicated 
univocally (with the same meaning) of God and creatures, this would put God on 
the  same  level  as  creatures  -  an  error  to  be  avoided.  If  the  meaning  were 
completely different (equivocal), only the word and not the meaning would be 
common.  In analogical  predication,  the meaning is  partly the same and partly 
different.' 130
There are two crucial steps of this argument that McFague would reject, and her 
conclusion is supported here.
Firstly, classical analogies are dependent upon the dualistic assertion that 'strong' 
is  a  material  property  whilst  'love'  or  'wisdom'  are  spiritual  ones.   It  is  here  that 
McFague's point that analogy of being is 'outmoded' finds its mark.  
Secondly,  as  Brümmer  shows,  this  approach is  dependent  upon a  Theory of 
Perfections131 by means of which what is only partially true of humans is true of God 
perfectly.   However  as  Brümmer  also  argues,  this  is  a  quantitative  solution  to  a 
qualitative problem.
More seriously for McFague (though she does not make this point herself) is the 
assertion that certain terms, like love, apply most properly to God and secondarily to 
human beings, even bearing in mind the limited and contextual understanding of the 
divine nature of the proper meaning of these terms.132  Now McFague would affirm the 
130 Ibid..
131 Vincent Brümmer 'Metaphor and the Reality of God' in T W Bartel (ed.) Comparative Theology,  
Essays for Keith Ward, London: SPCK 2003
132 Aquinas says , 'As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more 
properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of 
signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification befits 
creatures'  Summa Theologiae 1a Q13 art 3
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view that one should argue from the action and nature of God to our own ethical stance,  
rather than the reverse, when expounding the consequences of theological models.  She 
would hold that love derives its being (as do all things) from God.  Nevertheless, she 
would not wish to separate the concept of love so far from the concrete images of love 
that we experience.  One of the priorities of McFague's work is take images of human 
experience seriously and not to allow their particularity and subjectivity to be lost in 
abstract and objectifying theoretical moves.   Thus, for McFague, when a theologian 
speaks of love it is important that (s)he is speaking out of the deepest loves humanity 
experiences.  Images, understood as metaphors, are unsubstitutable and are used in their 
mundane sense. 
Despite  these  objections  though,  McFague  is  keen  to  see  a  return  to  a 
sacramental understanding (which she also calls a 'catholic' understanding).  Indeed her 
later works, and especially The Body of God can appear to come very close to a return to 
classical analogy.   But this reconstructed form of sacramentalism comes in the form of 
what  we might  term a  ‘second naivety,’133 Fowler’s  5th ‘Stage  of  Faith’ in  which  a 
person returns to previously rejected beliefs and reasserts their value while maintaining 
an  awareness  of  the  provisional  and  limited  character  of  religious  speaking, 
acknowledging the paradoxes but being willing to work within the constraints of the 
language.  
McFague’s reconstructed sacramentalism remains mindful of the indirectness of 
metaphorical reference in post-modern understandings of language.  With the question 
of reference greatly complicated by this indirectness, symbols require interpretation to 
mediate  between  them  and  the  underlying  Unity  that  is  not  only  described  but 
constructed by the process of interpretation.  This interpretation is provided by models, 
concepts and theories in the manner outlined later. 
133 See James W. Fowler Stages of Faith San Francisco: Harper & Row 1981
91
Extending beyond McFague’s own arguments in a way that she does not herself 
do, it could also be observed that the overarching context of unity in which McFague 
sees all being as relating looks like it has become a cognitive rather than an ontological 
reality.134  That is to say that the unitive powers and processes involved appear to be, 
first and foremost, aspects of our cognitive processes and not a metaphysical feature of 
the universe.  The unity is in our knowledge and is not present in the universe itself in a 
way which is separable from our knowledge of the universe.
Thus,  it  could  be  argued  on McFague’s  behalf  that,  while  there  is  clearly a 
difference between the statements, God is a Rock and God is Father, the difference is 
not that one is a metaphor and the other is an analogy.  Rather the former involves a less 
complex  mapping  (and  therefore,  being  simpler,  the  metaphor  remains  close  to  its 
imagistic  base),  while  the  latter  involves  a  more  complex  mapping.   This  complex 
mapping moves the metaphor along the way to becoming a model, and this increases the 
metaphor's conceptual content.  Involving, as it does, less concrete properties such as 
abstracted relationships, a metaphor such as God the Father is more conceptual and less 
basic an image.
Our observations here therefore should be seen as supporting and taking further 
her understanding of 'image' as an extended category, denoting an area of continuum, 
largely constituted of poetic metaphors, but blurring at one extreme with models and at 
the  other  with  symbols  (in  a  non-classical  sense).   This  strengthens  and  extends 
McFague's  claim  that  images  and  models  exist  on  a  continuum  and  also  further 
demonstrates the coherence of her work.
McFague’s 'basic' images are found at the symbols end of the spectrum.  These 
134 However, I would tentatively suggest that a cognitive understanding of the basis of analogy could 
still make at least a 'shy ontological claim' when combined with the Tillichian depth theology of 
Klemm and Klink.  See David E Klemm and William H Klink 'Constructing and Testing Theological 
Models' Zygon vol 38 no3 2003 p495-528 p503
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images relate to concrete entities and particular experiences (i.e. to 'bread' or 'light'), in 
the terms introduced in the previous chapter, they are semantically autonomous.  These 
are symbols in that the terms 'stand for' these entities.  They may also act symbolically 
in the sense that they can be employed to 'stand for' something else (e.g. Bread can 
'stand for' in the sense of 'present the possibility of seeing as' Jesus' body).  However 
when they are employed in the latter sense they do not do so by the analogy of being,  
i.e. by participation in the underlying Unity, but by the creation of a metaphor.  Thus the 
remainder of the continuum is populated by composite images; basic images placed in 
relation to each other (e.g. The body as bread, judgement as a storm, hope as a candle 
etc.)   These  composite  images  are  where  the  category of  image starts  to  blur  with 
‘model’ as the metaphorical character of both is brought to our attention.
Some images therefore should be understood to have the properties of metaphors 
outlined  above.   Indeed  these  are  metaphors  in  their  most  familiar  form,  poetic 
metaphors, and tend to be found in the form of a grammatical metaphor (e.g God is 
light).  It must be borne in mind that not all metaphors are only images, as shall be seen 
later when metaphors which are also 'models' are considered.  First, though, the role 
images play in McFague's theology should be examined.
In relation to the Christian tradition, McFague obviously uses the images of that 
tradition as these have already been outlined.  In fact it is striking that, despite there 
being no methodological restrictions limiting choice to traditional images, nevertheless 
virtually all of the images McFague uses are scriptural ones, rather than images derived 
from her own, or other contemporary, religious experience.  The principal exception to 
this is, however, for her the most important image: that of the world as the body of God 
which is all but absent in 'malestream' Christian tradition. 
Secondly, she draws upon images of Jesus in the form of scenes and motifs from 
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the gospels, from which she abstracts  concepts of his mission,  message and person. 
However, here she has begun to extend the category, because she has moved from a 
simple and generic image (e.g. 'bread'), to a complex and more particular image (e.g. 
'Jesus  breaking  bread  with  outcasts').   This  process  is  important  in  understanding 
McFague's view of the construction of theology which is not as proscriptive as it would 
be if categories like 'image' were taken only in a strict and limited sense.
From the discussion above, it can be seen that 'image,' as McFague uses it, if not  
explicitly in her definitions of it, can in fact be taken to refer to a particular instance or  
example of a phenomenon, not necessarily an image in the strict  sense of a picture 
brought to mind.  An image in this sense can be any specific case from which more 
general conclusions are to be drawn.  The same is also true of the other terms in this 
theological system as will be seen for each in turn.
While the properties of images have been described in detail, there are as yet few 
criteria for their assessment, beyond those already outlined for a successful metaphor. 
Any work that is done on an image beyond the initial aesthetic and intuitive test of its 
appropriateness or 'fit' with the sensuous reality of experience has put the image well on 
the road to becoming a model.  A model is, basically, a successful image which  has 
borne a degree of interpretation.  We will therefore move on to consider models in more 
detail.
 2.3 Model. 
In this section McFague's understanding and use of models is examined.  Since 
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McFague's  theology  is  very  much  concerned  with  the  production  of  models  it  is 
important to explore her understanding of them in order to be able to critique and assess 
the coherence of her statements on method and the models that this method gives rise to 
and deploys. 
McFague's use of models within her methodology is part of a trend in theology 
that came to prominence following Avery Dulles'   Models of the Church  in 1974.135 
McFague engages with and builds upon work that follows this trend, especially upon 
the work of Ian Barbour.136 
McFague is aware that there are many accounts and usages of the term 'model' 
across different disciplines.  She is interested specifically in metaphorical models in 
theology; models of God in relationship to all that is.  Such statements are, in one sense,  
necessarily  universal  statements  of  unlimited  scope.   However  it  is  important  to 
understand that she does not set out to provide a  universal account of the nature and 
function of models.
Other uses and senses of the term model outside her work can easily be found, 
for  example  Ian  Barbour's  examples  of  scale  models,  diagrams  and  mathematical 
models,  and  these,  though  sharing  some  broad  similarities  with  metaphorical, 
theological models, are also importantly different from them.  
Although Dulles does not explicitly make the point, there are two distinct uses of 
models  in  theology  which  are  clearly  discernible  in  his  work,  and  which  aid  our 
comprehension of McFague's usage.  McFague does not make the distinction herself in 
135 Summaries of this process and McFague's prominent place in it are provided by Stephen B Bevans 
Models of Contextual Theology: (Revised and Expanded Edition)  Maryknoll N.Y.:Orbis Books 2002 
(First edition 1992) p28f and Fr James H Kroeger 'Revisting Models in Theology: An Exploration into 
Theological Method' Asia Journal of Theology 15(2)2001 pp364-374 
136 Ian Barbour Myths, Models and Paradigms London: SCM Press 1974  McFague and Barbour are in 
close agreement on the nature and use of models.  Indeed McFague indicates that Barbour reviewed 
early drafts of Metaphorical Theology (see McFague 'Ian Barbour: Theologian's friend, scientist's 
interpreter' in Zygon vol 31 no 1 1996 pp21-28 p22) and  Barbour's later treatment of models in his 
1989-1991 Gifford Lectures is largely a representation of McFague's work on the subject.  (Ian 
Barbour Religion in an Age of Science London: SCM Press 1990 p41f
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her work, and yet the two uses are both to be found within it.  These two uses are the 
comparative and the juxtapositive respectively137.  The former use and construction of 
models is a kind of typology, since it is a simplified and schematic representation of 
diverse objects  through the recognition of similarities.   Understood and used thus a 
model is 
'An ideal case... That is to say it is a relatively simple, artificially constructed case 
which is found to be useful and illuminating for dealing with realities that are 
more complex and differentiated.'138
or 'an abstraction formed from concrete positions'.139
Understood  thus,  models  are  hermeneutic  devices,  devices  that  aid 
understanding by providing a simple interpretive structure.  McFague's work on Parable 
and on the Kingdom are examples of the deployment of this type of model140 since in 
both cases she simply brings together a number of examples and draws out common 
features from them.  These she then uses to form a comparative model, an idealised 
description of these common features.  For example she says
'A parable is a judgement or assertion of similarity and difference between two 
thoughts in permanent tension with one another: one is the ordinary way of being in the 
world, the other the extraordinary way.'141
This statement is in effect a comparative model of parables, a summary of their 
common features when they are compared together.   As such it  provides a working 
definition and a criterion against which other texts may be judged for whether or not 
they are parables.
137 It is not intended here to make a hard and fast distinction between the two.  Rather they mark two 
opposite extreme cases and most models are likely to have both comparative and juxtapositive 
aspects. 
138 Avery Dulles Models of Revelation Dublin: Gill and Macmillan 1983 p30
139 Bevans op. cit. p29
140 See Howard Snyder Models of The Kingdom Nashville, Ten.:Abingdon Press 1991
141 Metaphorical Theology p45
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Such models may be semantically autonomous however. They may well draw all 
their features from the examples which have been compared and not bring in additional 
insight from other domains. Therefore they cannot be regarded as truly metaphorical (as 
opposed to merely categorising).  In other words there is a clear distinction between a 
generalisation of the features of rocks into a model of what rocks are and using rock as a 
metaphorical model for some other phenomenon – such as modelling a group of people 
as 'men of stone'. 
If we wished to take the example from McFague on parables just quoted to the 
next  stage,  we  would  observe  (as  she  does)  that  ‘the  assertion  of  similarity  and 
difference’ present in parables is also present in metaphors.  Therefore we could move 
on  to  say  that,  metaphorically  speaking,  parables  can  be  ‘seen  as’ metaphors  and 
therefore a model of the second sort could be proposed, namely  that ‘parables can be 
modelled as (if they were) metaphors’.
Despite her employment of the comparative model, the majority of McFague's 
proposed new models of God, and the models she is most interested in, fall into the 
second  understanding  of  models,  that  is,  the  juxtapositive,  the  ‘men  of  stone’ 
construction,  which  applies  the  ‘metaphor’ principle  of  significant  difference  to  the 
more complex and refined instance of model.  This usage brings out the heuristic and 
metaphorical character of models, creatively and revealingly projecting the structure of 
one domain onto another to re-imagine it.
This juxtapositive view of models sees them as 'logically constructed theoretical 
positions'.142 
'...theoretical models, which are excogitated with the help of creative imagination, 
have a merely mental existence, and are used for the development of theories... 
they do not claim to give a literal picture of the reality under investigation. They 
142 Models of the Kingdom p76
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are 'imagined mental constructs invented to account for the observed phenomena' 
and are used to 'develop a theory which in some sense explains the phenomena.'143 
Because she is interested in novel and heuristic models of God, and because talk 
of  God  faces  its  own particular  epistemological  considerations  in  relation  to  'data', 
McFague is interested in models which are not so much illustrative simplifications of a 
complex,  but  known,  phenomenon  (as,  for  example,  a  scale  model  is),  but  in 
metaphorical models which exploit the ability of metaphor to redescribe reality,  and 
generate  new knowledge by using a term or image out of its natural context.   Thus 
metaphorical theology is, at the level of the model, a process of discovery, of insight, 
rather than of systematic presentation and classification of complex phenomena (which 
would in McFague's scheme, be the work of theory, not of model).  This focuses our 
attention  on  the  metaphorical  character  of  theological  models  in  McFague's 
understanding.  Indeed it would be true to say that the account McFague provides of 
models is itself a model based on Black's image of a metaphor as a smoked 'grid' or 
'screen'.   McFague’s use of ‘model’ is another case where her use of common term is 
given a modified meaning peculiar to her project, informed by her studies of the nature 
of metaphor.  
McFague's most basic definition of the term ‘model’, then, is:
   'a model is a metaphor with 'staying power'.  A model is a metaphor that has gained 
sufficient  scope  so  as  to  present  a  pattern  for  relatively  comprehensive  and 
coherent explanation.'144
Models  of  this  sort,  according  to  McFague  above,  are  to  be  understood  as 
developed metaphors which begin their life as images as described above.  Any image 
143 Dulles p 31 quoting Barbour, Myths p30
144 Sallie McFague Models of God: Theology for an ecological, nuclear age. (British Edition) London: 
SCM Press 1988 p34 see also Metaphorical Theology p23
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will have around it a network of associations.  If this network meets the criteria for a 
successful  metaphor,  in  particular  if  it  provides  a  relatively  well  defined  and  well 
understood structure which may be applied to other images, so as to make it possible to 
speak about them in more depth (albeit speak about them not as they are 'in themselves' 
but 'seen as'  something else),  then the image has begun to function as an enhanced 
metaphor, that is a model.  In this sense, all models are partial, and give only interpreted 
access to the reality they seek to model.  As we saw for metaphors, seeing something as  
something else necessarily obscures what would have been seen if another model had 
been formed.  
The process of reading the structure of the model into (as well as out of) that 
which is modelled, means that the question of the validity of the model is not trivial (for 
more on the truth, reference and assessment of models see Chapter 3.2 below).  For this 
reason models alone are not enough.  Although they give structure and order to what 
would otherwise be a chaotic assortment of images bearing little relationship to each 
other, they are not, in themselves, able to provide a fully comprehensive account of 
phenomena,  hence  the  qualifier  'relatively'  in  the  quotation  above.  It  is  one  of 
McFague's key contentions that models speak only partially of what they model and do 
so  in  a  way  which  is  highly  coloured  by  the  model  chosen.   This  contention  of 
McFague’s opens the way for models other than the traditional, dominant ones. It also 
directs  attention to  the way in which the use of  one model  alone can result  in  our 
forgetting  the  sense in  which  what  is  seen is  bound up with  how we see it.   This 
colouring of the target domain by the source domain is immediately more apparent if 
several models are in play, because of the tensions generated between them.  All of this 
directs us to consider the effects our ways of seeing (our dominant models), have on our 
lives and self-understandings, and opens up the possibility of changing this.145  
145 It is the combination of these three factors that give a metaphorical theology its heuristic nature, that 
99
Yet models do allow us to speak productively and analytically about issues that 
were previously inaccessible, however 'coloured' this speaking.   McFague says:
'The development of a metaphor into a model is  a  movement from revelatory 
insight to the possibility of conceptual and systematic elaboration.  Ian Barbour 
speaks of the distinction between metaphor146 and model in the following way: 
“Metaphors  are  employed  only  momentarily   ...  but  models  are  more  fully 
elaborated and serve as wider interpretive schemes in many contexts ... models 
offer ways of ordering experience and of interpreting the world ... they lead to 
conceptually  formulated,  systematic,  coherent  religious  beliefs  which  can  be 
criticized, analyzed and evaluated.”'147
The relationship  between images  and models  is  complicated,  though,  by the 
distinction above between comparative and juxtapositive models.  McFague does not 
differentiate between them, but this distinction has been identified above.
Comparative models can be seen to allow an image to interpret other images by 
both finding and creating similarities  between them.  Where a  group of images  are 
brought together, a model may emerge as an abstraction of their common properties as 
seen when one of these images, or often an idealised image, is used to interpret the other 
images.  This interpretive move is crucial though, and is one feature that distinguishes a 
model from an image for McFague.  Thus when McFague takes a number of examples 
of metaphors, and finds similarities between them so as to construct a model of what a 
metaphor is, she is creating this sort of model.  She does similar things by interpreting 
collections  of  examples  of  parables,  the  Kingdom,  Jesus  etc.  in  order  to  produce  a 
is its ability to function as 'a system of education under which pupils are trained to find out for 
themselves'. See Models of God p36  
146 Although a model is a metaphor for McFague, not all metaphors are models.  Here the term is being 
used to denote an 'image' as opposed to a model. 
147 Sallie McFague TeSelle Speaking in Parables (British Edition) London: SCM Press 1975 p84n citing 
Barbour Myths, Models and Paradigms pp16 and 27, her editing.
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model of each of them.
A juxtapositive model on the other hand, does not seek to unify disparate but 
known images,  but  projects  a  single  image (or  small  group of  related  images)  into 
hitherto unrelated domain (McFague is doing this when she constructs her models of 
God as Mother, Lover and Friend).  This is also evidently an interpretive process.
  Although she does  not  elaborate  too dogmatically on how this  interpretive 
process should proceed, it is clear that McFague sees it, in both cases, as a process of 
mapping  particular  features,  which  she  calls  'associated  commonplaces148',  from the 
matrix of meaning surrounding the term which is used to provide the model (the source) 
to the domain which is being modelled (the target).  Thus if one were to model the 
world as a machine,149 certain (though not all) features of machines, such as regularity 
of  operation,  individual  parts  with  well  defined functions  etc.  are  mapped onto  the 
world and matched to particular phenomena within the world that lend themselves to 
interpretation in this light.
However McFague's understanding of the process of modelling may be in need 
of nuancing to ensure its continuing relevance in the light of later studies. Bisschops, 
whose work was introduced above, has shown how common metaphors deploy their 
source domain in a way that is not consistent with the general use of that domain within 
language.   The  example  he  provides  is  'He  is  treating  me  like  a  dog'  where  the 
implication is that dogs are badly treated, when in fact dogs are often spoilt by their 
owners.   Here we can see that although some 'commonplace' associations are being 
mapped (such as the concepts  of  ownership and hierarchy),  other  mappings are  not 
commonplace but are 'merely emblematic notions' about the source.150
148 Metaphorical Theology p39
149 It is this particular model that McFague spends much of her time arguing against, especially in The 
Body of God and Super, Natural Christians!
150 Bisschops p 120
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In a detailed discussion of the metaphor 'Israel as Bride' from Ezekiel in relation 
to  what  can  be  said  about  its  context,  both  literary  and  historical,  Bisschops  also 
demonstrates that the mappings intended by a metaphor, and those mapped by a later 
interpreter working on the original metaphor may be very different, in part because of 
different (cultural) experiences, but also and particularly because the metaphor may not 
be  experientially  grounded,  in  the  sense  of  drawing  either  upon  commonplace 
associations or logical entailments.  Thus a metaphor may be employed in a strictly 
limited  and controlled  sense,  and the  purpose  and context  in  which  it  is  used  may 
combine to limit the range of possible and permissible interpretations quite narrowly.  In 
the illustration from Ezekiel the metaphor 'Israel as bride' is not intended by the author 
to license a range of romantic and mystical notions of intimacy, but is designed to make 
a  few  specific  mappings,  and  these  only,  namely  'idolatry  is  adultery'  and  'God  is 
husband in the sense the God acts in a jealous-like fashion'.  
Therefore  we  can  see  that  the  move  from  metaphor  to  model  is  not  a 
straightforward one.  It would seem that although Ezekiel's metaphor could have been 
developed  into  an  extensive  model  of  the  relationship  between  God  and  Israel,  he 
expressly did  not  wish it  to  do so.   We also see  here however  the  fact  that  model 
creation is not necessarily a fairly automatic, intuitive process of mapping logical or 
commonplace meanings between domains, as McFague's account seems to imply,  but 
that it is a controlled, active process in which the model-maker must participate to bring 
about the desired outcomes.  Thus Klemm and Klink say,
'The fact that models are constructed is important, for it means that the modeler 
knows the elements of the model from the inside.  The modeler can therefore 
change and control the composition or arrangement of elements in a workable 
manner.' 151
151 Klemm and Klink  'Constructing and Testing Theological Models'  p503
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We will see this process of change and control at work to a significant extent in 
McFague's own models in chapters 4 and 5, which will confirm that this process of 
model creation is not as automatic and straightforward as McFague's methodological 
presentation seems to indicate.  For now it must be noted that this is one area in which it  
may  be  that  McFague's  approach  has  been  shown  to  be  lacking  in  the  light  of 
subsequent research, threatening its continuing relevance for theology.  However what 
seems  to  be  lacking  appears  to  be  simply  more  detail  needing  to  be  added  to  her 
account,  rather  than  a  fundamental  contradiction  which  would  threaten  the  core 
coherence of her theological project.
Now, to return to McFague's own presentation, there are several, interconnected 
paths  she takes from image to  model;  the most  basic  is  in  the extension of  certain 
individual images, such as 'mother', 'lover' and 'friend' into models of the relationship 
between God and the world.  The network of associations of these terms provides the 
structure of the model and this structure is projected upon the God-world relationship. 
We will follow this process through in Chapter 4.  This is the basic method that she is  
advocating, and the purest example of the transformation of images into models.
However this process may be seen at work in a more complicated form within 
her justification of her method itself, and this will illustrate well the fact that models are 
not a neatly defined, discrete group for McFague, but constitute a part of a continuum 
with images.
In understanding and explaining the importance and use of metaphors, McFague 
constructs models of the nature and operation of metaphors.  Her most frequently used 
model sees metaphors as if they were smoked glass screens with lines scratched into 
them through which one looks at the stars.   The smoked glass screen is an image.  It  
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provides a starting point  to begin to make metaphor understood; it allows us to speak of 
the mystery, as McFague would say.  However it initially provides only the most basic 
of structures by which to understand the nature of metaphors.  We might say that this  
image of the screen is then turned into a model as more detail is filled in, and specific 
features of the image are mapped onto, and used to interpret, the features of metaphors.
The model of the smoked glass screen is not just an illustrative device, instead 
metaphors  are  treated  as if  this  model  described how metaphors  actually  are.   The 
model  has  a  cognitive  function.   The  grid  is  not  the  only  way metaphors  may be 
modelled of course.  Certainly there are other models such as the model of the two 
interacting dipoles that was employed in Chapter 1.   The screen model does not enjoy 
any ontologically  privileged access  or  status.   However,  when metaphors  are  being 
modelled as a screen for looking through, this device is not merely illustrative, rather it 
is determining how metaphors may be thought of for McFague.   
Her central understanding of metaphors is then itself informed by a model of the 
nature  and  operation  of  metaphors.  This  model  is  of  the  imagistic  sort;  it  is  a 
metaphorical model based on the imagistic metaphor of lines on a smoked glass screen. 
But not all her models are of this imagistic type.   Although much of her work on 
parables draws upon the imagistic models just discussed in relation to metaphors, not all 
the modelling there does.  Notice the difference between the two statements:
a) a particular narrative is a parable 
b) Jesus is a parable.
In the first case certain definite features as well as more abstract qualities are 
expected to be present in the narrative.   In the second, the modelling of Jesus as a 
parable is almost entirely conceptual, in that it is abstract qualities that are being shared 
by parable, and by Jesus, rather than concrete properties.  We don’t expect Jesus himself 
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to have a narrative, a plot or internal characters, any more than we expect a ‘man of 
stone’ to have veins of quartz or iron ore in his body.  Thus it can clearly be seen that  
there is a spectrum from imagistic models such as the model of 'metaphor as a smoked 
glass screen' to conceptual models such as 'Jesus as a parable'. 
This distinction is not explicitly drawn out152 and worked through in McFague's 
work, though it is there in her account of models being a meeting place for imagistic 
and conceptual ways of speaking, for example:
'...a constructive metaphorical theology insists on a continuum and a symbiotic 
relationship  between  image  and  concept,  between  the  language  of  prayer  and 
liturgy and the language of theory and doctrine.'153
In much of her earlier attempts to put her theoretical observations on the nature 
of theology into practical expression, it is primarily imagistic models with which she is 
working  (God  as  Mother,  Lover  and  Friend  for  example).   However  it  is  largely 
conceptual models that she uses to support her case for doing so (e.g. Jesus as parable, 
parable  as  metaphor  and  so  on).   In  other  words  she  recommends  that  theology 
progresses by deploying imagistic models but then deploys conceptual ones in support 
of this.  This tension does not overly threaten the coherence of her argument since her 
actual  method  is  still  contained  within  the  general  compass  of  her  ‘metaphorical 
theology’, but it does open up the possibility that there may be other ways of doing 
theology and other justifications of traditional models at the conceptual level for which 
she does not sufficiently and explicitly allow.  It raises the suspicion that the conceptual 
level is more important to her than she seems to suggest.  To be fair to McFague she 
152 The closest McFague comes to articulating this position explicitly is in saying 'many kinds of models 
(some more metaphorical and some more conceptual) will constitute a Christian theology.' 
Metaphorical Theology p129  For metaphorical read 'imagistic', for clarity.
153 Models of God p32
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does repeatedly draw attention to the fact that, however strongly she can support the 
general applicability of her approach, she sees it as only one way to proceed and that 
others are allowable.  She herself says:
'[Models] are dangerous, for they can exclude other ways of thinking and talking, 
and in so doing they can easily become literalized, that is, identified as  the one 
and only way of understanding a subject.'154
While this is true of particular models, it may well at times also be true of the 
whole category of 'model' as she understands it.
Our observation on McFague’s thought here is particularly significant though, 
because it is a sign that the method she recommends for theology has not always been 
identical to the whole of the method that she herself employs.  This may explain her 
move over time from focusing on her more imagistic models of mother, lover and friend 
to a much heavier concentration on 'the world as God's body',  which receives much 
more systematic treatment at the conceptual and theoretical levels.  We begin to see an 
explicit awareness of the need for this sort of approach in  Models of God where she 
says:
   'Metaphorical Theology ... as a partial account focussed especially on the imagistic 
foundation of theology … is but one kind of theology, not the only or proper kind. 
Since metaphorical theology, as I have envisioned it,  is hypothetical, tentative, 
partial,  open-ended, sceptical, and heuristic, it  would be contradictory to claim 
that such theology is anything more than one of many needed kinds of reflective 
enterprises.  To propose and elucidate metaphors and models of the relationship 
between God and the world appropriate for an ecological, nuclear age is not to 
reject other theological projects. Nor does a metaphorical theology, which sees 
itself  focused  principally  at  the  level  of  the  imagination,  denounce  kinds  of 
154 Metaphorical Theology p24 Emphasis original.
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theology that propose to reflect on Christian faith in other ways. I am not merely 
suggesting that  theological  tolerance  is  a  good thing;  rather,  my own position 
within a metaphorical theology demands it.'155 
From this it can be seen that McFague made a conscious decision to focus on the 
level of image and imagistic model, only because she felt that this was the most pressing 
need in her context.  But it is important to remember that her prioritising of image and 
model is a personal and pragmatic choice.  It is not to re-allow a hierarchy of values 
which would make the imagistic level primary, or worse the only arena for theology.  
It is also worth exploring the way in which images, models and concepts inter-
relate to enable the process of category extension that, it has been argued, consistently 
shape McFague’s use of terms to expand their meaning in unfamiliar ways.  We have 
seen to this  point that the use of a metaphor may add new examples to a category, 
extending it.  For example once McFague had derived a model and concept of parables 
from individual images (i.e. examples) of parables she was able to extend the category 
‘parable’ to include ‘Jesus as parable’.  It should be noted however that it is not her 
model of parable that allows for the extension (and certainly not the comparative model 
quoted  earlier,  namely  'A  parable  is  a  judgement  or  assertion  of  similarity  and 
difference…')156 Models in general and comparative models in particular may in 
fact reduce the range of reference of a category because they provide a criteria by which 
particular  examples  may be included or  excluded by whether  or  not  they share  the 
features specified by the model.  It was on this basis that McFague excluded the ‘Good 
Samaritan’ story from the  category of  parables  on  the  basis  that  it  did  not,  in  her 
judgement, fit the criteria (specified by the model) required for it to be a parable. 157 This 
also underscores the relationship between images and models, because here we see a 
155 Models of God p40
156 See p84 above
157 See the discussion on p51 above
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model causing particular images (i.e. examples) to be excluded from a category, that is 
the model determining which images are available to inform it.   In time then, a model, 
especially of the comparative kind, may tighten up the criteria by which  it can allow 
another example into a particular category of images or qualities.
However several examples have already been identified of McFague’s use of key 
terms and categories being extended by a process of  category expansion, with more and 
more disparate phenomena being added to a category.  Now if that process is not being 
driven by the process of modelling (which as we have just  seen,  may contract,  not 
expand the category under consideration), it is likely that this expansion is being driven 
at the conceptual level.  Indeed this can clearly be seen to be the case since it is, for 
example,  precisely  because  her  model  of  Jesus  can  be  shown  to  have  conceptual 
similarities with her model of parable (in that both are seen as presenting a radical way 
of life that creates a tension between the life of the kingdom and life as it is commonly 
experienced) that the two are allowed to become identified and Jesus becomes included 
in the category of parable.  It is the abstract nature of concepts that allows them to 
connect more disparate entities and subjects, because concepts define a much larger 
range of meaning and are blind to a larger range of particular differences.  For example 
a category whose membership is defined by the strict application of the specific features 
of the model ‘Mother’ (e.g. ‘one who is a female parent’) has a narrower membership 
than  a  category  defined  by  related  concepts  such  as  ‘life  giving’ and  ‘nurturing’. 
Conceptual models blur this distinction by incorporating specific conceptual features 
into the model’s structure, but again it is likely that much of the work done by the model 
will be done by these ancillary concepts.  This hypothesis will be tested in Chapters 4 
and 5 when McFague’s models will be evaluated in practice to see if they make much 
more use of the conceptual level than she herself allows.  This will allow a comparison 
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between her methodological statements and what she actually does in practice.
All of this is a reminder that, for all the importance of models in McFague's 
work, they are not enough on their own which is why attention must now be given to 
'concepts'.  This is particularly significant for understanding McFague as it has been 
argued above that much of the unity, coherence and continuity of her thought is to be 
found at the conceptual level.
2.4 Concept. 
McFague says:
'Concepts ... arise from metaphors and models; they are an attempt to generalize at 
the  level  of  abstraction  concerning  competing  and,  at  times,  contradictory 
metaphors and models. By 'concept' we mean an abstract notion ...  A concept is 
an 'idea' or 'thought'.'158
Concepts,  then,  are  abstractions,  but  specifically in  McFague's  understanding 
they emerge from models and images.  We have already seen examples of this, such as 
the concept 'metaphorical' arising from models and images of metaphor.  
The  move  from  model  to  concept  is  again  a  move  along  a  continuum  of 
increasing abstraction (we have just seen how at least some models are more conceptual 
abstractions  of  images  than  others).   This  move  from  model  to  concept  is  in  the 
direction of particular to general, concrete to abstract, imagistic to univocal.  Since this 
process is one of both identifying and generating similarity by constructing a device for 
the indirect investigation of reality, the process of concept formation is in accord with 
McFague's  concept  of  the  metaphorical.   Because  of  the  unsubstitutable  nature  of 
metaphors,  when  the  metaphorical  process  is  applied  as  a  model  to  the  process  of 
158 Metaphorical Theology p26
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concept formation this results in a rejection of the view that the underlying images and 
models from which the concept is abstracted are dispensable.   
This is key for McFague's project, since, for all the importance assigned here to 
concepts in her work, it is images and models that she is most explicitly concerned with, 
it is therefore important to be clear about the relationship between models and concepts. 
She says:
'The  relationship  ...  is  symbiotic.  Images  'feed'  concepts;  concepts  'discipline' 
images. Images without concepts are blind; concepts without images are sterile. In 
a metaphorical theology, there is no suggestion of a hierarchy among metaphors, 
models,  and concepts:  concepts  are  not  higher,  better,  or  more  necessary than 
images,  or vice versa.  Images  are  never  free of the need for interpretation by 
concepts,  their  critique  of  competing  images,  or  their  demythologizing  of 
literalized models. Concepts are never free of the need for funding by images, the 
affectional  and  existential  richness  of  images,  and  the  qualification  against 
conceptual  pretensions  supplied  by  the  plurality  of  images.  In  no  sense  can 
systematic thought be said to explain metaphors and models so that they become 
mere  illustrations  for  concepts;  rather,  the  task  of  conceptual  thought  is  to 
generalize  (often  in  philosophical  language,  the generalizing  language),  to 
criticize images, to raise questions of their meaning and truth in explicit ways.'159
The relationship is thus, again, symbiotic.  Images are necessary to give rise to 
the concepts which are abstracted from them.  However the meaning of these images is 
not consumed or exhausted in the process.  Concepts 'discipline' models and images by 
relating them to each other and prioritising them by their correspondence to the concept 
in  question.   This  process  of  generalisation  inevitably  leads  to  loss  of  detail  –  the 
159 Ibid. Note that within this quote, the terms ‘image’, ‘metaphor’ and ‘model’ are used, if not quite 
interchangeably, certainly with considerable freedom and overlap of meaning.
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particularity of individual models is given up in exchange for the systematising power 
of the concept.  McFague puts it thus:    
'Conceptual language tends toward univocity, toward clear and concise meanings 
for ambiguous, multilevelled, imagistic language. In this process something is lost 
and something is gained: richness and multivalency are sacrificed for precision 
and  consistency.  Conceptual  thought  attempts  to  find  similarities  among  the 
models while models insist on dissimilarities among themselves.'160
Her  point  is  evident  if  we  compare  the  multivalency  of  images  with  the 
univocity  of  concepts.   Concept  formation  brings  clarity  by  screening  out  factors 
extraneous to the concept. Concept formation is a necessary step towards making the 
otherwise  undisciplined  mêlée  of  images  and  models  intelligible,  however  this 
screening process means that particularities of the images are lost. It is also the case that 
theological  images  and models  cannot,  in  and of  themselves,  be arbitrated  between 
without  the intervention of  concepts.   Nor can an individual  model  be applied to  a 
situation without concepts to direct this application, it  is concepts that suggest those 
applications of a model that are appropriate and those that are not.  
To interpret what McFague is proposing, consider Black's model of metaphor as 
a smoked glass screen.  For this model to provide any insight it needs to be 'mined' for 
conceptual similarity between the two domains.  Thus some properties of glass screens 
like hardness, coolness or smoothness do not translate fruitfully into insights into the 
properties of metaphor.  Others, like the ability to mediate and interpret what is viewed 
into a pattern defined by the screen, are more fruitful.  This is because metaphor cannot 
be said to  possess any properties  that  could be conceptualised as 'smooth'  but  does 
possess ones that can be conceptualised as 'seeing through'.161  
160 Ibid.
161 It is of course the case that not all models would be processed in this way.  The assessment of 
physical models in the sciences would include an experimental process of the exploration of properties 
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But, as already stated, concepts cannot dispense with models if they are to be 
useful or  even to have any specific reference.  For example 'love' is a concept.  It is a 
powerful  concept because it  is  abstracted from similarities between a huge array of 
significant images and experiences.  The concept helps interpret these experiences and 
allows them to relate to each other  (without the concept these experiences would have 
no  power  or  significance  beyond  themselves  and  the  specific  circumstances  within 
which they occur).  However the concept itself, as a concept, is of little value unless it is 
expressed in particular concrete realities.  It is models and images that have the ability 
to  express  and  structure  the  experiences  of  love  and  also  apply  the  concept  to  a 
particular situation, to determine the course of action that would be most loving for 
example. 
We can see what all this means more easily by considering some of McFague's 
other use of concepts in practice.  From her account of metaphor, McFague abstracts a 
number  of  concepts  such  as  'tension,  dialectic,  openness,  change,  growth  and 
relativity.'162 She derives similar concepts from the Parables and the Kingdom of God, in 
conversation with her study of metaphor.  But these rarely appear simply as abstracted 
concepts.  Where these concepts are deployed as a description of metaphor, parable or 
the  Kingdom,  they  are  functioning  as  conceptual  models and  they  are  frequently 
deployed  thus  as  a  model  for  theology  throughout  her  writings.   In  other  words 
'dialectic' is, in and of itself, a concept, but when this concept is deployed as 'parable as 
a dialectic' or 'Jesus as a dialectic' or 'theology as a dialectic', 'dialectic' is functioning as 
a metaphorical, conceptual model.
The most striking example of this is the career of the concept 'personal' in her 
work.  This is derived, both in Speaking in Parables and Metaphorical Theology, from 
between the two fields, however McFague, and we, are concerned with theological models where such 
direct methods of validation do not present themselves.
162 Metaphorical Theology p64
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Jesus as parable, the biblical parables and the vast majority of biblical and traditional 
images and models of God.  McFague wishes to speak of God as 'personal'.  Now this is 
not an attempt to actually model God as 'a person' in any concrete and definitive sense 
(for example one that might involve assigning a gender),  rather the term 'personal' is a 
concept in that its meaning is that models which are (conceptually) 'personal' are to be 
preferred over impersonal ones when speaking about God. 
We could call  this  a 'paradigmatic abstraction'  since it  is  a concept  which is 
defining of a paradigm and a concept which subordinates other concepts within that 
paradigm, but this paradigmatic abstraction, important though it is, is also very general 
and  unspecific.  As  a  concept,  it  is  too  distant  from  the  particulars  of  tradition, 
experience,  Jesus and scripture to be able to dispense with them.  Thus the concept 
'personal' needs to be translated into models again.  These models range in their level of 
abstraction.  At the most abstract is the key model (or 'root-metaphor', see section 2.5 
below) from Metaphorical Theology, 'a certain kind of relationship exhibiting a certain 
tension'.163  Next is the basic premise of Super, Natural Christians: that 'subject-subject' 
language  (rather  than  'subject-object')  is  most  appropriate  for  conceiving  of  human 
relationships to all that is.  164 The most concrete, imagistic deployment of the concept 
'personal' (along with many other supporting concepts also) is in her models of God as 
Mother, Lover and Friend (in Models of God).
Thus we see that, although McFague's thinking is funded by images and models 
and ultimately results in the production of the same, it is in fact frequently conceptually 
driven.  The unity of her thought and its points of continuity with the Christian tradition 
are at the conceptual level, whereas much theology is continuous with the tradition at 
the level of the model (e.g. continuous by virtue of sharing an established model of the 
163 Metaphorical Theology p109
164 Super, Natural Christians pp35-37 and pp107-109
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atonement, or of scripture or of the Trinity)165.  The unity drawn out by a metaphor is 
very often also at this conceptual level as has already been observed.  
This places a question mark over quite how 'earthy' and 'incarnational' theology 
can be,  as well  as how imagistic  it  can remain at  least  for 'theologians',  those who 
produce the images and models rather than simply apprehend and make use of them. 
McFague is concerned that theology is too abstract, but rectifying this may actually be a 
question  of  the  expression of  theology  in  chosen  forms  and  genres  which  seek  to 
employ concrete, basic and hence accessible imagery and models, rather than the heart 
of theological method which may need to remain somewhat abstract, or at least be open 
to engaging in abstract and conceptual thought. 
The idea that the conceptual level in McFague's thinking requires revisiting has 
been highlighted by one of her respondents in particular.  Referring to Models of God, 
Kaufmann questions  whether  models  alone  (which  he  understands  to  be  principally 
imagistic ones) can provide the necessary complexity required by theology.  He argues,
 'is it only when we move to the order of concepts that we are able to hold before 
the mind the sort of complexity with which we are here concerned? (If there is 
any doubt that matters of great complexity can be dealt with more adequately with 
concepts than with images, consider the fact that we have no difficulty whatsoever 
in conceiving very precisely the difference between a pile of sand consisting of 
two million grains and another of two million and one; but it is difficult indeed to 
see how the image of two million grains of sand differs a whit from the image of 
two million and one.'166
Now this example is slightly misleading, because it appears to be pitting image 
165 McFague is at pains, however, especially in later writings to avoid talk of a 'timeless essence' of 
Christianity.  Ultimately the continuity of a theology with the Christian tradition appears to be located 
for McFague in continuities of person, community, time, place and text.
166 Gordon Kaufmann 'Models of God: Is metaphor enough' Religion and Intellectual Life 5 1988 pp11-
18 p17
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and concept against each other directly, rather than using the concept of model as an 
intermediary as McFague does, and allowing that such models may tend towards either 
the conceptual or the imagistic (in other words two million and one grains of sand is not 
actually a  concept  in  McFague's  usage  because it  is  particular,  and this  despite  the 
difficulties in precise visualisation).  Still Kaufmann is very likely correct in going on to 
say
   'Highly complex realities can be entertained conceptually but hardly imagistically, 
(however indispensable our images may be in much of our thinking.) If we are to 
think of God, then—the creator or ground of all other reality, or the all-inclusive 
organic whole within which all other reality emerges and is sustained— it may be 
that concepts like 'evolutionary process' or 'life' or 'creativity' or 'universe' must be 
given centrality instead of powerfully evocative personal images of the sort that 
Sallie McFague (along with our ancient traditions) has suggested. I do not wish to 
make a dogmatic claim here, but I have some serious doubts that we have any 
images  complex  enough  to  do  the  work  required.  If  we  are  serious  about 
developing an adequate conception of God for our time, we will need to draw our 
metaphors from the conceptual order as well as from the imagistic order of bodies, 
mothers, and lovers.'167 
McFague's response to Kaufmann sees conceptual models as complementary to 
her  more  imagistic  ones  but  insists  that  the  images  must  remain  if  theological 
constructions are not to 'lack imaginative power ... As they say in the South 'It won't 
preach'.'168
Both writers are correct that there is a need for a balance between the imagistic 
and the conceptual.  However it is possible that theology is a more complex, multi-stage 
167 Ibid..
168 Sallie McFague 'Response' Religion and Intellectual Life 5 1988 pp38-44 p42
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process than McFague sometimes allows for, as in the views of several commentators. 
Images,  models  and  concepts  may have  differing  degrees  of  importance  in  and for 
different stages of the process.  This, however, is to anticipate matters treated later.  In 
order  to  substantiate  these  suspicions  first  the  following  chapters  will  examine 
McFague's 'models of God' themselves and identify the actual roles played by image, 
model and concept in these constructions.
That the unity of McFague's thought exists at the conceptual level may also raise 
a problem for method, since as already observed, concepts can be paralysed by their 
own  generality  if  lacking  the  intervention  of  mediating  models.   We  can  see  this 
paralysis in her own work for example when discussing whether philosophy is itself 
metaphorical she says:
'Kenneth Burke points out that 'abstraction' means 'drawing from', the drawing out 
of  similar  strains  and motifs  from dissimilar  situations.  The principal  tasks  of 
conceptual thought— analysis, classification, and synthesis— all depend on this 
process of 'drawing out' similarities within dissimilars. ... When we interpret, that 
is, when we analyze, classify, and synthesize a series of events, structures, objects, 
or whatever, we suppress the ways in which they are dissimilar because we have 
discovered significant similarities among them. It goes without saying that what 
we find to be significant is so from our own limited perspective: metaphorical 
thinking, which is to say, all thinking, is intrinsically perspectival. We say 'this' is 
like 'that,' but we realize that it is also not like 'that' and that other ways of linking  
up the similarities and dissimilarities are possible.'169
Here the concept of the metaphorical has become so abstract and so general as to 
be  of  little  practical  use;  if  all  thinking  is  metaphorical  this  result  must  be  a 
169 Metaphorical Theology p36
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generalisation at such a level of abstraction (if it is to include ‘all thought’) that it has 
disregarded  the  important  differences  between  different  ways  of  speaking,  such  as 
analysis, classification and synthesis versus poetry and storytelling.  Thus the assertion 
that ‘all thought is metaphorical’ becomes a finding of little value, it is an example of 
category expansion going so far that the category itself becomes so ill defined it is of 
little practical use.  This illustrates both the need for concrete models to make concepts 
practically useful and also the fact that concepts cannot dispense with the models that 
give rise to them.  
Now McFague clearly realises this, at least when it comes to her outworking of 
her theology in practice. This is why she is so focussed on models, as indispensable to 
the framing of the conceptual, saying:
'We will focus on models because, as mediators between metaphors and concepts, 
they partake of the characteristics of each and are an especially fruitful type of 
expression  to  investigate  for  a  metaphorical  theology  ..  .The  tasks  of  a 
metaphorical theology will become clear: to understand the centrality of models in 
religion and the particular models in the Christian tradition; to criticize literalized, 
exclusive  models;  to  chart  the  relationships  among  metaphors,  models,  and 
concepts;  and  to  investigate  possibilities  for  transformative,  revolutionary 
models.'170
And, 
    'what are  interesting and important  are the particular  metaphors,  models,  and 
concepts which make God's saving power a concrete reality for particular peoples 
in particular times and places. Our primary datum is not a Christian message for 
all time which becomes concretized in different contexts; rather, it is experiences 
of women and men witnessing to the transforming love of God interpreted in a 
170 Metaphorical Theology p28
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myriad of ways.'171 
Above it was contended that McFague's theology is often conceptually driven. 
This remains true but it is important that this statement is always held together with the 
latter  of  the  preceding  quotations,  which  stresses  its  need  for  concrete  expression. 
McFague's method requires her to pass through a conceptual phase before returning to 
models but this is not a quest for a timeless essence of Christianity, that is for a set of 
universal Christian concepts.  Rather this search for conceptual unity and continuity 
with tradition is:
 'Always a partial, limited account of the contours of the salvific power of God in a 
particular time in light of the paradigmatic figure of Jesus of Nazareth.'172 
However  it  is  important  to  our  purposes  that  the  unity  of  her  thought  is  at 
conceptual level and not at another level.  McFague is of course setting out to change 
Christianity both through a process of addition and subtraction.  The relative benefits of 
these  losses  and  gains  is  of  course  a  subjective  evaluation  and  one  which  will  be 
revisited throughout our discussions of McFague's proposed models.    Speaking of one 
historically and currently dominant traditional model for example, McFague says 
'The problem does not lie with the model of 'God the father,' for it is a profound 
metaphor  and  as  true  as  any  religious  model  available,  but  it  has  established  a 
hegemony over the Western religious consciousness which it is the task of metaphorical 
theology to break …. [therefore] we will look at new religious images and models…'173
She is seeking
'a  significant  reformation  of  the paradigm,  a  reformation  both meaningful  to 
171 Models of God p 44
172 Models of God p 45
173 Metaphorical Theology p29
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feminists and in continuity with the root-metaphor of Christianity.'174
The main point to note here is that McFague locates herself within Christianity, 
as  a reformer within that  tradition,  not  as  a revolutionary trying to establish a  new 
religion,  not  even  a  new  religion  based  upon  Jesus.   But  she  is  aware  that  the 
reformation of the paradigm (of Christianity itself) may become a revolution, that is it 
may become a wholly new paradigm (a new religion), unless it is mindful of its points 
of continuity. However the possibilities of maintaining this continuity depend, she says
'both  on  the  profundity  of  the  basic  models  of  a  tradition  and  a  tradition’s 
flexibility in admitting new options.'175
It  is  important  to  identify  where  she  sees  her  points  of  continuity  with 
Christianity in order to assess whether her work is consistent and succeeds on its own 
terms,  as  well  as  making,  as  she  wishes,  a  continued  contribution  to  theology  (a 
contribution which is only possible if the interface between McFague’s theology and 
other theologies is clear).  However, the quotes above indicate a level of equivocation in 
McFague  as  to  where  continuity  with  the  tradition  is  maintained  –  is  it  through 
‘flexibility’ and the co-existence of new models with traditional ones?  Is it  through 
preserving  a  ‘root-metaphor’  or  through  the  durability  of  ‘basic  models’?  These 
questions are explored in more detail in the next section.
At this stage, as consideration is given to the role of concepts in her thought it is 
important to note that the conceptual level of McFague’s work does provide the meeting 
place  for  models  from  disparate  fields,  such  as  Philosophy  of  Language  and 
Christology.  We see this clearly in the fusing of concepts arising from reflections on 
Jesus, on parable and on metaphor and the way in which these three become unified into 
174 Ibid. p147
175 Ibid. p146
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a  single  coherent  account,  held  together  by  consistent  conceptual  connections. 
Although this fusion is especially convincing in its conceptual coherence because Jesus 
taught  so  heavily  in  parables,  (and  so  there  is  a  direct  line  connecting  the  three 
together), this approach of conceptual harmonising and resultant deploying of models 
across disciplines could perhaps be used more widely than McFague attempts to do. It 
could be used for example to relate her models to traditional ones.
 This  means  that  McFague's  theological  project  could  perhaps  be  further 
legitimised on its own terms as reforming and not revolutionary if a synthesis at the 
conceptual  level  was  attempted  between  pre-existing  theological  models  and  the 
proposed new images and models.  
Chapters  4  and  5  will  put  these  features  of  McFague's  theology to  the  test.  
Indeed  here  one  of  the  key  tests  has  been  identified,  a  conceptual  continuity  of 
relationship  with  Christianity,  however  defined,  that  avoids  revolution  and  enables 
reformation  within  that  religious  tradition  as  McFague  herself  aspires  to.   The 
relationship between McFague's constructive theology and traditional models will be 
examined as also will the modifications made to that tradition by the process of the 
interpretation of these new heuristic metaphorical constructions.  Close attention will be 
given  to  the  role  that  concepts  play in  her  constructive  theology as  her  method  is 
expressed  in  concrete  examples  since  several  reasons  have  been  advanced  here  for 
giving  more  weight  to  the  role  of  conceptualisation  and  conceptual  reasoning  in 
theology than McFague may allow for.
In this section, we have begun to see how McFague's thoughts on theological 
method are integrated to form an overarching 'theory' which must be treated and judged 
as a whole as well  as in its  interrelating parts.   Therefore we will  now look at  her 
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observations on 'theory' and at the theory of theology that she advances.
2.5 Theory.
Concepts,  as  we  have  just  seen,  relate  models  and  images  by  finding  and 
generating  similarities.   Concepts  also  direct  the  application  of  models.   However 
concepts,  as  concepts  alone,  cannot  arbitrate  between  models  or  arrange  models 
hierarchically into more comprehensive and ordered systems.  This process of arranging 
and relating models critically is the process of theory formation.  
McFague defines theory as follows:
'by  theory  we  mean  a  speculative,  systematic  statement  of  relationships 
underlying certain phenomena.  A concept is an idea or thought; a theory organises ideas 
into an explanatory structure.  Concepts, unlike metaphors, so not create new meaning, 
but  rely  on  conventional,  accepted  meanings.   Theories,  unlike  models,  do  not 
systematise one area in terms of another, but organise concepts into a whole…. All…
theories are metaphorical in the sense that they too are constructions; they are indirect 
attempts to interpret reality, which can never be dealt with directly…[They] are at the 
far end of the continuum and rarely expose their metaphorical roots.'176 
'Systematic thought tries to organise all the dominant models in a tradition into 
an  overarching system with a  key model  of  its  own.  For  instance,  for  Paul,  it  was 
justification by grace through faith, for Augustine, the radical dependence of all things 
upon God…Each of these is a radical model, which could be called a 'root-metaphor'177.
A theory then, is a network of models and images related by concepts but also, 
crucially, by one or more 'key models'. These models are themselves likely to be quite 
176 Metaphorical Theology p26
177 Ibid. p27
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abstract and conceptual and they are variously named as follows in her writing with 
little substantial difference between them.  Therefore the terms 'root-metaphor',178 'key 
model' and 'material norm179' should all be understood as playing the same role, though 
each may be subtly different in its location along the continuum from basic image to 
concept.
McFague defines a root metaphor as:
'a 'root metaphor' is the most basic assumption about the nature of the world or 
experience that we can make when we try to give a description of it.'180
She also defines a paradigm as
'the most basic set of assumptions within which a tradition…functions. It is the 
unquestioned framework or context for its normal operations.' 181
But a paradigm is also:
'the tradition that sets the limits on the range of acceptable models…[and] root-
metaphors are the content that specifies these limits'.182
Therefore we can see that McFague seems to use ‘root metaphor’ to define both 
‘theory’ and 'paradigm', giving both terms similar senses, though with a paradigm being 
the  broadest,  most  general  and  basic  case  of  theory.   Therefore  the  two  will  be 
considered together.
At this point it is important to note the difference between a 'theory of theology' 
(e.g. metaphorical theology) and a 'theological theory'  (e.g. the world as the body of 
God).  There is a clear difference between the types of key models used in the two 
cases, a difference which is due to the tension outlined in the previous section between 
an understanding of the nature of theology itself as finding unity and continuity at an 
178 Ibid. p28
179 Models of God p45
180 Metaphorical Theology p28
181 Metaphorical Theology p108
182 Ibid. p109
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abstract conceptual level, and the need for theology to make this intelligible in more 
concrete and imagistic output. 
McFague's theological theories are explored in detail in chapters 4 and 5, here, 
however, concern is with her theory of theology itself.  Because this first, basic stage is 
determining  of  all  that  follows  on  from it,  attention  is  primarily  on  her  paradigm. 
Paradigm  formation  is,  as  was  said  above,  the  most  generalising  case  of  theory 
formation.  The key models in her understanding of the Christian paradigm therefore 
unsurprisingly tend towards the simple and abstract.  They are much more conceptual 
models. 
We  shall  look  at  what  these  key  paradigmatic  models  are  shortly.   Firstly, 
though, it is worth recalling the distinction made in the Introduction between criticisms 
of a theology that share the same paradigm as that theology and criticisms which do not 
share its paradigm.  For reasons of space and focus, attention here is devoted to the 
former  only.   Therefore  no  attempt  will  be  made  to  evaluate  McFague's  key 
paradigmatic models in relation to other potential models. Rather, the following account 
of McFague's Christian paradigm should be seen as the initial foundation or reference 
point in relation to which McFague's models of God will be assessed; other Christian 
paradigms  could  doubtless  be  defined..   The  following  section,  therefore,  forms  a 
prelude  to  our  more  detailed  examination  of  criteria  for  the  assessment  of  a 
metaphorical theology in the next chapter.
 Before considering the content of McFague's  Christian paradigm, which has 
remained  fairly  constant  throughout  her  career,  first  it  should  be  asked  how  her 
understanding of the status of this paradigm has developed over time. 
Metaphorical Theology contains an unresolved tension which is only fully faced 
in  Life  Abundant.  The former,  along with  Speaking in Parables,  seems to find the 
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continuity  within  Christianity  (and  thus  between  her  theology,  other  potential 
metaphorical  theologies,  and Christianity)  existing at  the conceptual  level  but  being 
expressed in certain constant, paradigm-defining root-metaphors.  This is evident in the 
quotation with which Chapter 1 began, where the theologian is described as one who 
makes the gospel heard in their time.  The strongest statement of this position is the 
assertion that, if we change the root metaphor, we change the religion183.
However  Metaphorical Theology also appears to claim that the continuity is to 
be located not so much in a defining root-metaphor, but in the continuities of individual 
persons and human communities and their identities, experiences and texts.  She says 
for example 
'Christians confess their faith by telling a story or a series of stories…a religious 
tradition…is transmitted more by the memory of its exemplars than by a set of explicit 
principles'184
These two positions are partially unified by an appeal to the person of Jesus, 
whose story it is that is transmitted and who also embodies the root-metaphor but this 
does not itself entirely resolve the issue.  We may still ask of McFague whether it is a 
particular timeless model or concept derived from Jesus or the retelling and reliving of 
the story of Jesus in a particular context that is the point of continuity for Christianity?
In Metaphorical Theology most weight seems to be placed on the role of ‘root-
metaphor’  and  a  particular  account  of  this  ‘root-metaphor’  as  'a  new  quality  of 
relationship, a way of being in the world under the rule of God…. [a way of being that 
is]…highly  metaphorical  –  abjuring  identification,  possession,  absolutism,  stasis, 
conventionality, and spiritualism.'185
This approach, while faced with difficulties preventing a timeless ‘essence’ of 
183 Metaphorical Theology p110
184 Ibid. p111
185 Ibid. p109
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Christianity being reintroduced to the discussion from whence McFague had sought to 
banish them, does at least 'set the limits on the range of acceptable models' and provides 
us with a criterion by which models may be judged as falling within the tradition.
However in the later work, Life Abundant, McFague appears to have opted for the 
second of these positions, saying that the matter of what is 'Christian':
 '...is an empirical, not a foundational question.'186
 However, even if it is an empirical question, certain distinctions need to be made 
between what is, and is not, Christian, and a basis must be provided for making this 
distinction.  Ultimately it may appear that she has opted for the latter, socio-historical 
(rather than conceptual or dogmatic) basis for the continuity by directing attention to the 
'the  Christic  lens'  with  which  Christianity  operates187.   This  would  suggest  that  the 
defining characteristics of Christianity are its ways of seeing the world in continuity 
with the historical person of Jesus of Nazareth.  But the choice of the term 'Christic' is  
significant, since it implies a certain reading of Jesus.  Historical Jesus studies make a 
clear distinction between Jesus of Nazareth, and the Christ as the interpretation of him 
(which stands in contrast to Jewish or Islamic interpretations of him for example).  Thus 
it  appears  that  the  continuity  of  her  thought  is  indeed  really  to  be  found  at  the 
conceptual level and that the tension between this and her desire not to exclude any 
understanding of Christianity, or absolutise another, remains ultimately unresolved.  
This tension should not be judged to be fatal for her project, though it does leave 
McFague open, as will  be seen later,  to being quickly dismissed as ‘unchristian’ by 
critics188.   It  can  be  partially  resolved  by following  her  later  movement  towards  a 
186 Sallie McFague Life Abundant Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in Peril Minneapolis: 
Fortress 2000 p60
187 The Body of God pp160-8   For a full discussion of ‘The Christic Lens’ see Shannon Schrein Quilting 
and Braiding:The Feminist Christologies of Sallie McFague and Elizabeth Johnson in Conversation  
Minnesota: The Liturgical Press 1998 p46f 
188  See for example Paul D Molnar Divine freedom and the doctrine of the immanent Trinity: in  
dialogue with Karl Barth and contemporary theology London: Continuum 2005 p7
125
position  which  advocates  that  the  task  of  branding something Christian  or  not  is  a 
matter of discernment for a Christian community.   This is in line with her practical 
concerns – ultimately for McFague her theology is validated if it changes the thought, 
and  therefore  the  behaviour,  of  real,  living  Christians,  so  its  reception  by  that 
community is central.  She is not interested in deriving a technical definition by which 
she may judge her own work in a vacuum as being ‘Christian’.   This does not solve the 
issue,  rather  it  transfers  responsibility  for  solving  it  to  the  receiving  community! 
However since it is likely that any such community would draw upon the person of 
Jesus and the narratives concerning him, as well as their own traditioned experience, we 
can see that the requirement for the community to ‘embody the tension’ fits well with 
McFague’s  beliefs  concerning  the  ultimate  nature  of  theology  as  provisional  and 
tentative.  After all she says
'Christianity  will  be  lost…if  the  tensive  qualities  of  the  parables  and 
Jesus as parable are lost.'189
Meanwhile what is most significant for our purposes here in the argument that 
McFague is putting forward, is that in neither case is continuity to be located solely at 
the level of any one particular  model.  Thus there are no absolute models which are 
above  criticism,  there  is  no  model  whose  use  by  itself  guarantees  the  status  of  a 
theology as Christian and there is also 'space' for new models. 
For our purposes here, then, McFague's Christian paradigm should be treated as 
defining  Christianity for her, in her particular place in time, in personal development 
and as a member of a community.  Thus, with Christianity defined for her by controlling 
metaphors, which are themselves expressions of foundational concepts, her desire to 
accommodate  other  paradigms  established  upon  other  concepts  and  root  metaphors 
amounts in reality to little more than a statement of the provisional and tentative nature 
189 Metaphorical Theology p110
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of her own paradigm.  Ultimately she provides no philosophical framework for uniting 
or  relating  the  multiple  paradigms  that  she  insists  Christianity  (as  an  historical, 
communal entity)  can work with.   No attempt will  be made here to provide such a 
framework but we will look instead at her particular definition of the Christic lens and 
work within it. We are interested in whether or not McFague's work is coherent on its  
own terms, and therefore, as part of this, whether it is Christian on its own terms, rather 
than when judged against an external definition of what is Christian.  
Having located  the  boundaries  of  her  paradigm for  her  theology,  we should 
therefore look at its content.  McFague's key paradigmatic models derive from common 
concepts found in her ethical position and imperatives, her study of metaphor and the 
parables and her understanding of Jesus which links all these together.  Jesus is defining 
of the paradigm because her reading of him is such that not only do his teaching and life 
connect  her  ethics  and  understanding  of  metaphor  together  but  also  because  the 
traditional doctrine of the incarnation resonates at  the conceptual level with both of 
these.  Through the metaphorical model of the incarnation God is 'seen as' a fully human 
being who teaches and lives a life which itself re-images the world by a dynamic and 
dialectic tension between a logic of hierarchy, limitation domination and exclusion and 
a logic of radical equality, grace, self-offering and abundant life.  As the highest point of 
conceptual cohesion, Jesus is deployed as the key model in the Christian paradigm as 
she understands it.   This has the following consequences for the derivation of root-
metaphors to which all her theological 'output' that follows must be held accountable.
 Firstly, as we have seen, relational models will predominate because Jesus was a 
person and spoke of relationships and conceived of God in relational terms.  We have 
already seen how this root-metaphor appears in various forms.  This is not to say that 
impersonal models are ruled out, indeed McFague advocates the exploration of such, 
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rather it is to say that it is personal models, and ultimately the model of God as personal, 
that  will  predominate  and  it  is  these  to  which  impersonal  models  must  be  held 
accountable.
Secondly, this relationship must be a relationship of a certain type and exhibit a 
certain tension.  This is conceptually expressed in Models of God as 'the transforming 
love of God'.  In terms of models this love is exemplified by Jesus according to the 
reading of him given by liberation theology.
This is of course a partial reading of Jesus as is to be expected. Seeing Jesus 
through this 'grid' necessarily excludes other features that would be seen through other 
grids.  However this is the grid that McFague chooses because it is the one that she feels 
produces, not a defining message for all time, but the necessary message for her time 
and context. 
The  principal  features  of  this  reading  of  Jesus  are,  firstly,  a  destabilising, 
reorienting  stance  with  respect  to  conventional  understandings  of  divisions  and 
dualisms of value, secondly a tendency to inclusivity, to include those conventionally 
accorded lesser value by virtue of these divisions and dualisms and thirdly an anti-
triumphalist and anti-hierarchical compassion for those it seeks to include by empathy 
and solidarity with the same.
This, then is the key model of Jesus which is defining of her theological theory 
and it will be outlined further in Chapter 4.  It also provides the basis for the criteria for 
the criticism of models outlined in chapter 3.   We should remind ourselves that for 
McFague it is emphatically not the case that this key model says all that can or must be 
said by a theology.  This model simply provides a reference point and the possibilities of 
order and assessment for the whole network of images, models and concepts which are 
required to give expression to the fullness of the human, lived experience in the light of 
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God.
McFague  herself  provides  a  clear  account  of  how  these  four  points  on  the 
continuum, from image through model and concept, to theory, function in practice, with 
reference specifically to, say, the theology of St Paul190.  (This is of course a very quick 
sketch of Paul's thought, but it does serve to sum up the basic nature of the theological 
method with which McFague is working.) 
Paul, she contends, generalises upon the Kingdom of God as it is expressed in 
the images and models of the parables.  This produces the concept of 'justification by 
faith'.   This concept is in continuity with the parables,  but it  in no way reduces the 
parables to illustrations of itself,  nor is it  the only concept that can be drawn out of 
them.  Rather this concept is then applied, by means of key models of the atonement, 
that express the concrete meaning of 'justification by faith' in relation to which other 
themes in Paul's thinking are derived or ordered.   
Taken together, then, this network of images, models and concepts related to its 
key concept and resultant models form a 'justification theory' of the Christian life.
2.6 Summary. 
This chapter has distinguished between McFague's theory of theology and its 
application in  particular  models.   Exploration of  the  relationship  between these has 
identified both in theory and in application the nature, roles and interrelationships of 
images, models, concepts and theories.
We have seen how McFague uses examples (or ‘images’ in its expanded sense) 
of metaphors in order to derive a particular model of what metaphors are.  This model in 
turn gives rise to concepts of ‘the metaphorical’ and these inform a theory of metaphor 
190 Metaphorical Theology p27
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which brings all of the previous levels together into a coherent whole.
The originality  of  McFague,  and what  makes  her  a  theologian  rather  than  a 
philosopher  of  language,  is  that  this  movement  from image to  model  to  concept  to 
theory with respect to her understanding of metaphor is always being  integrated with 
the same process being carried out in relation to her religious experience, to scripture 
and its accounts of Jesus, to the historic Christian tradition and also her discernment of 
the ethical agenda of her context.  
We see a good example of this integration in Metaphorical Theology where she 
describes the life of the Kingdom as 'metaphorical' in that it:
'abjur[es]  identification,  possession,  absolutism,  stasis,  conventionality  and 
spiritualism.'191
Here her method and associated models (i.e. her understanding of metaphor) are 
being united with her theological understanding and lived experience of a root-metaphor 
of the Christian tradition, namely the Kingdom of God, at the conceptual level.  It is this 
sort of coherence that is one test of a theology as McFague understands it.  
Her theological theories are therefore, it can be argued, informed at many points 
by her theory of theology not only in form (as would entirely be expected) but also in 
content.   In the following chapter we will see this in more detail as the criteria and 
process by which theological models are to be assessed are more firmly set out.  It will 
be seen that these criteria are deeply informed by McFague's theory of theology itself in 
that the key concepts and models used to assess the content of such models also provide 
the conceptual content of the models themselves.  
We will continue to see that she is able to provide an integrated account of a 
theological  approach  that  enables  her  to  construct  God-talk  which  is  thoroughly 
‘metaphorical’ both in its form and its content as she seeks to do.  It is ‘metaphorical’ in 
191 Metaphorical Theology p109
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the sense that her understanding of metaphor is deeply integrated into the process by 
which God-talk is created, the literary forms in which it is expressed, the criteria by 
which it is assessed, the root-metaphor it seeks to embody and the content of that God-
talk as being about a quality of transformative tension which unites disparate entities.
This  chapter  has  also  sought  to  develop  and  clarify  McFague's  explicit 
methodological statements.  This has been done for two reasons.  Firstly to assess the 
coherence  of  McFague's  proposed  theological  methodology,  particularly  in  light  of 
insights  from  selected  later  sources  and  secondly  to  enable  us  to  proceed  to  an 
assessment of whether  or not the method McFague advocates is  in fact  the method 
which she employs.  Important questions raised in this regard were as follows: 
A discussion of images raised questions about the role of personal experience.
The section on models raised questions surrounding the relative importance of 
the conceptual level, the roles of heuristic and hermeneutical models and the precise 
nature of the modelling process.
The discussion of concepts generated several questions for the consistency of 
McFague's method with its application.  These centred on the role and importance of the 
conceptual  level  in  metaphorical  theology  and  in  locating  the  points  of  continuity 
between McFague's models and the Christian tradition, broadly understood. 
Discussions of theory returned attention again to the question of the relationship 
between  McFague's  models  and  the  existing  Christian  tradition,  showing  the 
ambivalence in McFague's position between a link based on 'root-metaphor' and one 
based on continuities of community.
This critical process is continued in the next chapter.  Meanwhile, the following 
passage from McFague provides a good summary of the ground we have covered thus 
131
far. 
'The aim of a metaphorical theology, as we recall, is to envision ways of talking 
about the relationship between the divine and the human which are nonidolatrous 
but relevant: ways which can be said to be true without being literal; ways which 
are meaningful to all peoples, the traditionally excluded as well as the included. 
Such a theology, I believe, is appropriate to the Protestant sensibility and I have 
suggested clues to its character from the parables of Jesus and Jesus as parable. In 
this  framework,  moreover,  models  are  critical  because  models  are  dominant 
metaphors: they retain the tension of metaphor—its 'is and is not' quality which 
refuses all literalization. Models are also dominant metaphors: they are dominant 
within a  tradition both because they have earned that  right  as 'classics'  which 
speak to people across many ages and because they have usurped that right to the 
false exclusion of other metaphors. Both their right and their usurpation of right 
must be taken into account.'192
Again though, despite these small criticisms of McFague, we have seen the high 
degree of coherence and consistency at this more complex level of her thought as well 
as in its basic elements considered in Chapter 1. We have also seen that while again 
subsequent research has suggested a direction for the modification of one aspect, the 
larger part of her theological project itself endures this research, detailed analysis and 
the scrutiny of her respondents. These observations continue to support the view that 
that her theology is indeed still able to meet its aims today.  
192 Metaphorical Theology p28
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Chapter 3 – Critiquing models in practice.
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3.1 Introduction.
This chapter looks at both theoretical and practical criteria for assessing models 
of God in metaphorical theologies in light of McFague’s work, in order to derive the 
criteria used to assess her models of God in relationship with the world in the following 
chapters.
It  begins  by looking at  the  relationship  between 'metaphorical  theology'  and 
theology  more  generally,  showing  how  McFague's  approach  is  located  within  the 
discipline while remaining distinct from it in its emphases and style.   It will also show 
that it is not necessary to look outside McFague's own work in order to assess it for its 
consistency since she provides criteria for assessment as part of her method.  However 
these criteria are not themselves alien to theology more widely.  This discussion will 
also  support  the  conclusions  reached  in  the  preceding  chapter  where  we  saw  that 
considerable  work  needs  to  be  done  in  order  to  understand  more  clearly  the 
relationships between theories that are structured around different key models.  Do these 
define different and irreconcilable paradigms, or may they be integrated with each other 
in some way? 
We will then move to consider the question of the truth and reference of models 
in  McFague's  theology.   This  is  necessary  since  these  questions  are  of  central 
importance for  the assessment  of her theology.  The nature of  any attempt to  assess 
theological models will naturally depend upon the understanding of truth and reference 
used by that work.   (For example, a naively realist theology would be in principle open 
to straightforward empirical confirmation or denial.)  It will be seen that these questions 
of truth and reference are not trivial but that the 'shy ontological claims' made by models 
in metaphorical theology are in fact secondary in the practice of assessing them, with 
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pragmatic factors being more to the fore and experience playing a more subtle role is 
this assessment process than straightforward verification.  It will also be observed that 
McFague can  appear  equivocal  about  the  ability of  her  models  to  refer  to  God.  In 
drawing  upon  the  work  of  other  researchers  in  relevant  fields,  potentially  fruitful 
directions towards a remedy of this dilemma will be advanced.  Questions will also be 
raised concerning the adequacy of pragmatic criteria alone as grounds for verification. 
This will suggest a question mark over the precise link McFague makes between models 
and ethics and between her models and the Christian tradition and scriptures.  It will 
also be argued that if the ability of religious language to refer to God is taken seriously, 
this also requires more attention to be paid to relating models to each other.   
Over  the  course  of  this  chapter,  formal  and  substantial  criteria  for  choosing 
between  models  will  be  drawn  from  McFague's  work  and  these,  along  with  the 
accompanying questions just outlined will be investigated in practice in the following 
chapters.
This  will  be  followed  by  a  brief  examination  of  these  criteria  in  action  in 
McFague's hands as we look at  her critique of one principal model in the Christian 
tradition, God as Father. This section will illustrate how McFague's criteria operate in 
practice and it is also important for clarifying her relationship to traditional Christianity, 
which she sees as a 'reforming' one rather than a 'revolutionary' relationship.
Finally all these observations over this chapter and the two preceding will be 
drawn together.  These encompass McFague’s relationship to the Christian tradition and 
set  out  ways  in  which  this  relationship  will  be  evaluated  in  the  remainder  of  our 
enquiries.
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3.2 Theology and metaphorical theology.  
 Is all theology metaphorical? Or is only 'metaphorical theology' metaphorical? 
The answer to these questions is, typically, both yes and no.  
All theology, McFague would argue, is metaphorical at least in the sense that all 
language is metaphorical (see our discussion of radical metaphor in Chapter 1) and thus 
all human discourse is metaphorically based.  Further all theology is metaphorical given 
her  radical  monotheism  which  rejects  any  pretensions  of  theological  models  to 
achieving the status of literal descriptions or definitions of the divine.  She strongly 
rejects  the  view  that  this  reduces  all  reality  to  a  'game',  seeing  the  error  of 
deconstructionism as its failure to allow that there is any reality beyond metaphor.193  By 
this she means that,
    'the 'games'  we play with language make a difference in what we understand 
reality to be and how we conduct our lives in relation to other beings, both human 
and non-human.'194
The universality of metaphor has two consequences for McFague then.  The first 
is that it  means for her that no one discourse can claim ultimate superiority over all 
other possible ones by a claim to be an absolute and literal representation of reality. 
This clears sufficient space for her project.  On the other hand, it does not imply that 
'anything goes'; it is still possible to advance reasons for holding one position and not 
another, and crucially such arbitration is necessary and desirable.  
On  what  basis  this  arbitration  should  proceed  is  another  question,  although 
important pointers towards an ethical basis  for arbitration are already evident in the 
quotation above.  An exploration of this process of arbitration comprises much of this 
193 Models of God p26ff  The position she takes here implies a basic premise of realism but links this 
realism strongly to ethics and human behaviour.  For more on this, see below.
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chapter, but, before we turn to this, there are still a number of points to be made about 
the relationship between metaphorical and other forms of theology.
As noted in chapter 2, the understanding of all language as metaphorical exists at 
such a level of abstraction as to be of little material use and does not take into account 
real differences in the usage of language.  It is also clearly the case that while there are 
some forms of theology that McFague seeks to reject which do not correspond to the 
metaphorical approach, there are also other forms of theology which she seeks to affirm 
and see as complimentary to her own.  Where these latter theologies can be seen simply 
as using alternative but equally valid key models they cause little problem, and such is 
the way that McFague seems to regard many of the great theologies of Christian history. 
However  the  difficulties  are  more  substantial  if  the  ‘metaphorical’ method  that  we 
outlined in chapter 2 is not taken to be  normative for all theology.  On this question 
McFague is more equivocal as already seen.  
Therefore,  if  not  all  theology  is  metaphorical  theology,  and  not  all  non-
metaphorical theology is illegitimate, then the relationship between metaphorical and 
non-metaphorical theology at least requires exploration in future research.  However 
questions of this nature fall outside our area of focus.  What at least needs to be said 
here is that the precise structure of the relationship between the metaphorical and non-
metaphorical approaches is not clear from McFague's writing.  Despite this it can be 
observed that firstly she wishes to engage with, and indeed participate in, the discipline 
and traditions of Christian theology and secondly she regards herself as speaking to and 
answerable to this community.  She therefore sees some need for continuity with this 
community in terms of the form and content of her theology as well as a sociological 
continuity based on personal participation with this community.  
138
She also sees a distinction, at least in degree, between her form of 'constructive 
theology'  and  others.   She  says,  for  example,  that  'metaphorical  theology'  is  'more 
experimental, imagistic and pluralistic',195 while other constructive theologies are more 
'systematic,  comprehensive,  conceptual'.196   Although  attention  has  been,  and  will 
continue to be, drawn here to the fact McFague's theology is far more conceptually 
based than she herself seems to allow, the point can be conceded to some extent because 
'metaphorical theology' draws upon metaphor and parable  in its content as well as its  
form.  The use of metaphor, not only as a methodological constraint but as itself a key 
model  in  both  the  construction  and the  content  of  theology,  and the  fusing  of  this 
understanding with a rejection of absolutism and dualism in life and ethics, means that 
'metaphorical theology' is not to be seen primarily as a normative, prescribed  method 
but as an ethos, a value system.  Thus, it may be say that even if all theology is in some 
sense metaphorical, this does not make it all 'Metaphorical Theology'.  
In the light of this, the criteria for the assessment of theological models become 
less  a  case  of  formal  application  of  rules  for  deciding  'right'  models  from 'wrong' 
models, and more a subjective, personally involving, experience-based assessment of 
the  content  of  models,  as  being  comparatively  better  or  worse  suited  (than  other 
competing models) for producing the sort of vision of reality and way of life advocated 
by metaphorical theology.  
This would appear to be making theology, of necessity, comparative.  That is to 
say that theological models, on this understanding, must be regarded as better or worse 
for particular purposes than another given model.  This is very likely the reason for 
McFague's extensive critical engagement with mainstream (or 'malestream') Christian 
models, such as Father, Lord and King and may be a considerable reason for her desire 
195 Models of God p37
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to participate in the Christian theological community; it gives her the alternative models 
required by her own account of the justification of beliefs and consequently her models 
can be supported, not in any ultimate sense as being demonstrably 'true', but as being 
better (in the sense of 'more suited to certain purposes') than other, prior models. 
Thus Metaphorical Theology should be seen as engaging with the models of the 
Christian theological community, but doing so using a hermeneutic which is distinctive 
and yet still  congruent with the root-narrative of that community: the story of Jesus 
Christ.  This hermeneutic arises from the unity of formal understanding and material 
content  in  McFague's  theology.   The  major  strength  of  her  theology  is  that  she 
incorporates the theological and philosophical problems of language into her approach 
in a holistic and organic way; she makes them central and integrated into the form and 
content of her theology rather than leaving then as a peripheral auxiliary hypothesis. 
'Metaphorical' therefore denotes a value system as well as a theological method; it is an 
attempt to unify at the conceptual level both theological means and theological ends.  It 
is  the universal nature of problems of language that leads to the apparent claims of 
metaphorical  theology  to  be  the  only  possible,  or  at  least  most  beneficial,  type. 
However  such an absolute  claim is  also against  the ethos  of  metaphorical  theology 
itself.  It is this tension that results in the lack of clarity and the need for further research 
identified above.   Below we will see that this tension ultimately derives from a failure 
by  McFague  to  distinguish  between  a  model's  verifiability in  relation  to  'objective 
reality' and its capacity to potentially depict or reference that reality.
Of course all of this is to presuppose that the question of the truth and reference 
of models is not simple.  If it were to be the case that the models were taken to be a  
direct and literal representation of reality it would be relatively easy to judge between 
them by determining objectively which model bore the closest resemblance to 'the truth'. 
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However, as we shall see in the following section, things are not so simple and the role 
played by 'data' and 'experiment' in the assessment of theological models is more subtle. 
3.3  Truth and reference in metaphorical theology.
At the heart of McFague's understanding of metaphor is the simultaneous 'is' and 
'is  not'  of  the  metaphorical  way  of  speaking.   Both  are  important.   Metaphorical 
statements do seek to refer beyond themselves.  They are realist in their intention, but 
they refer only indirectly.  Whatever is seen, is not seen 'as it is in itself,' but by being 
'seen as' something else.  Thus the reference of a metaphorical statement is indirect. 
According to McFague herself,  this  places her epistemology in the 'critically realist' 
camp197.  This is to be distinguished from 'naïve realism' which sees its statements as 
directly referring to reality and as therefore being literally true (or false).  It is also to be 
distinguished from instrumentalism and positivism.  The former would hold that models 
are heuristic fictions, useful in the construction of theories, but ultimately dispensable. 
This  is  contrary  to  McFague's  views  on  models  which  are  based  on  the 
unsubstitutability  of  metaphor,  and  hence  of  models,  and  also  to  her  view  that 
metaphors do indeed refer, albeit indirectly.  The fourth position, positivism, prioritises 
observation  and sees  theoretical  speculation  as  simply the  ordering  of  observations. 
This  is  clearly  a  long  way  from  McFague's  views  on  the  theory-laden  nature  of 
observation  and  the  need  for  interpretive  categories  which  are  inseparable  from 
observation.
For McFague then, theological models do refer, and they do so in such a way 
that the divine-human relationship to which they refer 'bear[s] description in some ways 
197 Metaphorical Theology p132
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and not others.'198   
This  quotation  suggests  one  of  her  principal  arguments  in  support  of  her 
critically realist position.  These arguments are firstly, that observations are theory-laden 
but not theory-determined.  That is to say that what is seen is highly influenced by who 
is  looking  and  how,  but  nevertheless  the  observer's  preconceptions,  assumptions  or 
heuristic devices do not fully determine what is seen.  Events have their own 'depth' or 
'substance', a consistency across observers and an independence from them.  Something 
of what is seen is determined by factors outside the observer and intrinsic to what is 
being observed.  She says,
'Hunger,  fear,  and  suffering  unite  beings,  both  human  and  non-human,  in  a 
wordless community where a cry of pain is a universal word.199
By holding certain experiences to be universal and perceivable across contexts it 
is clear that she is arguing for a degree of reality underlying language and not entirely 
determined by it.
Secondly she argues that  models have the ability to  influence behaviour and 
change the way we see the world and live in it and that some do so more effectively 
than  others.   From this  it  may be  inferred  (though  not  of  course  proved)  that  the 
statements which have such an effect must refer to entities which genuinely exist.  She 
quotes two philosophers who make this point.  One is Max Wartofsky who says 
'If the argument runs: “I don't really take the entities in the model to exist, but it is 
useful to think of them that way...,” then I would raise the question as to what 
makes it useful to think of it that way at all, if there were not some sense in which 
the model mirrored some aspect of what it was taken to be a model of.  In short,  
the existence claim of a model may be limited in scope and applicability ... but to 
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deny it such a claim makes a mystery of its significance altogether.'200
The second is Frederick Ferré, thus:
    'But if language literally based on certain models of great religious responsive 
depth found within human experience is  capable  not  only of  synthesizing our 
concepts in a coherent manner but also of illuminating our experience — moral 
experience,  sense  experience,  aesthetic  experience,  religious  experience  — we 
may ask why this happens to be the case. And if some models are capable of 
providing greater coherence and adequacy than others, we may begin to suspect 
that this tells us something not only about the models but also about what reality 
is like: reality is of such a character that a metaphysical system based on model X 
is  more  capable  of  interpreting  our  experience  and unifying  our  ideas  than  a 
metaphysical system based on model Y.'201
Following  McFague's  understanding  then,  models  do  refer  but  this  does  not 
mean that there are simple true/false decisions to be made.  Rather the effect of the 
theory-laden nature of observation means that a) no model can be tested in isolation but 
only as a part of the network of images, models, concepts and theory to which it belongs 
and b) decisions can only be made about the usefulness of models relative to each other 
and  in  relation  to  a  particular  context.   This  is  because  of  the  indirect  way  that 
theological models refer.  
Recalling  our  discussion  of  metaphor  in  Chapter  1,   metaphors,  and  hence 
metaphorical models, refer by the re-description of reality.  Thus not only does existing 
theory influence what is seen, but the process of forming the model itself affects what is 
200 Metaphorical Theology p132 citing M.W. Wartofsky Models:Representation and the Scientific  
Understanding Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co. 1979
201 Metaphorical Theology p142 citing Ferre 'Metaphors, models and religion' p341-2 in Gill (ed.) 
Philosophy and Religion: Some contemporary Perpectives Minneapolis: Burgess 1968.
143
seen in the same moment that the insight is gained; indeed in a sense the insight is only 
gained through this moment of transformation.  Discovery and invention, reality and 
construction are therefore inseparably bound up.  
'Theological models are re-descriptions of reality in the sense that they offer new 
ways of being in the world.'202
This is why it is not possible to separate 'truth' from construction but only to talk 
comparatively  about  constructions  and  this  comparison  is  firmly  located  within  a 
particular context.  McFague says,
'Are such statements 'true'?  Obviously not if judged by a crude correspondence 
view – that  our  statements  'correspond'  to  God's  reality.   We have no way of 
judging that.  All that we can say is that from our own experience and within the 
parameters  of  our  tradition,  we have  been  persuaded  to  stand  on this  or  that 
carefully  thought-through  interpretation  of  God's  relation  to  the  world.   The 
theologian will say, 'I believe it.  I believe it is Christian.  I believe  it is good for  
the world.''203   
 
This last quote is a good, if brief, summary of McFague's position on the truth 
and reference of her models and it provides the starting point for our discussion in the 
following section of her formal criteria for arbitrating between models.  But first there is 
a crucial question that must be addressed if what we have said in this section is to hold.  
Throughout  the  argument  here  it  has  been  assumed  that  the  distinction  between 
epistemology and ontology can be made at least in principle and in theory in the case of 
religious language.   A realism has been assumed and inferred here which, while not 
explicitly used in judging between models is used as the justification for employing 
202 Metaphorical Theology p134
203 Life Abundant p29
144
them at all and has been inferred to lie behind their effectiveness at least in part.  But is 
it in fact meaningful to distinguish between the god of our language and models and 
'God' the ultimate reality beyond all our words?  Can the latter be held to exist if nothing 
of any certainty may be known or said about this reality; if all religious language is in 
no sense univocal?
McFague wrestles with this question in some detail in an endnote to Models of  
God and it is worth quoting this vital passage extensively.    
'But what is the relationship between our constructs of God and God, or in our 
postmodern, decontructionist era is that distinction even appropriate? That is, do 
our constructions refer to anything, anyone? Is not talk of the 'real God' or 'Being-
itself' also metaphorical or symbolic? For instance, is not God a metaphor central 
for the West, whereas other religious traditions are based on other foundational 
metaphors? To the extent that I think that there is something, someone to which 
our metaphors refer, my belief falls into Ricoeur's notion of a wager that, as I 
phrased it earlier, 'the universe is neither indifferent nor malevolent, but there is a 
power  (and  a  personal  power  at  that)  which  is  on  the  side  of  life  and  its 
fulfillment. . . .' 'This is indeed the central metaphor of the world view of the West, 
but it is not necessarily only that. Yet, how the metaphor refers we do not know—
or indeed, even if it does. At the most one wagers it does and lives as if it does, 
which means that the main criterion for a 'true' theology is pragmatic, preferring 
those  models  of  God  that  are  most  helpful  in  the  praxis  of  bringing  about 
fulfillment for living beings. The other issue, however, the issue of the referent of 
the model, not to our world but to God, will not disappear, and here the question 
arises of whether metaphorical thinking ought to be applied to the idea of God 
itself. The basic point of metaphorical assertion is that something is there that we 
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do not know how to talk about and which we have no access to except through 
metaphors.  If  then,  we  apply  metaphorical  thinking  to  the  reality  that  is  the 
referent of our metaphors, what would, could, that mean? I think it means most 
basically that we say God both 'is' and 'is not.' Metaphorical theology applied to 
the  'being  of  God'  agrees  with  the  tradition  of  the  via  negativa  and  the 
deconstructionists  in  stressing  the  absence  of  God  over  our  presumptuous 
insistence in Western religious thought on the presence of the divine.  God is not, 
not just in the sense of being unavailable to us or absent from our experience but 
as a basic aspect of the being of God. I think something like this is necessary both 
to include the very different notions of other  major religious traditions and to 
preserve a sense of the mystery of the divine,  whatever  our hopes,  beliefs,  or 
wagers might be. It is a recognition of the 'privacy' of God, of the dark side of the 
divine that the mystics speak of ...  To affirm all this, however, does not mean 
there  is  not  a  reality  (nor  does  it  mean  there  is),  though  the  presumption  of 
metaphorical  discourse  –  as  evidenced  by  the  conflict  of  metaphors,  the 
competing 'versions' of reality that metaphors project — is that these metaphors, 
these versions, are of something, or there would be no point in arguing for one 
another.'
On the basis of passages like this, it seems that, for McFague, metaphors are 
actually held to refer, if only out of practical necessity, for it is only if they are held to 
refer that they can have the transformative power that she desires them to have.  Her 
realism therefore appears simply pragmatic, and is ethically driven, as much as it is 
critically and philosophically grounded.  However  the equivocation McFague shows 
here, along with some strong statements she makes concerning the relative character of 
models,  has  led  some  scholars  to  see  her  position  as  ultimately  non-realist  and 
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projectionist, despite her own self-designation as a critical realist.  
For example Achtmeier characterises McFague as claiming that 
'God is the great Unknown and that therefore human beings must invent language 
for God that can be changed at will'.204
Meanwhile Gunton has McFague saying that 
'Metaphor is  a form of indirect  characterisation of a  kind that  does not really  
speak of reality at all.'205
However such characterisations tend to focus on McFague's weaker ontological 
claims and not deal with the, admittedly sometimes ambivalent, reference claims that 
she does in fact make for her models.206  
Reynolds has closely and extensively investigated McFague's equivocation on 
this  point  and  a  number  of  his  findings  are  significant  here207.   He  concludes  that 
McFague does indeed intend a weak realism and indeed that 'it is hard to see what more 
could be asked' of her account of realism.  
His work makes several important distinctions.  Firstly, he differentiates between 
'relative with regard to justification' and 'relative with regard to truth'.208  This means 
that  while  a  writer  may  note  the  importance  of  context,  its  influence  upon  the 
justification  of  beliefs  and  the  fact  that  there  is  no  neutral  ground  from  which 
conflicting beliefs may be assessed, this does not necessarily imply that such beliefs 
cannot be held to have any ability to depict reality in a transcendent or universal way. 
Such claims to reference must, given the context-relative nature of justification, remain 
204 Elizabeth Achtemeier 'Exchanging God for 'no gods': A discussion of Female Language for God' in 
Alvin Kimel Jr Speaking the Christian God: The Holy Trinity and the Challenge of Feminism 
Leominster: Gracewing 1992 pp1-17 p5
205 Colin Gunton 'Proteus and Procrustes: A Study in the Dialectic of Language in Disagreement with 
Sallie McFague' in Kimel Jr. op. cit. pp65-80 p73 Emphasis original.
206 For a further example see Keith Ward Religion and Creation Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996 pp149-
150, who argues that her use of metaphor makes her theology necessarily non-realist.
207 Terrance Reynolds 'Two McFague's: Meaning, Truth and Justification in Models of God'  Modern 
Theology 11(56) 1995 pp289-313
208 p293
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humble and open to review, yet they may still logically be made.  Such are the claims 
that McFague makes.  This distinction also implies that although a belief may always 
have  been  true  (or  untrue)  it  may  at  different  times  and  in  different  contexts  be 
warranted or not warranted and those who assessed it in another context may have been 
correct  in their  context in asserting or denying the belief accordingly.  This supports 
McFague's desire to respect traditional models in their original setting but deny their 
appropriateness to our age.
Secondly Reynolds locates the cause of McFague's confusion on the question of 
reference (and thus much of the ensuing confusion among her critics) in a failure to 
differentiate between the demonstrable correspondence of a statement with its referent 
and the ability of the statement to refer to that referent at all.  This is a key distinction 
also made by Soskice.209  She argues that a statement may still be held to refer to an 
object  even  if  the  accompanying  description  in  the  referring  sentence  is  entirely 
inaccurate.  Her favoured example is that the statement 'Columbus proved that the world 
is  round and discovered America'  can still  'depict'  a real,  historical  Columbus,  even 
though we may hold that Columbus in fact did neither of these things.  
McFague seems to fail to make this distinction and therefore has fallen into the 
trap  of  equating  a  claim that  a  statement  refers  with  both  the  need  to  demonstrate 
correspondence  with  exterior  reality  neutrally  observed,  and  also  with  a  claim  to 
exclusive or privileged access to truth.  Instead, Soskice shows the importance of the 
fact that it  is not words that refer, but speakers using words, and that, further these 
speakers belong to linguistic communities that have a tradition through which reference 
is maintained. (To return to her example, a speaker's ability to refer to Columbus is 
dependent upon her  membership of a continuous linguistic community and tradition 
209 See Janet Martin Soskice Metaphor and Religious Language Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985 esp Ch 7 
and 8
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reaching back to an original designation of an historical figure as 'Columbus', rather 
than on any specific 'facts about Columbus' the speaker may wish to assert.)
The fact that speakers, and not merely words themselves, refer, has been picked 
up by a number of other scholars who aid McFague's cause by arguing from this fact to 
the ability of a metaphor to logically possess the potential to refer. Both Brümmer210 and 
Chyssides211 for example argue that a metaphor may refer if 'real existence' is one of the 
'penumbra of meanings' that the speaker intends to map between domains.  (Brümmer's 
example is that such a mapping is intended for 'Father' in the case of 'Father God' but  
not in the case of 'Father Christmas' – again note that here the difference presupposes 
the distinction between intending reference and demonstrating correspondence – the 
difference is one of speaker's intention before the fact and not a question of empirical 
investigation after the fact).
Though these writers all add support to McFague's claim to refer to God without 
idolatry (in other words, without claiming to possess a description which demonstrably 
corresponds with the inner being of God or that enjoys ontologically privileged access) 
this support comes at a certain price, for each of them directs us back to the question of 
how McFague's models relate to the God of the Christian tradition.  Soskice's approach 
is dependent upon continuities of community and usage and she stresses the way in 
which metaphorical religious language builds upon the previous use of terms within the 
tradition,  a  process which creates  networks of  meaning and imbues metaphors with 
tradition-specific richness.  Soskice's contribution would imply that there is much to be 
gained  from  a  cross-fertilisation  of  meaning  between  models,  and  yet,  generally 
speaking, McFague's models are developed and expressed in isolation.
210 Vincent  Brümmer 'Metaphor and the Reality of God' in Bartel T W (ed) Comparative Theology,  
Essays for Keith Ward London: SPCK 2003
211 George Chyssides 'Meaning, Metaphor and Meta-Theology' Scottish Journal of Theology 38(2) 1985 
pp145-153
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Meanwhile  Brümmer  and  Chyssides  both  ask  the  question,  how  are  we  to 
determine which feature of the source domain can appropriately be mapped to the target 
domain?
These questions direct us to consider the target domain in McFague's models 
more  closely,  that  is  to  consider  what  is  being  presupposed  about  God  before  the 
metaphor is applied.  Now McFague seems, on the basis of her interactionist theory of 
metaphor, to treat the target domain as essentially empty or at least unresolved until the 
particular metaphor is formed.  That is, she seems to intend to draw all her insights 
about God from the source domain (from 'mother' or 'lover' for example) and does not 
seek  to  integrate  these  insights  either  with each other  or  with  the  biblical  tradition 
except in their broad ethical direction.  Each model then is treated in relative isolation, 
as an isolated interaction between an individual source and an always largely empty 
target.  Thus when God is considered as Mother, the interaction is between the category 
'mother'  and 'the mystery of God'  rather than between mother and God-who-is-also-
considered-as... (whatever else may already be held to be true of God). 
It is likely that this approach has in part led to the appearance of her models as 
projectionist and also to her failure to explore ways in which different models may more 
fully relate to each other.  Reynolds again provides insight into this issue, and does so in 
a  way that  binds  together  the  questions  of  reference,  ethical  pragmatism and  prior 
beliefs about God.  Reynolds shows that McFague employs a 'web of belief' related 
theory of truth and justification, or a 'coherentism'.  By this he means that:
'We never start from scratch but always begin already immersed in an epistemic 
context  or  tradition  that  orients  us  by  means  of  assumptions,  beliefs  and 
precedents.   We  demonstrate  our  rationality  by  how  we  move  out  from this 
starting  point  in  a  dialectical  and  spiraling process  of  reasoning  and 
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justification...'212
'...McFague, in essence, makes truth claims as a theological bricoleur, one who is 
justified in holding to certain well entrenched religious beliefs and building upon 
them.'213
'McFague adopts a ... form of theological realism, but without a string or 'bad' 
correspondence  view  of  truth.   Instead,  she  defends  a  weak  or  ...  'non-
controversial  sense'  of  correspondence,  namely  '...The  perfectly  intelligible 
relation of correspondence between theoretical statements and the facts as they are 
described in the vocabulary of a background theory'.214
Reynolds then shows that McFague presupposes a small number of 'facts' about 
God which determine the way in which her models are both formed and assessed, and 
also the way in which they are held to be true.  The first of these is the belief that God is 
'on the side of life and fulfilment'215, a belief that she claims to be ontologically true 
even if it must remain unverifiable.  This serves to tie together McFague's theological 
pragmatism and her  desire  to  at  least  potentially  refer  to  God as  an  extralinguistic 
reality, since if a belief about God can be shown to lead to life and fulfilment and this is 
also held to be the basic nature of God, then one is justified, within this web of beliefs, 
in holding that such a belief indeed refers to this God.  On this understanding McFague 
is freed from charges of pure projectionism and is able to use her pragmatic criteria as 
criteria for truth.
Reynolds, though, also shows that McFague depends at least as heavily on the 
'Imago  Dei',  that  is  a  doctrine  which  links  together  the  notions  of  creation  and 
212 Barney Twiss 'On Truth and Justification' in Jeff Stout Ethics after Babel Boston: Beacon Press 1998 
p44 cited in Reynolds op. cit. p302
213 Reynolds op. cit. p303
214 Jeff Stout Ethics after Babel p298 quoted by Reynolds op. cit. p306
215 The Body of God p191
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personhood.216   This, 
'enables  McFague  to  move  beyond  ...mere  instrumentalism  ...and  assert  that 
knowledge of persons leads us to knowledge of God.'217
Schaab, while discussing feminist methodology more generally, agrees, saying:
'Certainly, what the Christian feminist tradition can assert of a foundational nature 
is  inextricably  connected  to  belief  in  God  as  creative  Source  of  all 
being...Christian feminist theologians must maintain the ontological link between 
the Creator and creation if such theologies are to validly assert the foundational 
nature of human experience as a critical locus of knowledge and expression of the 
mystery of God and the God-world relationship.'218
Here the 'background theory' is that the God to whom McFague wishes to refer 
is, by virtue of his/her self-expression in creation, able to be in some sense depicted in 
terms of the creation, and especially in terms of human relationality.  Thus a model that 
is able to give valid expression to human experiences of creation and relationship may 
be regarded as being true, within the context of this background theory.
Thus Reynolds has shown (though he does not put it  in these terms)  that in 
McFague's models,  the target domain ('God'),  is not as bereft  of previously existing 
content as it may at first appear.
However,  whilst  Reynold's  findings  are  helpful  in  clarifying  and  defending 
McFague's work and the status of her models, and elevating her pragmatic criteria to be 
216 Perhaps we should say 'an interpretation of the Imago Dei' since not all would agree on the meaning , 
and implications for method, of this doctrine.  See for example Thomas Torrance 'The Christian 
Apprehension of God the Father' in Kimel (ed) op. cit. p120-143  'Hence [the imago Dei] does not 
mean that man ... through his own nature can somehow reflect God's nature; it means only that man is 
specifically destined by grace to live in faithful response to the movement and purpose of God's love 
toward him as his creaturely partner.  The Creator/creature relationship in being and knowing between 
God and man cannot be reversed.' p125
217 Reynolds p303
218 Gloria Schaab 'Of Models and Metaphors: The Trinitarian Proposals of Sallie McFague and Elizabeth 
A. Johnson' Theoforum (Ottawa) 33 (2) 2002 pp213-234 p233
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also  part  of  the  criteria  for  truthfulness,  they  do  invite  the  question,  'why  these 
particular background beliefs' and only these beliefs?  Once attention has been drawn to 
the  presence  of  certain  particulars  of  the  Christian  tradition  within  McFague's 
'background theory', it is legitimate to ask why others are not included also.   
A partial answer to this would be that any particulars here included would need 
to be at least of neutral pragmatic ethical value for McFague's project, else the link 
between ethical pragmatism and relative truth would be lost.  It seems unlikely though 
that this factor would rule out such a large part of the Christian tradition as McFague 
seems to do.  This assessment would depend of course both on the pragmatic criteria 
used  and  on  one's  assessment  of  the  past  and  current  ethical  performance  of  the 
tradition. These criteria will be examined shortly.  Meanwhile note should be taken of 
another contribution from Reynolds who has compared the methodologies of McFague 
and Lindbeck.219  Ultimately, he argues, the key differences between these writers are 
not  in  the  area  of   methodology but  on their  differing  assessments  of  the past  and 
present ethical performance of the tradition.  This would seem to support our view here 
that  McFague's  rejection  of  much  of  the  tradition  is  pragmatic  rather  than 
methodological  and  that  consequently  it  would  be  possible  to  employ  McFague's 
method and allow for the construction of novel models while operating with a fuller 
version of the tradition.
The  discussions  here  have  shown  that  McFague's  account  of  theological 
pragmatism is of vital importance to her work.  Not only is it her preferred method of 
assessment because she wishes to meet certain contemporary ethical challenges, nor is it 
219 See both Terrence Reynolds 'Parting Company At Last: Lindbeck and McFague in Substantive 
Theological Dialogue' Concordia Theological Quarterly 63 Ap 1999 pp 97-118 and  Terrence Reynolds 
'Walking Apart, Together : Lindbeck and McFague on Theological Method' Journal of Religion 77 no 1 Ja 
1997 pp 44-67
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only the case that she sees ethical behaviour as the most important product of theology. 
As well as both of these, as we have just seen, the claims to truth and reference made by 
her models are fundamentally dependent upon a positive pragmatic assessment of them. 
Against the background theory she describes, a model can only be held to refer to God 
if it is pragmatically useful.
One upshot, however, of our attempt to better establish the claims of religious 
models to refer is that if they do in fact refer, then the need to have regard for how they 
relate to each other becomes more pressing.  If models of God are held to be entirely 
about our own experience, about mothers, lovers, friends etc. rather than about God, 
they only need to be related together if we wish to discuss the relationship between 
mothers, lovers and friends for example.  If however these models are held to refer to 
God, even if their accuracy as depictions cannot be independently adjudicated, they are 
still models that purport to refer to the same subject.  Consequently, as simultaneously 
existing models of the same entity, they must have some form of relationship to each 
other.  If further these models pass our pragmatic validation process and are held in 
some sense to describe the reality to which they refer, this need for a clarification of 
their  interrelationship,  and the  possibility that  such a  task would provide additional 
insight,  must  increase.   Further,  if  one  was  to  follow  Lindbeck's  more  positive 
assessment  of  the  past  performance  and  current  potential  of  traditional  theological 
models,220 such that they would then be held to be referential models of God by the 
standards outlined here, then a relationship between these models and any new ones 
would clearly not only be warranted but would be highly desirable. 
  
220 See the summary of Lindbeck's position in Terrence Reynolds, 'Walking Apart, Together : Lindbeck 
and McFague on Theological Method.' Journal of Religion 77 no 1 Jan 1997, p54. 
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3.4 Assessing a metaphorical theology in theory.
This  chapter  has  begun  an  examination  of  the  criteria  needed  to  assess 
theological  propositions  arising  from an application  of  the  principles  of  McFague's 
metaphorical theology and attention will be given to a more detailed study of these.  It is 
evident that there are two potential sources of criteria in McFague's work against which 
models of God may be assessed to see if they accomplish her purposes.  Firstly there are 
her theoretical statements on the issue of the assessment of models and then there is the 
actual  process  she  appears  to  be  using  in  practice  when actually  assessing  models. 
These two are not necessarily the same and so each will be discussed, both on their own 
merits and in comparison to each other.  Here we will be looking particularly at those 
theoretical  statements  concerning  the  assessment  of  models  that  McFague  herself 
makes.
As we have seen above, McFague stresses that theological models cannot be 
assessed in a vacuum but can only be assessed relative to other models and as part of a 
web of beliefs, as the quote below illustrates.  It is therefore true that it is not simply the 
models  themselves  that  are  being  tested  but  the  models  in  their  web of  associated 
images, models, concepts and theory that are being examined.  In other words, since 
models are paradigm-dependent, the model can only be assessed within its paradigm, or 
else the whole paradigm needs to be assessed in relation to other potential paradigms. 
McFague quotes Ian Barbour making this point using a comparison with the sciences:
  '...scientific  concepts  and theories  can be  tested only  in  networks.   Webs of 
interdependent  constructs  are  evaluated  as  total  systems.   The  fabric  of 
interlocking religious beliefs must also be contextually tested; ideas of God, self, 
society and nature are not independent.  An interpretative scheme is evaluated 
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indirectly by the convergence of many lines of enquiry.'221
Our investigations here are not concerned with the justification of paradigms, 
rather  we  are  interested  in  the  justification  of  models  within  and  in  relation  to  a 
paradigm – McFague's paradigm. Therefore we must look at how a paradigm affects the 
models within it.  Recalling the discussions in Chapter 2, a paradigm for McFague is 
defined  by its  root  metaphors,  and  the  Christian  paradigm is  defined  by the  root-
metaphor of Jesus as parable of God, most basically stated as 
'a mode of personal relationship ... a tensive relationship distinguished by trust in 
God's impossible way of love in contrast to the loveless ways of the world.'222 
Thus the paradigm within which a model is evaluated has two consequences for 
that process of evaluation.  Firstly McFague intends the model to be coherent with the 
root-metaphor and secondly it must be an appropriate translation of the root-metaphor. 
To treat these in turn, what I might call the  'criterion of coherence'' of model 
with root-metaphor is both a general and a specific one.  (These 'criteria of...' terms are 
my own but are in my view consistent with McFague's own observations on criteria for 
the assessment of models, which are not categorised).  The criterion of coherence is 
specific in that root-metaphors specify the acceptable limits of the paradigm.  Now this 
root metaphor does not control or specify the form and content of all models, but is a 
limiting factor upon the construction of theology which should be a translation of this 
root-metaphor.  
An example that illustrates that the root-metaphor does not crudely control the 
choice  of  models  can  be  seen  in  the  way McFague  handles  impersonal  models  in 
221 Metaphorical Theology p138 citing Ian Barbour Myths, Models and Paradigms: A comparative study 
in science and religion New York: Harper and Row 1974 p124 Emphasis original.
222 Metaphorical Theology p108 
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relation to a root-metaphor rooted in personhood and relationality.  For although the 
root-metaphor  of  the  Christian  tradition  is  personal  and  relational  in  McFague's 
understanding, this is not to imply that  only personal models can be justified by the 
criterion of coherence to the root metaphor.  Rather an impersonal model is likely to be 
more peripheral to the overarching theological theory or system of which it is a part, 
while personal models are more likely to be central to the theory, contributing more 
significantly to  the theory's comprehensiveness. However the impersonal model may 
still have value in relating aspects of contemporary human experience to these centrally 
held personal models (the model of God as Rock would be an example of an impersonal 
model commonly used in this way). 
Indeed,   in  Super,  Natural  Christians McFague integrates  impersonal  models 
more fully into her theology by suggesting that the use of personal, relational language 
be extended to the inanimate world.  This reduces the tension between personal and 
impersonal models since if we use subject-subject language in relation to, say, rocks, 
such images can be better seen as translations of the personal root-metaphor.223
The limit imposed upon models then by the criterion of coherence with the root-
metaphor is therefore not fully prescriptive of model choice or determinative of the 
success  of  a  model  considered  on  its  own,  but  the  criterion  is  nevertheless  a  real 
constraint. It should be remembered that the basic images of a tradition, these being the 
person and teaching of Jesus in the Christian tradition, are not to be replaced by a root-
metaphor.   They  are  unsubstitutable in  the  tradition  and  cannot  be  removed. 
Consequently, one should surely argue, if a new model is to be considered a valid part  
of a particular metaphorical theology, such a new model needs to a) be located relative 
to  the root-metaphor,  b) be mindful of the basic images and c)  embody the tension 
inherent in the tradition without fragmenting it.
223 See especially p9 and 19.
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The last of these requirements warrants further scrutiny however.  The quality 
'tension' just referred to is highly ambiguous in McFague’s work.  Its origins for her are 
in  the  'is  and  is  not  of  metaphor224,  the  simultaneous  affirmation  and  denial  of  a 
suggested  comparison.   However  in  McFague's  definition  of  the  Christian  root-
metaphor  of  Jesus  as  parable  of  God  quoted  above225,  this  has  become,  not  a 
comparison, but a stark contrast between an 'is of love' and an 'is of lovelessness' (rather 
than the relationship being characterised by truly 'metaphorical'  tension,  in  which it 
would  be  a  relationship  that  'was  and was  not'  love).    It  is  therefore  questionable 
whether this ‘contrast’ is the same as what is meant by the term 'metaphorical tension'. 
This lack of clarity is likely due to the loss in precision that occurs when a model is 
translated into a concept and the corresponding category is extended. Here the category 
‘metaphor’ is being extended to include a contrast between opposites in the definition of 
metaphor,  however  doing so loses  what  is  for  McFague one of  the  key features  of 
metaphor,  its  ability  to  hold  similarity  and  dissimilarity  together,  a  property  quite 
different from contrasting a property with its negation. This demonstrates one difficulty 
a metaphorical approach may encounter in providing clear criteria for assessment by the 
application of rules, rather than the application of experience.  If this ‘tension’ cannot be 
defined clearly,  it  cannot  be  used  as  a  logical  criterion.   Then only subjective  and 
intuitive judgements can be made on whether a model ‘embodies tension’ .   
Instead, it can be argued, that in the general case, the requirement of coherence 
means  that  the  links  between  images,  models,  concepts  and  theories  and  their 
implications for each other should be well thought through.  McFague herself makes a 
much stronger claim saying:
 'diametrically opposed or contrary models cannot be introduced into a theological 
224 Metaphorical Theologyp110
225 'a mode of personal relationship ... a tensive relationship distinguished by trust in God's impossible 
way of love in contrast to the loveless ways of the world.'
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system.'226
However the situation may be more complicated than McFague allows.  Taking 
the  Bible  as  the  classic  text,  as  a  key example  of  how theology is  to  proceed,  as  
McFague  advocates,  it  can  be  seen  that  contradictory  models  may  be  required  to 
adequately  express  contradictions  in  believers'  experiences  of  life  and  faith.   For 
example,  in  scripture,  models  of  God as  lion,  fire  and avenging angel  coexist  with 
models of God as loving husband, shepherd and mother.  
As we have just seen, there is a need for theology to embody tensions that are 
inherent both in religious and human experience and in the Christian root-metaphor. 
Consequently, and contra McFague at least in the statement quoted above, contradictory 
models may be necessary to provide an adequate translation of the root-metaphor.  This 
is a further example of the difficulty a metaphorical theology has in providing formal 
criteria for the assessment of models.   However, again, admitting this difficulty is not to 
allow an arbitrary selection of models since if a contradictory model is to be valid it is 
required to demonstrate how the particular contradiction makes the translation of the 
root-metaphor better rather than worse.  Contradiction is not to be valued simply for its 
own sake.
Given that a model is therefore required to be a translation of the root-metaphor, 
what I would term a 'criterion of adequate translation' is a second requirement that a 
paradigm places on a model.  (Here 'translation' is being used in its linguistic rather than 
mathematical sense.  It  is translation as an 'art'  rather than a 'science',  a necessarily 
creative attempt to embody a meaning in a new form.)  
Some of the most important questions McFague wishes to ask of a model arise 
from this criterion.  A translation may only be judged appropriate in a given context and 
for a given purpose.   A good translation is one that helps people in a specific context to 
226 Metaphorical Theology p140 
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understand their experience and  live the 'abundant life' in the sense of a life lived in the 
knowledge of the inclusive love of God.  
It should be remembered that, for McFague, theological models refer at least as 
much to ourselves as to God.  Indeed in one passage she likens the process of model 
formation in theology to that of looking at a  Rorschach Test,  
'where one sees a pattern similar to something which is vaguely familiar and the 
mind jumps to fill in the unknown gaps in order to see it whole. The whole that one sees 
is not identical with anything with which we are familiar, but the similarity has enabled 
us to see a new thing.'227
The focus of her theology is on the nature and possibilities of human life as it is 
lived rather than on the nature of God considered for its own sake.  Models of God are 
therefore as much models of ourselves, and in three ways.  Firstly, models are derived 
from human experience and use its  language,  secondly they cause deeper  reflection 
upon that  experience and thirdly they are designed to both interpret  and shape that 
experience.   Consequently  there  is  a  significant  role  for  experience  to  play  in  the 
assessment of the adequacy of a model's translation of the Christian root-metaphor.
This  condition  results  in  the  following  three  additional  formal  criteria  (here 
again a new label is being given to McFague's underlying ideas): which will be called 
here a  'criterion of relevance',  a  'criterion of comprehensiveness', and  'a criterion of  
fruitfulness' and it is in these three areas where there is an important role for experience.
The criterion of relevance means that a model should be related to the specific 
conditions of the context that it seeks to address and that it does so in terms which are 
intelligible in that context.
The criterion of comprehensiveness means that a model is required to aid the 
paradigm  to  which  it  belongs  in  interpreting  and  correlating  as  much  of  human 
227 Metaphorical Theology p36
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experience as possible.  Here the fact of 'anomalies' is significant and it is this which is  
of  vital  importance  to  McFague.   Comprehensiveness  requires  that  models  address 
anomalies.    An anomaly is  any aspect  of  experience that  is  either  absent  from an 
interpretative scheme or is  contradictory to  it.   For McFague, particularly important 
examples of anomalies (in relation to the dominant Christian paradigm) are the absence 
of the distinctive experiences of women and the 'contra-factor'228 of the human nuclear 
capability to destroy life on earth (in contradiction to any model of God which sees only 
God as having ultimate power over the destiny of the earth).
A model is therefore given support if it is able to better relate the root-metaphor 
to the previously absent experience or the relevant contra-factor.
The criterion of fruitfulness means extending this ability to relate root-metaphor 
and anomalies to the more general case.  A fruitful model is one that is capable of 
generating new insight over a period of time and across a range of experiences.  A 
model is fruitful if it is able to be consistently useful in interpreting a range of diverse 
experiences  which  are  either  new  or  previously  unconsidered  or  have  proved 
problematic for previous models.  It is most likely to be able to do this if it  has an 
extensive and well defined structure in the sense discussed earlier with regard to good 
metaphors. 
So far, we have seen that the following criteria may be used for the assessment 
of models:
 A model may be considered an adequate part of a metaphorical theology if it is 
(in comparison to other models):
a) more coherent with the root-metaphor of its paradigm in that it is 
i) well located relative to the root-metaphor,
228 Metaphorical Theology p140 using a term borrowed from Jerry Gill in  Ian Ramsey To Speak 
Responsibly of God London: George Allen & Unwin 1976 p131
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ii) mindful of the basic images of the paradigm
iii) able to embody the tension inherent in the tradition without fragmentation
iv) well worked through in its connections to and implications for other models 
in the paradigm.
b) a better translation of the root-metaphor in that:
i) it is relevant to its context
ii) it aids the comprehensiveness of the paradigm
iii) it is better able to interpret anomalies
iv) it is fruitful for the continued interpretation of experience.
c) more helpful in promoting the fulfilment of all life.
The following passage, taken from  Models of God illustrates our summary of 
McFague's points well:
'What  prevents  models  of  God,  such as  mother,  lover,  and friend,  from being 
arbitrary? The most direct answer to that question is that they are not arbitrary, 
because, along with the father model, they are the deepest and most important 
expressions  of  love  known  to  us,  rather  than  because  they  are  necessarily 
descriptive of the nature of God. But, pressing the ontological issue more sharply, 
are  these  loves  descriptive of  God as  God is?  ...  it  seems to me that  to  be a 
Christian is to be persuaded that there is a personal, gracious power who is on the 
side of life and its fulfillment, a power whom the paradigmatic figure Jesus of 
Nazareth expresses and illuminates; but when we try to say something more, we 
turn, necessarily, to the 'loves' we know ...That is to say, I do not know whether 
God (the inner being of God) can be described by the models of mother, lover, and 
friend; but the only kind of love I know anything about and that matters most to 
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me is the love of these basic relationships, so I have to use these loves to speak of  
divine love. The metaphors do not illustrate a concept of love (that is basically an 
allegorical direction); rather, they project a possibility: that God's love can be seen 
through the screen of these human loves. Metaphors and models relate to reality 
not  in  imitating  it  but  in  being  productive  of  it.  There  are  only  versions, 
hypotheses,  or  models  of  reality  (or  God):  the  most  that  one  can  say of  any 
construct,  then,  is  that it  is illuminating,  fruitful,  can deal with anomalies,  has 
relatively comprehensive explanatory ability, is relatively consistent, has humane 
consequences,  etc.  This  is  largely  a  functional,  pragmatic  view of  truth,  with 
heavy stress on what the implications of certain ways of seeing things (certain 
models) are for the quality of both human and non-human life (since the initial 
assumption or belief is that God is on the side of life and its fulfillment). This is  
obviously something of a circular argument, but I do not see any way out of it: I 
do  not  know  who  God  is,  but  I  find  some  models  better  than  others  for 
constructing an image of God commensurate with my trust in a God as on the side 
of life. God is and remains a mystery.' 229
This passage, however, also illustrates the apparent confusion within McFague's 
work  over  the  ontological  claims  made by her  models;  an  issue  that  we examined 
earlier.  There we showed that, contrary to McFague's own concerns in this passage, the 
'circularity'  of  her  argument  is  both  acceptable  and  is  what  enables  her  to  make 
ontological claims that are better grounded than she herself seems to appreciate, at least 
here.  However in order to make these claims, the third criterion, the ability to promote 
the fulfilment of all life, becomes very important, for it is this criterion that supports the 
ontological claim of the model within McFague's web of beliefs.
The passage itself also indicates the importance of this pragmatic approach for 
229 Models of God  p192 n37 
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McFague.  The various criteria just discussed only have relevance for McFague, and can 
only be used for the assessment and justification of McFague's models, in as much as 
meeting these criteria may to said to assist the model in promoting a vision of life and 
fulfilment for all and enabling action towards the realisation of this vision.  
Now this is helpful in meeting the objection of Huiser who identifies a problem 
with such criteria saying
'The problem concerning these criteria in  the case of religion,  is  that  they are 
notoriously vague and difficult to apply'. 230,
In McFague's case, it is clear that the function that her models are, and are not, 
designed to achieve, and her particular ethical vision, at least provide a context in which 
the criteria may be applied since they provide a stated purpose and aim against which 
the models may be judged.  We will examine her particular ethical vision itself in detail 
shortly.  Still, it remains to be seen in the following chapters whether these criteria are 
adequate for her purposes and the question remains, how exactly does one assess the 
ethical ramifications of a particular model?
McFague's criteria for assessment also appear to partly address another issue  – 
the question of the relationship between McFague's models and the Christian tradition. 
These  criteria  are  also  noteworthy  for  their  originality.   McFague's  more  general 
methodological remarks regarding comprehensiveness, fertility, scope etc. are common 
in theologies influenced by the science-religion conversation and especially in work 
following Barbour.  However the addition of formal criteria to relate novel models to 
the Christian tradition is a welcome and more unusual step (many theologians either 
advocating the developing of new models  in  relative isolation from the tradition or 
230 By ‘criteria’ Huiser is referring to the general criteria of 'agreement with data, coherence with other 
beliefs, a wide scope and fertility'  Pieter J Huiser Models, Theories and Narratives:Conditions for the  
Justification of a Religious Realism Amsterdam:Thesis Publishers 1998 p162
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assuming a concentration on defending the rationality of traditional models).231
Whether these criteria for assessment with regard to the tradition, depending as 
they do on judgements  concerning the  translation of  root-metaphors  are  sufficiently 
robust to locate new models within the tradition satisfactorily is another question.  Two 
things arise from this attempt by McFague to provide such criteria though.  Firstly that 
this is again an example of continuities with the tradition being conceptual and secondly 
the fact that such an assessment process in relation to the tradition is felt to be necessary 
underlines the importance that McFague does place upon speaking as a specifically and 
authentically Christian theologian.
   Having  identified  some  of  the  formal  criteria  that  a  model  should  meet  in 
general, we now turn to look at the significance that the particular features of a given 
context have for the assessment of models.  It is clear that any translation of a root-
metaphor, and any judgement regarding ethical performance, can only be assessed in a 
given context and so the nature of the particular context addressed by McFague's work 
is of great importance.  
3.5 Speaking to a context – the loving eye vs the arrogant eye.
In  our  preceding  discussions  in  this  chapter  and  chapters  1  and  2  we  have 
identified a number of features which are to be desired if a model is to be considered 
valid and useful in metaphorical theology.  Here these features will be recalled and their 
implications for McFague's practice of theology in her context will be drawn out.  This 
231 See for example the  list of standard assessment criteria provided by Anna Case-Winters in 'The 
Question of God in an Age of Science: Constructions of Reality and Ultimate Reality' Zygon 32 no.3 
1997 pp351-375.  This list is comprehensive with regard to criteria for general rationality, but criteria 
for assessing the status of a model in relation to the tradition are entirely absent.
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context is primarily made up of North American, middle-class Christians living in the 
period  1980-2001  (a  group  she  herself  addresses  explicitly,  particularly  in  Life  
Abundant, which includes an appendix entitled 'A manifesto to North American Middle 
Class Christians).232
Contexts,  of  course,  change  with  time,  as  do  our  understandings  and 
interpretations of them.  This is the thrust of much of McFague's argument and the most  
basic justification of her project.  It is little surprise then  that in an era of substantial 
cultural  change,  her reading of her context  changes  in  emphasis  over  time,  even in 
works written over the course of 10 years,  This should be borne in mind as her models  
are assessed and when 'McFague's context' is referred to below.  In her earlier works, 
including the writing of  Speaking in Parables and  Metaphorical Theology (1982) and 
associated articles, her context is most defined by the perceived exclusion of the female 
voice and experience from theology.  Models of God (1988) carries this forward but is 
also driven by a concern with the nuclear threat to life on earth.  The Body of God 
(1993)  and  Super,  Natural  Christians  (1997) are  written  to  address  a  context  of 
environmental  exploitation  and  threat  more  generally  and  Life  Abundant (2001)  is 
concerned  with  the  range  of  human  identity  and  diversity  of  human  experience, 
especially where this differs from the 'hegemonic, idealised norm'233 as well as all the 
preceding factors.   This extension of concern from the personal to the universal is, 
McFague argues, a quite natural progression made by Christianity as a whole over time 
and  by  many  theologians  over  their  careers.   It  is  also  based  on  a  consistent 
hermeneutic, namely a criticism of dualism and hierarchy and an interpretation of the 
world based on continuums of unity which are mindful of genuine difference. 
232 Life Abundant p205ff This article also appeared as 'A Manifesto to North American Middle-Class 
Christians,' Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature, Jeffrey Kaplan and Bron Taylor (eds.) London: 
Continuum International Publishing Group 2003.
233 By which she means the idealised man of Leonardo DaVinci, the US Declaration of Independence 
and contemporary advertising. See Life Abundant p47
166
McFague's  models  of  God  were  introduced  in  her  published  work  over  the 
period 1982-1988, thus the extension of 'context' after 1988 to include other 'anomalies' 
not previously considered provides an opportunity for the testing of the 'fruitfulness' of 
these models.   Meanwhile, the most basic criteria her models will need to meet, on her 
own claims,  is  that  they should  be on the side  of  abundance and  inclusivity whilst 
avoiding idolatry and irrelevance.  
Idolatry is perhaps the easiest avoided, given the assumptions about metaphor 
which underlie all her models.  A charge of idolatry could only be truly levied if one 
model or set of models was allowed to dominate to the exclusion of all others.  A model 
is  also aided in  meeting this  criteria  by being mindful  of the 'tensive'  properties of 
metaphor (see chapter  1.4).   There should be sufficient  distance between the model 
proposed for God and generally held ideas  of  God in her context  for  the model  to 
generate a sufficient 'shock' of recognition and difference for the metaphorical tension to 
be established and also for new insight to be gained.  As she says 
'Does [a model] have both marks of a good metaphor, both the  shock and the 
recognition?  Do these metaphors both disorient and reorient? Do they evoke a response 
of hearing something new and something interesting?'234
The condition of 'relevance' is also related to some of the properties of metaphor. 
'Familiarity' and 'structure' are both important here.  A model needs to use imagery that 
is accessible to her context; that is imagery that most within her context have a good 
working knowledge of, and particularly those in that context who are excluded by other 
models.  Further the extent and complexity of this knowledge needs to be relatively high 
if  the  model  is  to  prove  fruitful  and  aid  comprehensiveness.   This  combination  of 
structure  and  accessibility  is  vital  if  the  model  is  to  function  with  the  same 
transformative possibilities as a parable, being able to necessitate, facilitate and reward 
234 Models of God p63
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further reflection beyond the immediate recognition of hidden similarity.
This imagery should also bear emotive content as well as informational content. 
This aids the transformational power of the model and also assists in connecting it to the 
primary religious act of worship.
McFague argues that models should also be chosen bearing in mind that our 
understanding of both domains is altered by the creation of the metaphor.  Thus the 
image or concept chosen as the basis of the model should bear the resultant 'divinisation' 
(as she calls it) without this being contradictory to the goal of the model.
This last criterion, she contends, affords an opportunity for inclusivity, since the 
content  of  the  model  may be  such  that  what  is  'divinised'  by  it  is  the  identity  or 
experience of a group commonly excluded from the sphere of religious reflection (or 
from another form of participation in society) in the given context.  For example she 
contends that there would be a direct benefit in the way in which women are perceived 
if they are used to model God through metaphors such as 'God as Mother'.
However  this  understanding  of  metaphor  is  questionable  and  the  preceding 
analysis  has  instead  preferred  an  account  which  sees  new  metaphors  as  affecting 
cultural change much more slowly and indirectly.   This is not, though, to rule out such 
change  entirely;  as  Glucksberg  and  Keysar  have  shown,  certain  changes  in 
understanding  have,  for  example,  occurred  through  metaphorical  usage  extending 
common  linguistic  categories  such  as  the  addition  of  'computer'  to  the  category 
'machine' which has led to a significant change in our understanding of the category 
'machine'  as  well  as  understandings  of  those  things  metaphorically  understood  as 
machines (e.g. the human brain).235
235 Sam Glucksberg and Boaz Keysar 'How metaphors work' in Andrew Ortony (ed) Metaphor and 
Thought 2nd edition Cambridge: CUP 1993 pp401-424 p414  Glucksberg and Keysar argue that 
metaphors operate by category extension.  That is that the target term is added to the category of 
objects denoted by the source term, thus changing the nature of that category to some degree.  It is 
significant that the categorisation process occurs this way round.  Consider the case of God the 
Mother.  Here God is added to the category of 'Things that are Mothers'.  It is not the case that 
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Therefore what is essentially at issue is the way in which a change in language 
can accompany and interact with a change in understanding in society (such as a change 
in the way women are viewed).   McFague contends that this is a question of how things 
are  seen and  connects  this  to  her  understanding  of  metaphor  as  seeing  as.   Our 
reservations centre on our questioning of the ability of novel metaphorical God-talk to 
directly affect this renewed vision.  This springs from our rejection of the interaction 
theory of  metaphor in the light  of later  work in  cognitive linguistics.   It  is  not  the 
intention here of course to suggest that the role of women in society or any other issue 
cannot be seen differently.  Rather it is to argue that this renewed vision needs to be a 
partner project relating to the construction of models of God.  It is we suggest a part of 
that construction process that needs to be deliberately and mindfully pursued, rather 
than  being  an  automatic  consequence  of  the  process  itself,  with  further  efforts  not 
required.   
As McFague’s  work progresses,  we do indeed find her  pursuing just  such a 
partner project, and she no longer appears to be simply assuming that her models of 
God will themselves create the renewed vision she seeks unassisted.  This appears to be 
an unexpressed acknowledgement that the points we have made here are correct, since 
they explain a discernible shift in her work (that McFague does not herself explain or 
seem to acknowledge).   The  seeds  of  this  change may perhaps be discerned in  the 
following  quotation  from  Metaphorical  Theology  in  which  McFague  implies  that 
patriarchy is not simply the product of the use of masculine imagery in God-talk and 
that a wider cultural context needs to be taken into account :
'It is…a mistake to focus on God the father as a limited model for talk about 
Mothers are added to the category 'Things that are Gods'.  This approach would account for the slower 
process of 'divinisation' of the sources of metaphors for God.  On this understanding, such divinisation 
only occurs once the usage of the newly added term becomes such that it serves as an instantiating 
example of the category. (In McFague's schema it becomes an 'image')  This may have arguably 
occurred with the term 'father', a category within which 'God' may provide the intention – the 
category's conceptual basis.
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God; rather it is partriarchalism – the expanded, intransigent model radical feminists 
take to be the root-metaphor of Christianity – that is at issue. 236
But the process really begins in earnest in The Body of God,  where she moves 
away from presenting individual models of God and towards a more detailed analysis of 
the world and society and the interaction between prevailing understandings of these 
and her new models of God. 
This later, additional focus on examining the way in which the world (as well as 
just God) is currently understood in her context finds its most eloquent expression in 
Super, Natural Christians in which McFague uses Marylin Frye's distinction between 
the  'loving  eye'  and  the  'arrogant  eye'.237  These,  she  says,  are  basic  modes  of 
interpreting  experience  in  accordance  with  foundational  assumptions  about  what  is 
viewed and who is viewing it.  
'Arrogance' in this case means to see the observed as object and to measure its 
value  in  relation  to  its  usefulness  for  the  self.   By contrast  'love'  is  'the  extremely 
difficult  realization  that  something  other  than  oneself  is  real.'238 The  Loving  Eye 
assumes that value is intrinsic, based upon the nature of what is seen in and to itself 
rather than in its usefulness to the observer.  To see lovingly is then to grant the seen the 
status of subject, to therefore see it as in some ways 'like' the observer and to grant it a 
complexity and richness beyond simply its function. 
'A very different kind of vision from the so-called God's eye view is suggested by 
the phrase 'locking eyes.'  Imagine shifting your  vision from the picture of the 
whole earth to the eyes of another person—not to look at him or her, but into their  
eyes. Sight is not necessarily the eye of the mind; it can also be the eye of the 
236 Metaphorical Theology p 147-148 
237 Marilyn Frye 'In and out of harm's way: Arrogance and Love' The politics of reality: Essays in  
Feminist Theory Trumansburg NY: Crossing Press, 1983 pp53-83
238 Iris Murdoch (unreferenced quotation) cited in McFague 'How should we love nature?' Earthlight  
Spring 1997.  The copyright for this article is held by Fortress Press.
170
body—in fact, it rightly and properly is. When we lock eyes something happens: 
we become two subjects,  not  subject  and object.  Locking eyes  is  perhaps  the 
ultimate subject-subject experience: it is what lovers do and what nursing mothers 
do with their babies. A version of it can happen with other animals. especially the 
eerie experience of locking eyes with a lowland gorilla or chimpanzee at a zoo. It 
is possible even with a tree or plant. The loving eye, paying attention to another 
(another  person,  animal,  tree,  plant)  is  not  staring;  it  is,  in  Martin  Buber's 
suggestive phrase,  relating to  the other  more like a  Thou than an It.  There is 
nothing sentimental or weak-minded about this: it is simply a refusal to assume 
that subjectivity is my sole prerogative.'239
In  this  section,  then,  we  have  identified  some  of  the  primary  features  of 
McFague's context and we have argued that the properties of metaphors that she insists 
on, and as they were outlined earlier, need to be taken into account if a model of God, 
understood as a translation of a Christian root-metaphor, is to be adequate to its task 
within its context.
We  conclude  with  a  passage  from  Models  of  God,  which  sums  up  well 
McFague's position on the justification of models and also illustrates the importance of 
context in that process.
'... our constructions are intended to be better than the ones they refute or replace. 
This is, of course, a difficult issue, because if one admits that all are readings, with 
the new replacing the old, on what basis can some be better than others?  They 
certainly cannot claim to be better absolutely, or from all perspectives, or for all 
time. At the most, they might be better relatively (to other constructions) from a 
particular perspective, and for a particular time. And this is the claim I would 
make: that a construction of the Christian faith in the context of a holistic vision 
239 Sallie McFague Super, Natural Christians London: SCM Press 1997 p25
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and the nuclear threat is from our particular perspective and for our particular time 
relatively better than constructions that ignore these issues. It is relatively better in 
part  because  of  what  Christian  faith  at  base  is  about.  The  claim  is  that  to 
understand the Christian faith in terms of the holistic vision and in response to the 
nuclear threat is in continuity with the basic Christian paradigm as well as being 
an appropriate construction of that faith for our time. I will attempt to make that 
case, but it cannot be proved. As with any construction, the most one can do is to 
'live within' it, testing it for its disclosive power, its ability to address and cope 
with the most pressing issues of one's day, its comprehensiveness and coherence, 
its potential for dealing with anomalies, and so forth.'240 
3.6 God the Father.
Earlier we suggested that if we are to establish the consistency of McFague’s 
work, it needs to be determined whether McFague's assessment of models of God could 
potentially be different in her theory and in her practice, in other words whether she 
actually assesses models in the same way that her discussion of theological method 
suggests that one should.  Further it needs to be investigated whether the criteria she 
uses to assess her own models are the same as those used to assess other models, such as 
the ones she identifies as belonging to the Christian tradition.  
In the passage above, McFague says 'our constructions are intended to be better 
than the ones they refute or replace.'  This implies a criticism of existing models and this 
in turn implies that she has conducted a practical assessment of those models.  It is to 
this that we now turn.  In this section we will look at a model that McFague regards as 
240Models of God p26-27
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central to the tradition, namely the model of 'God the Father', and McFague's criticism 
of  it.   We  will  see  that  McFague  does  indeed  employ  the  criteria  listed  above  in 
critiquing this model.  We will also show, though, that to 'refute or replace'  existing 
models does not completely characterise her approach to traditional models and so we 
will  return  to  the  important  distinction  McFague  makes  between  'reforming'  and 
'revolutionary' stances.
It is important to note from the beginning that McFague does not wish to dismiss 
the model of God as Father out of hand.  In a few passages she praises the model for 
meeting many of the criteria we set out above, particularly its explanatory scope and 
systematising potential. It is clear that she does not find this model to be incoherent and 
the enduring nature of the model is testimony to its relative comprehensiveness.  In fact 
it is not the model itself, as a model, that McFague finds problematic but rather two 
related aspects of its use.
McFague can be seen to show that the 'father' model is relatively comprehensive, 
that is:
   'It  suggests  a  comprehensive,  ordering  structure  with  impressive interpretive 
potential. As a rich model with many associated commonplaces as well as a host 
of supporting metaphors, an entire theology can be worked out from this model. 
Thus, if God is understood on the model of 'father', human beings are understood 
as 'children,'  sin is rebellion against the 'father,'  redemption is  sacrifice by the 
'elder son' on behalf of the 'brothers and sisters' for the guilt against the 'father' and 
so on.'241 
241 See Metaphorical Theology p23.  See also Chapter 5 which is devoted to this question and is 
McFague's main treatment  
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Consequently,  she argues, the model has become dominant within commonly 
held theories of Christian doctrine.  This is not in itself a bad thing. This interpretive 
process is one that McFague advocates herself.  However if this process becomes over-
extended so that a model becomes  hegemonic, i.e. it  becomes dominant to the point 
where it excludes other models in principle, it  has become, for McFague, an idol242. 
This has two consequences which McFague finds undesirable.  
Firstly she argues that it may result in the deification of the source domain of the 
model ('father') within a community especially if that community holds the model to be 
the only valid way of talking of God243.  (However note that we have already expressed 
caution about this finding by rejecting the interactionist theory of metaphor.)  
Secondly, because 'Father' is a model and therefore partial, McFague argues that 
it follows that its use screens off other insights that would be gained from using other 
models.244  Indeed when putting forward her own models, it is significant that McFague 
spends little time critiquing the models she seeks to replace or supplement in and of 
themselves.  Rather she is concerned to compare the implications of each set of models 
for our understanding of some aspect of life or conduct.  For example she is ultimately 
more interested in whether sin should be seen as rebellion (against the Father) or as a 
failure to affirm the existence, and seek the flourishing, of all (the Mother's children), 
than  whether  God  is  best  modelled  as  'Father'  or  'Mother'  in  the  abstract.   This 
consequence  of  McFague's  focus  on lived  experience  and ethical  praxis  rather  than 
metaphysical speculation or systematics again highlights the fact that for her the third of 
our major criteria above ('more helpful in promoting the fulfilment of all life') is the 
most important.  This is not to say that McFague is purely a theological pragmatist.   As 
we have seen, there are other criteria of rationality and coherence that she advances as 
242 See for example Metaphorical Theology pp 8, 21, 29 and especially 145
243 Ibid. p147
244 Ibid. p115
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well  as  pragmatic  concerns.   However,  all  other  things  being equal,  it  is  pragmatic 
criteria that are decisive in her account.
This  problem of  all models,  that  they are  partial  and therefore lack  or  even 
exclude other potential insights, is intensified both by the hegemony of 'Father' but also 
most crucially by the model's  gendered nature.  This is not only due to the fact that it 
images  God after  slightly less than half  of the (human) population (a  criticism that 
implies that the model can be found lacking in the categories of relevance, its ability to 
deal with anomalies and to produce continued fruitful insights), it is also a function of 
the history of the model within patriarchal systems and history.
Two points need to be made here.  The first is to repeat the observation with 
which we began section 3.4, that models cannot be tested individually but only as part 
of networks.  This is even more so in the case of a relatively comprehensive key model, 
especially one with as long a history of interpretation as God as Father.  In reality it is 
this  network of  the  models  of  'God  as  Father'  surrounded  by  various  extensions, 
interpretations and applications and its patriarchal context and history that McFague is 
assessing, rather than the model itself in its original formulation.  To repeat more fully 
the quotation already cited earlier:
'It is therefore a mistake to focus on God the father as a limited model for talk 
about God; rather it is patriarchalism – the expanded, intransigent model radical 
feminists  take  to  be the  root-metaphor of  Christianity -  ...  This  root-metaphor 
refers to 'the whole complex of sentiments, the patterns of cognition and behavior, 
and the assumptions about human nature and the nature of the cosmos that have 
grown out of a culture in which men have dominated women.'  At the heart of 
patriarchalism  as  root-metaphor  is  a  subject-object  split  in  which  man  is 
envisioned over against God and vice versa.'245
245Metaphorical Theology pp147-8 quoting Sheila D Collins A Different Heaven and Earth: A Feminist  
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The second point is that McFague regards 'Father' as a model coined by Jesus246, 
an important consideration given the Christocentric origins of her theology.  Therefore 
McFague stops short of rejecting the model entirely.  However her disagreement with 
the model is not in the fact of its existence or in its use as she sees Jesus using it (in her  
reading, Jesus used the model in ways that challenged the patriarchy,  hierarchy and 
dualisms of his day247).  Rather she is concerned, as we just saw, with the way in which 
the  model  has  been used  when adopted  as  the  basis  for  a  patriarchal  theology and 
combined with patriarchal world views.  The extent to which this has happened means 
that  for  McFague  it  is  not  simply  the  case  that  the  model  can  be  rehabilitated  by 
returning to Jesus' destabilising, 'parabolic' use of the term, although she does argue that 
this rehabilitation can occur.  
Thus we can see that McFague is neither advocating a 'recovery'  approach to 
traditional models, trying to restore an 'original meaning' distorted over time, but nor is 
she arguing for the total rejection of such models either.   Instead she feels that the 
solution is to underscore its status  as a model and one model only  among the 'many 
names' of God by using other complementary models248.
Her models are intended to 
'tak[e]  the  place,  as  it  were,  of  the  most  ancient  and  hallowed  names  of  the 
Trinitarian God – Father, Son and Holy Spirit.  It was not a coincidence but a 
deliberate attempt to unseat those names as descriptions of God which will allow 
no supplements or alternatives.'249  
A deliberate attempt, then, but nevertheless one in a limited sense.  These names 
are unseated precisely (and only) as 'names' and 'descriptions' of God, not as potential 
Perspective on Religion Valley Forge, Pa.:Judson Press 1974 
246 Ibid. p170
247 Ibid. p151
248 Ibid. p21
249 Models of God p182
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models of God in relationship to all that is.  These terms may still be used (with the 
understanding that they are not 'divine names') so long as they are 'reoriented' within a 
new scheme which includes new models.   In these way, McFague holds, traditional 
models can still be fruitful ones.250
This makes it clear that McFague, while putting forward radical and far-reaching 
novel ideas locates herself as a  'reformer' in relation to the Christian tradition rather 
than a 'revolutionary' who seeks to move beyond and replace it251.  In fact she is explicit 
on  this  point,  contrasting  herself  with  other  feminist  colleagues  such  as  Naomi 
Goldenberg, Carol Christ, and Mary Daly.  McFague says
'Can  an  immanental,  exclusively  feminist  perspective  be  absorbed  into  the 
Christian paradigm?  It is doubtful, in my opinion, that it can be, nor is revolutionary 
feminist theology interested in making it commensurate with the tradition.'252
However,
'Reformers believe that the root-metaphor of Christianity is human liberation, 
not  patriarchy,  and  that  liberation  for  women  can  occur  within  the  Christian 
paradigm.'253
and,
'As a feminist reformer, I believe that we must start with …the Gospel for all 
peoples.'254
The key distinction that she makes is one of paradigm and consequently root-
250 McFague and Soskice both pick up on Ricoeur's article 'Fatherhood: From Phantasm to Symbol' and 
Soskice in particular shows how the image of Father is more fluid in scripture and tradition than may 
be commonly realised and hence that it is open to a constructive re-evaluation.  Overall, because 
Soskice follows Ricoeur's emphasis on exegesis more closely than McFague, her understanding of the 
ambiguity of the biblical Fatherhood of God is more nuanced.  See Janet Martin Soskice 'Can a 
Feminist call God Father?' in Kimel Jr (ed.) op. cit. pp81-94
251  For McFague’s full discussion of this distinction, see Metaphorical Theology, Chapter 5, subsections 
entitled 'Revolutionary Feminist Theology: A New Paradigm and a New Model' p151ff  and 
'Reformist Feminist Theology: The Search for New Models' p164ff
252  Metaphorical Theology pp155-156 
253  Ibid. p162
254  Ibid. p163
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metaphor.   Revolutionary  approaches,  as  she  defines  them,  are  those  that  not  only 
critique  and  find  wanting  particular  key  models  but  also  reject  the  paradigm's 
underpinning root-metaphor.   Reformers,  such as McFague herself,  she argues,  may 
reject or seek to supplement certain key models but retain the underlying root-metaphor 
of  Christianity.   It  is  this  prioritising of  the  root-metaphor  over  certain key models 
including 'God the Father' which makes McFague both radical and reforming, but not in 
her  own assessment, revolutionary.
A number of scholars however would disagree with McFague's assessment of the 
importance  of  the  Father  model  within  Christianity.   For  many,  the  Trinity  is 
foundational to the Christian narrative.  Torrance makes an important distinction 
'We cannot forget that the Trinitarian formula — Father, Son, and Holy Spirit — 
gives expression to God s personal self-revelation, one in which what he is toward 
us in the persons of the Father, the Son. and the Holy Spirit, he is inherently and 
eternally in himself, three persons in one divine being. Any other formula such as 
'Creator. Redeemer, and Sustainer,'  while a true expression as far as it goes of 
God's external acts toward us in creating, redeeming, and sustaining us, does not 
express  what  God eternally  and personally is  in  himself— three  persons  who 
mutually contain and indwell one another — but only something of what he is 
toward us...the formula 'Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer' by itself does no more 
than  give  expression  to  a  unitarian  conception  of  God  characterized  by three 
different  names,  modes,  or operations.  Moreover,  the impossibility of 'Creator, 
Redeemer, and Sustainer' being a substitute for 'Father, Son, and Holy Spirit' is 
apparent  from the fact that  there can be no coinherent or perichoretic relation 
between Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer, for that would imply that God creates, 
redeems,  and  sustains  himself!  The  effect  of  that  would  be  to  identify  God's 
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functional relations toward the creaturely world with the intrinsic interrelations of 
his divine being, which would amount to a very gross form of anthropomorphism.' 
255 
Now McFague would doubtless disagree that such talk of inner knowledge of 
the being of God was possible or appropriate.  However we should note that the loss of 
the Trinity as a model of God significantly reduces the scope of the Christian tradition 
taken as a whole.  We should therefore at least ask whether the rejection of the Trinity is 
required by her method.  Now McFague argues that models are partial.  What seems to 
be lacking in her account is a treatment of how models supplement one another and can 
be suitable for different tasks.  The admission that God can be given many names and 
modelled  in  many ways  vis  a  vis God's  relationship  to  us  and the  world  does  not 
necessarily imply that God may not be modelled in a Trinitarian fashion in relation to 
the Christ-event for example.  McFague argues that the Trinitarian formula should be 
unseated  as one that allows no alternatives.  But this does not imply that it must be 
rejected in all contexts or for all purposes.  Many readings of McFague appear to miss 
this point, as indeed it would seem that McFague does herself when she insists she is 
always and only a monist.256  Crucially, McFague's models of Mother, Lover and Friend 
may be designed to unseat Father, Son and Holy Spirit from a certain status and role but 
they should not be thought of as a replacement or translation of these names.  Not only 
does  McFague's  view  of  the  unsubstitutability  of  metaphors  make  such  a  crude 
replacement impossible, it is also clear that the 'tasks' of both formulae are different.
Once again,  we have raised a question over McFague's  relationship with the 
tradition and her assessment of its performance.  This is of particular interest to our 
255 Torrance op. cit. p141
256 Models of God p92  Compare this to Soskice in Kimel op. cit. p92f who follows broadly Moltmann 
in differentiating between God's monotheistic Fatherhood in relation to patriarchal understandings of 
nation and family and God's Trinitarian Fatherhood of Jesus.
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enquiry here and concern is heightened by her stated desire to be reforming within the 
tradition. This may call into question the coherence of her project.  We must ask to what 
degree it is possible for her to retain this reforming role while rejecting so much of the 
content of the tradition she seeks to reform.  
3.7   The  Aims  of  Metaphorical  Theology  –  Heuristic,  Christian  Metaphorical 
Theology.
It is only possible, of course, to assess McFague's models of God if we know for 
what purpose we are assessing them; what tasks they are being required to fulfil and in 
what context? 
 Most basically for McFague the task is the creation of models which assist the 
fulfilment of all life as a result of and  response to experiences of the liberating love of 
God. 
It is also clear that McFague's theology is intended for an audience shaped by the 
Christian tradition and participating in that tradition but that she also wishes to effect 
change within that tradition.  While she is keen to make far-reaching changes to much 
of  that  tradition's  formulation,  doctrine  and  imagery,  she  wishes  to  do  so  whilst 
remaining  inside  it,  unlike  many  of  her  feminist  colleagues.   Her  basic  goal,  her 
fundamental theological task, is to construct Christian models of God that assist  the 
Christian community in bringing about a vision of the fulfilment of all life.  This means 
that however much pragmatic criteria of assessing models (i.e. assessing them for their 
ethical connotations) are brought to the fore, and however strong the desire to create 
new,  imaginative  and  fruitful  models,  the  requirement  for  these  models  to  be 
demonstrably Christian models remains.  This also in turn raises the crucial question: 
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what makes a metaphorical theology Christian? (as opposed to making a metaphorical 
theology ethically consistent with some readings of Christianity).   Therefore we should 
now bring together the various points discussed with regard to McFague’s relationship 
with the Christian tradition to see to what extent this crucial question can be answered. 
We have seen that McFague acknowledges that the unsubstitutionary nature of 
metaphors means that changing models means changing the meaning being expressed 
because  no  two models  carry exactly  the  same meaning.   It  is  therefore  clear  that 
McFague is not simply attempting an update of language – a translation of old meanings 
into new language that preserves all the features of the old, simply restating them in new 
terms. Instead we have found her to be explicit that she is attempting to express new 
meanings and address new concerns, while remaining in continuity with the Christian 
tradition.
She wishes to locate herself within the Christian tradition, reforming it, rather 
than overthrowing it by proposing new models that are so at variance with the ‘root-
metaphors’ of that tradition that they would necessitate a paradigm change resulting in a 
new religion.
Her process of reformation involves the creation of new models to address the 
concerns of our time in the language of our time.  These new models are to have a 
continuity with the Christian tradition which may be judged by a Christian community. 
We have identified this continuity as being at the conceptual level, the level of what she 
calls ‘material norms’ which, we have argued, should be seen as be concepts which are 
derived from a particular reading of Jesus which draws upon Liberation Theology.
However her reformation is not only constructive, it is not an attempt to simply 
place  new  models  alongside  existing  ones  as  supplemental  or  complementary 
formulations.  Her theology is also deconstructive.  She is critical of existing models, 
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and  especially  those  that  use  what  she  judges  to  be  patriarchal  images  and 
understandings.  She criticises their ‘hegemony’ in the tradition, by which she means 
their perceived special status as direct descriptions of God which she argues has meant 
that new models have been excluded from consideration.
She is also critical of the content of some of these traditional models, finding 
them irrelevant to ‘our time’ in the sense that they neither address what she views as the 
most pressing issues of her context – nuclear weapons and environmental threat – nor 
(in some cases) draw upon contemporary imagery.
We have seen that McFague also equivocates over the future status of traditional 
God-talk in the light of her project; the question arising is, are they to be replaced or 
merely  supplemented?   If  we  are  to  be  able  to  make  our  own judgements  on  this 
question, to help resolve the uncertainty on McFague's relationship to the tradition but 
in her own work and in the responses of her critics, then it must be noted that a number 
of relationships between new and existing traditional models are logically possible.
We must initially ask whether the new models could simply sit alongside the old, 
extending the explanatory scope of Christianity as a whole, allowing it to address new 
subjects and issues. However we have already seen how models may conflict with each 
other in their implications and that if they do so in a way that indicates contradictory 
paradigms, then this is a tension that needs to be addressed for Christianity to remain a 
coherent web of beliefs.
If the tension between models needs to be resolved there are three ways of doing 
this:
Firstly the new models could be held accountable to the old, with new models 
only being accepted if they can be harmonised with traditional formulations.  
Secondly,  the relationship could be reverse,  with the new models standing in 
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judgement upon the old. 
However  both  of  these  would  not  find  favour  within  McFague’s  stated 
methodology because the first is simply the hegemony of traditional models to which 
she objects so strongly, and the second would be to replace it with a new hegemony. 
Neither has a basis in her methodology.  This is not to say that there is nothing to be 
gained by harmonising  or  contrasting  models  with  each other.  This  may well  be  a 
productive exercise for theology.  Rather it is to say that one model or set of models  
cannot be used to judge another if we are to be consistent with McFague’s methodology 
and with the findings here, in neither of which is the model the appropriate device for 
making this judgement.
Thirdly then some form of external criterion must be used to judge both new and 
traditional models.  For McFague, this criterion is provided by the material norms she 
draws from the tradition.  But what at first seems to be a clear solution, turns out on  
further analysis to have a significant problem.
The material  norms she identifies  are  not,  as  we have  seen,  for  McFague a 
‘timeless  essence  of  Christianity’.   Rather  these  norms  have  been  constructed  and 
approved by her  in  response to  the contemporary challenges she wishes  to  address. 
These material norms are those that are relevant to ‘our time’ in the sense that they are  
relevant  to  the  particular  and  specific  issues  of  our  time  that  McFague  wishes  to 
address.
What McFague does not address is whether these specific issues of our time are 
the only issues of our time.  If they are not, then the question arises as to whether or not 
these material norms, and the models based on them, are sufficient to address all the 
issues of our time.
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We also need to ask whether the issues of our time have any continuity with the 
issues of past times.  Whether for example existential themes of personal alienation, or 
questions of individual guilt and forgiveness, or the enduring existence of the individual 
beyond death have ceased to have any meaning for contemporary life?
If it is the case that human experience in our time shares many common features 
with human experience in times past, then this suggests that models from the past may 
have enduring relevance and may be able to address issues that models limited by a 
focus  in  their  construction  on  addressing  specific  and  limited  contemporary  issues 
cannot address.  It may also be the case that models that previous Christian communities 
have  adjudged  to  be  useful  in  addressing  some aspects  of  their  experience,  might, 
through  their  reinterpretation  also  be  able  to  contribute  to  the  tackling  of  new 
contemporary issues. 
Now,  it  is  clear  that  despite  the  ambitious  and commendably wide range of 
issues McFague applies her models to (which we shall  set  out in the following two 
chapters)  she  is  not  attempting  a  complete  systematic  theology  that  addresses  the 
entirety  of  the  human  condition.  We  would  not  expect  her  to  undertake  such  an 
impossible endeavour of course.  But it therefore follows logically that there are issues 
that she does not address which traditional models may address.  
Further it is logically unlikely that a set of material norms derived to address 
specific contemporary issues could be sufficient to give rise to models that address all 
contemporary issues, including those issues which have substantial continuities with the 
concerns of past generations. This would imply that a broader set of material norms 
could, in theory, be derived in order to address a broader range of issues and that a place 
could be found for traditional models to make a continuing contribution.
184
In short, there is a danger that by trying to allow the gospel to ‘speak to our time’ 
McFague will unintentionally impose a limit upon it that will only allow it to speak to 
specific issues. 
Therefore  our  discussion  here  suggests  that  it  is  necessary  to  examine  how 
McFague’s proposed new models relate to traditional models.  This is not in order that 
traditional models may stand in judgement on them.  It is in order to establish whether:
 a) the new models are being allowed to establish a hegemony of their own and replace 
traditional models in such a way as to limit Christian discourse to only the issues that  
McFague wishes to address 
b) she is attempting any constructive relationship between new models and traditional 
ones that would preserve the ability of the tradition to address other concerns  
c)  her  method leaves  space  for  the reinterpretation of  traditional  models  to  make a 
positive contribution to  the issues  the new models are  themselves  addressing.  (This 
would  support  her  avowed  methodological  aim  to  be  reforming  rather  than 
revolutionary.
If   McFague’s  account  of  Christianity as  a  historical  continuity carried by a 
community  is  preferred,  similar,  though  less  precisely  defined  questions  apply, 
concerning  exactly  to  what  extent  and  how  quickly  a  community  can  embrace 
substantial  change  to  this  tradition  while  still  feeling  itself  to  remain  within  that 
historical continuity.  Further it could also be asked whether continuity at the level of 
concepts is sufficient to maintain the continuity without retaining in some form any of 
the community's traditionally held models.  
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Finally it should be remembered that the aims of metaphorical theology, while 
on one level radical, are also modest in what they are actually trying to claim about 
'matters of fact'.  McFague cautions:
'The alternative models ... are not a trinity in the old sense of hallowed names for 
God intended to discourage experimentation and ensure orthodoxy; nevertheless, 
a modest proposal  is advanced: for our time the new models are illuminating, 
helpful and appropriate ways in which to think about the relationship between 
God  and  the  world.  And  that  is  all  that  is  being  advanced  inasmuch  as 
metaphorical, heuristic theology says much but means little. It is mostly fiction, 
mainly  fleshing  out  a  few  basic  metaphors  in  as  deep  and  comprehensive  a 
fashion  as  possible  to  see  what  their  implications  might  be.  Perhaps  the 
imaginative picture that has been painted provides a habitable house in which to 
live for a while,  with doors open and windows ajar and with the promise that 
additions and renovations are desired and needed.'257
 The  concern  here  is  essentially  that  this  temporary construction  of  a  ‘habitable 
house’ does not so clear the building site of resources and existing structures that it 
become difficult to build any different houses within it in the future.
3.8  Conclusions.
While subsequent research and the responses of McFague's critics have again 
suggested small modifications which might strengthen McFague's case and ability to 
achieve her aims, the analysis of her theoretical statements and theological methods in 
this  chapter  has  further  supported  the  judgement  of  the  previous  ones.   It  may be 
provisionally concluded at this stage that, even bearing in mind the challenges raised, 
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McFague's  theoretical  work  is  itself  consistent,  coherent  and  still  able  to  make  a 
relevant contemporary contribution.   What remains to be seen in the following chapters 
is whether or not this judgement can be extended to McFague's models in practice and 
to the relationship between this practise and her theory. Therefore, over the course of 
this  chapter,  criteria  have  been  derived  for  the  assessment  of  models  from within 
McFague's own work and these criteria will  be used as the basis for evaluating her 
models over the next two chapters.
The following are initial criteria for a good image:
Familiarity 
Structure 
Accessibility 
Emotive content
The following relate to the image's ability to become more formally a model 
within a Christian metaphorical theology:
(in comparison to other models):
a) more coherent with the root-metaphor of its paradigm in that it is 
i) well located relative to the root-metaphor,
ii) mindful of the basic images of the paradigm
iii) able to embody the tension inherent in the tradition
iv) well worked through in its connections to and implications for other models 
      in the paradigm.
b) a better translation of the root-metaphor in that:
i) it is relevant to its context
ii) it aids the comprehensiveness of the paradigm
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iii) it is better able to interpret anomalies
iv) it is fruitful for the continued interpretation of experience.
c) more helpful in promoting the fulfilment of all life.
In  all  of  this  we  have  seen  that  successful  models  can  be  characterised  as 
showing or assisting the use of the 'loving' rather than the 'arrogant' eye.
It has also been observed that McFague intends her models to be reforming and 
located within the Christian tradition and that the criteria relating to root-metaphors are 
intended to achieve this.  However some doubts have been expressed about the ability 
of these criteria alone to indeed meet this condition fully. These doubts will now be 
more fully addressed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 4 – Models of God in relationship 
– Mother, Lover and Friend.
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4.1  Introduction.
Having examined McFague's theoretical statements, it is now time to examine 
the outworking of this theory in practice.  Are McFague's models of God themselves 
coherent and are they consistent with her theory and aims? Can they contribute, as she 
wishes, to reform of the Christian tradition today?
This  chapter  therefore  looks  at  the  models  of  God  in  relationship  which 
McFague introduced in  Models of God in 1987; the models of God as Mother, Lover 
and Friend.  McFague presents her models in Models of God in a threefold movement, 
looking at first at the ‘activity’ of God under the model, then at the resultant account of 
‘love’ suggested by the model and finally the ‘ethic’ that she argues results from these. 
The presentation which follows here broadly mirrors her own.  Treating each of the 
three models of God as Mother, Lover and Friend in turn, the meaning of the model is 
outlined (going somewhat beyond ‘activity’ and including any qualifications McFague 
gives to them elsewhere in her work).  This is followed by discussion of the accounts of 
love  and ethic  provided by the  model.   In  these  sections  the  concern  is  to  present 
McFague’s view.  An assessment of her models then follows as they are evaluated in 
relation to the criteria derived in chapter 3 to assess how far McFague is remaining 
constant with her previous writing and declared aims.  This is in turn followed by a 
review of critical responses to the model in the available literature.  However there is an 
important and necessary limit set on these sections since they are concerned only with 
those responses that critique, as this chapter does, the ability of McFague's models to 
achieve  her  purposes  and meet  the  criteria  she  sets  out.    They do not  include  for  
example parallel discussion of models of God as Mother, Lover or Friend in sources that 
are not in dialogue with McFague, for reasons set out in the Introduction.
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It is worth noting that most studies that critique McFague's models do so by 
means of criteria derived quite separately from McFague's own. Consequently, there are 
apparently very few attempts in the literature to engage with these models in McFague's 
own terms, either theoretically (as is done here) or empirically (as shall not be attempted 
here because of word constraints).  By empirically is meant studies which attempt to 
assess in practice the ability of the models to meet their  stated aims in the lives of 
worshippers or worshipping communities. As McFague says, 
'A model of God is verified mainly by its consequences and this verification 
takes place within the community, the Church.'258
Studies of this type would be extremely useful in evaluating McFague but are 
noticeably,  and perhaps surprisingly,  rare given that  Models of God  has been widely 
read and engaged with for nearly twenty years, although a small number of studies of 
this type are examined below.  This remains a potentially fruitful area of research for the 
future.
Finally, throughout it should be remembered that the partner and context of these 
models of God in relationship is another model in McFague, that of the world as God's 
body.  That is, God is, in the first instance, mother, lover and friend to the 'world' (or 
universe) modelled metaphorically as God's own body, rather than mother, lover and 
friend of individual human beings or 'my mother, lover and friend' for example.  The 
coherence  and implications  of  this  combination  of  models  will  be  examined at  the 
beginning of the next chapter where consideration is given to the model of the 'body of 
God'.
258 Sallie McFague 'Models of God for an ecological, evolutionary era: God as Mother of the Universe' 
in Robert Russel et al (eds.) Physics, Philosophy and Theology: A common quest for understanding 
Rome: Liberia Editrice Vaticana 1988 p255 
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4.2 The meaning of God as Mother.
McFague's primary justification for using female imagery for God is the biblical 
concept of the 'image of God' in which human beings are created both male and female,  
while on the other hand there is  what she perceives to be a relative lack of female 
imagery for God in the Christian scriptures and traditions.  The use of female language 
by McFague,  in  partnership  with,  but  also  in  contrast  to,  traditional  male  imagery 
therefore serves several functions.  Firstly by imaging God in both male and female 
terms she wants to expose the metaphorical character of religious speaking since God is 
shown to be both like and unlike anything else we know.  McFague argues:
'This crucial characteristic of metaphorical language about God is lost … when 
only one important personal relationship, that of father and child, is allowed to 
serve as a grid for speaking of the God-human relationship.'259
Secondly,  although  traditional  language  of  God  as  Father  is  not  intended  to 
ascribe sexual characteristics to God, such language remains gendered and has sexual 
connotations. McFague sees the use of female imagery as offering both the realisation 
that Father language is  not gender-neutral  or non-sexual,  and also the possibility of 
recovering a more positive attitude towards female sexuality than has historically been 
the case.
This said, McFague also feels that female imagery and especially imagery drawn 
from  motherhood  needs  careful  qualification.   In  particular  she  is  keen  to  avoid 
inadvertently reinforcing existing hierarchical dualisms by deifying the stereotypically 
'feminine'. Therefore:
'God should be imagined in female, not feminine, terms... the distinction between 
259 Sallie McFague 'God as Mother' in Judith Plaskow and Carol Christ (eds.) Weaving the Visions: New 
Patterns in Feminist Spirituality  San Francisco: HarperCollins 1989 p139
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'female' and 'feminine is important, for the first refers to gender while the second 
refers  to   qualities  conventionally associated  with women.   The problem with 
introducing  a  feminine  dimension   of  God  is  that  it  invariably  ends  with 
identifying as female those qualities that society has called feminine. Thus, the 
feminine side of God is taken to comprise the tender, nurturing, passive, healing 
aspects of divine activity, whereas those activities in which God creates, redeems, 
establishes peace, administers justice, and so on, are called masculine.  Such a 
division, in extending to the godhead the stereotypes we create in human society, 
further crystallizes and sanctifies them.'260
Elsewhere she warns:
'We must not sentimentalise maternal imagery.  We will not suppose that mothers 
are 'naturally' loving, comforting or self-sacrificing.  Our society has a stake in 
making women think that they are biologically-programmed to be these things, 
when, in fact, a good case can be made that the so-called qualities or stereotypes 
of mothers are social constructions – women are not born, but become, mothers 
through education and imitation.  Rather we will focus on the most basic things 
that females (as mothers) do among most, if not all the species and which human 
mothers do as well: give birth, feed and protect the young, want the young to 
flourish.'261
This  distinction  between 'female'  and 'feminine'  also  avoids  the  stereotypical 
attribution  of  roles  as  well  as  characteristics,  lest  the  same  dualistic  divisions  be 
perpetuated with regard to roles and activities as well as characteristics and qualities. 
McFague also extends this distinction to the activity of giving birth itself, defending her 
use of the model 'mother' against the potential charge that it too stereotypes the female, 
260 Ibid. p140
261 Sallie McFague 'Mother God' Concilium 206 1989 p139
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reducing her to motherhood only.  
'Although mothering is a female activity, it is not feminine; that is to give birth to 
and to feed the young is simply what females do – some may do it in a so-called 
feminine fashion, and others may not.'262
In addition, McFague is concerned to stress that the choice of mother as her 
primary female image is not intended to suggest that women who are not mothers are 
any less women or any less fulfilled.  Mothering, she argues, is an activity that in one 
sense all who seek the flourishing and fulfilment of others are involved in.263  Also, 
since mothering is something that females  do (as opposed to something that they of 
necessity are) she avoids the implication that mothering is the purpose of being female 
hence avoiding excluding women who are not mothers by the use of this model.  She 
also recommends the use of other female imagery such as sister or midwife to avoid this 
potential problem.  
Further, she is also clear that
'The intention is not to turn the tables and establish a new hierarchical dualism 
with a matriarchal model of God.'264 
With this in mind there is a final and perhaps most serious qualification to be 
added.  McFague says:
'We need to recognise how dangerous and oppressive maternal language can be, 
both to women and to all human beings in relation to God ... The model poses 
problems for all human beings in relation to God because if the parental model, 
mother or father, is used exclusively for God, it places us always in the role of 
children. At a time when we need desperately to be 'adults', to take responsibility 
262 Weaving the Visions p142
263 In Models of God (p 121) McFague gives a list of activities from the naturalist observing gorillas in 
the wild to rock-stars performing famine-relief concerts as examples of 'universal parenthood'.
264 'Mother God' p 139
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for our world and its well-being, we cannot support a model that suggests that the 
'great  mother'  or  'great  father'  will  take  care  of  our  crises  of  poverty, 
discrimination, damage to the ecosystem, and so forth.'265
This is of particular concern for McFague since one of the central arguments of 
Models of God,  one which funds her search for new models and causes much of her 
rejection  of  old  ones,  is  the  observation  that  our  ability  through  nuclear  or 
environmental destruction to eliminate life on earth suggests that ultimate power should 
not be conceived to be in the hands of God but in our own hands.
However, despite these reservations and qualifications, McFague feels that we 
not only should but must pursue the model of God as mother because, 
'Parental love is the most powerful and intimate experience we have of giving 
love whose return is not calculated (though it is appreciated).'266
It is to the nature of this love that we now turn.
4.3 The love of God as Mother.
In Models of God it is clear that the nature of the root-metaphor of Christianity 
introduced  somewhat  abstractly  in Metaphorical  Theology as  'a  certain  relationship 
exhibiting a certain tension', is understood by McFague to mean the radical, inclusive, 
impartial  and  reorienting  love  of  God.   Each  of  the  three  models  considered  here 
attempts to explore the nature of this love by means of what McFague judges to be the 
deepest loves that we know.  In the case of God as Mother, the aspect or type of love 
265 Ibid.
266 Ibid. p140
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under  consideration  is  agape.   However  McFague's  presentation  of  this  quality  is 
somewhat different from traditional accounts.  The nature of the agape love of God as 
Mother is linked strongly to the activity of God that 'Mother' seeks to model, that is 
God's creative activity. 
Traditional, and McFague argues, patriarchal, models of God's creative activity 
can be represented by the 'imaginative pictures' of the artist/craftsman or of intellectual 
activity,  willing or  speaking the world into being.267  The  model  of  God as  mother 
creates a picture of God creating out of herself,  giving birth to her own body.  The 
paradoxical nature of such a statement is explored in the following chapter.  Here it 
should be noted that McFague's presentation of creation is quite deliberately at odds 
with the traditional models despite  a brief  attempt to  relate it  to the wisdom/sophia 
tradition.  
This, coupled with the shift of the focus of agape from redemption to creation, 
results  in  a  crucial  shift  in  the  interpretation  of  agape  offered  by  McFague.   She 
identifies this as follows,
'The usual  understanding of agape sees  it  as totally unmotivated,  disinterested 
love.'268    
Against this McFague sets a passage from Paul Tillich:
'The mother-quality of giving birth,  carrying,  and embracing, and, at  the same 
time, of calling back, resisting the independence of the created, and swallowing 
it.'269
By implication, this act of creating out of oneself and resisting the independence 
of that which is created in turn generates a degree of need, desire and vulnerability in 
267 See Models of God p 109
268 Ibid. p102
269 Paul Tillich Systematic Theology vol 3 Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1963 p294 cited in 
McFague Models of God p101
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the creator in relation to the created.  It is the love of a mother for her child.  While the 
love of parents towards their various children may be regarded as impartial in that it 
ideally does not show favouritism and is not earned, based on aesthetic merit, strength, 
ability, success or any other criteria, it is certainly not disinterested.  Being rooted in 
creation rather than redemption, this is love that affirms the essential goodness of being 
itself  (as  opposed  to  loving  it  despite  its  sinfulness  and  therefore  redeeming  it  to 
imputed goodness)270.  In short this love declares 'it is good that you exist'.271  
It  is  also a  love that  'calls  back'  the loved into deeper  relationship,  resisting 
independence  and  underscoring  the  interrelatedness  of  all  its  children  (these  being 
understood as all the component parts of God's body, which God has herself given birth 
to).  Hence this love is not limited to human beings or even other creatures who could 
potentially be consciously responsive to it.   This is love for all  the created, without 
calculation of return.  Yet it is also a love that desires, seeks and appreciates a return.
Another consequence of this equality of love for the whole creation/body is that 
it  shifts the focus of attention from human beings and their history and society to a 
concern for the whole creation.  Thus the model of God as mother produces an account 
of love that affirms the essential goodness and right to flourish of all things and takes an 
impassioned interest in the establishing of this flourishing.  This is the basis for the ethic 
arising from this model to which we now turn.   
270 It is also clear that McFague means more by 'being' and 'existence' than simply the fact of being 
there.  Her understanding of 'existing' is a fullness of being, of becoming abundant in the sense of 
being all that it is possible to be.  We see this implied, for example, when McFague says 'Loving 
others 'as yourself' means – whatever else it may mean – willing for others the existence, the right to 
birth, nurture, and fulfillment, that one wills for oneself'. Sallie McFague 'the Ethic of God as Mother, 
Lover and Friend' in Ann Loades Feminist Theology: A Reader  London: SPCK 1990 p256   
271 Models of God p103
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4.4 The ethic of God as Mother.
The first ethical application of the model comes from 'moving inside' it, using 
God so modelled as an image of idealised human behaviour.  This results in a concept of 
'universal  parenthood'  encompassing  all  activities  and  attitudes  that  lead  to  the 
flourishing  of  others.   This  McFague  applies  alike  to  individual,  corporate  and 
governmental actions and processes.
McFague's  vision  of  society  based  upon  the  agapic  mother-love  of  God  is 
admittedly and unashamedly utopian.272  However she does not intend to imply that such 
a utopia is achievable.  Rather:
'The picture that one holds of utopia makes a difference in the way one conducts 
daily business  If one thinks of it as individual election to an eternal otherworld, 
one will act differently than if one thinks of it as a just order for all in this world: 
both are utopian in the sense that fulfillment is always partial, but each serves as a 
goal and a goad, as an attraction and a critique.'273
This just ordering for all is the heart of the ethic of God as mother and develops 
out of the model's stress on interrelatedness and the 'interested' and universally inclusive 
nature  of  God's  love.   This  love  that  desires  the  flourishing  of  all  is  frustrated  by 
selfishness or exploitation.  This connects the model of God as mother to the model of 
God as judge274, but modifies the traditional presentation of the latter in the process. 
Thus McFague says:
'God  as  mother-judge  condemns  those  who  selfishly  refuse  to  share.  When 
272 Arguably this is as close as McFague comes to eschatology.
273 Models of God p118
274 This is an attempt to answer her own objection to parental imagery in Metaphorical Theology p177-8 
where she is concerned that by focussing on the family as the setting for God's activity, parental 
language overemphasises personal and individual guidance, compassion and security at the expense of 
the political and ecological dimensions of the gospel.
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judgement  is  connected  to  the  mother-creator,  it  is  different  from when  it  is 
connected to the king-redeemer. In the picture of the king-redeemer, individuals 
are  condemned  who  rebel  against  the  power  and  the  glory  of  the  monarch, 
assigning to themselves the status that only the king deserves. The king judges the 
guilty and metes  out  punishment,  or  as  the  Christian  story happily concludes, 
takes the punishment upon himself and thus absolves those condemned. In the 
picture of the mother-creator, however, the goal is neither the condemnation nor 
the rescue of the guilty but the just ordering of the cosmic household in a fashion 
beneficial to all. God as mother-creator is primarily involved not in the negative 
business of judging wayward individuals but in the positive business of creating 
with our help a just ecological economy for the well-being of all her creatures. 
God as mother-judge is the one who establishes justice, not the one who hands out 
sentences.  She is concerned with establishing justice now, not with condemning 
in the future.'275
The transformation  of  the  image of  judge by the  interested  nature  of  divine 
agape is also clear in McFague's corresponding discussion of the nature of sin when she 
argues:
'God  the  mother  judges  those  who  thwart  the  nurture  and  fulfillment  of  her 
beloved creation.  God as mother  is  angry because some of her created beings 
desire  everything  for  themselves,  not  recognising  the  intrinsic  worth  of  other 
beings. In this view, 'sin' is not 'against God', the pride and rebellion of an inferior  
against a superior, but 'against the body', the refusal to be part of an ecological 
whole whose continued existence and success depends upon the recognition of the 
interdependence and interrelatedness of all species.'276 
275 Ibid. p117-118
276 'Mother God' p142
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The establishing of justice in the present involves a further two models which 
connect with the model of mother-judge.  These are the models of gardener (which is 
used less in Models of God and related articles but becomes more important in later 
works with their heavier focus upon nature) and 'home-maker'.
The  term  'home-maker'   is  not  used  explicitly  by  McFague,  indeed  she, 
unusually, does not use any anthropomorphic image at all for this activity and ethic of 
God, instead making reference to doing home economics in God's household.  This may 
be an attempt to avoid feminist difficulties concerning the stereotyping of women as 
housewives but the model is certainly present and influential in her thinking.  Thus she 
says:
'The mother-God as creator, then, is also involved in 'economics', the management 
of the household of the universe, to ensure the just distribution of goods to all.'277 
However  there is  one important caveat with which we should round off and 
qualify this utopian picture. This is to introduce a level of realism and complexity which 
McFague notes but does not elaborate to any significant degree.  This is the effect that  
competition for limited resources has upon attempts to establish justice in such a way. 
McFague applies this particularly to avoid interpretation of her ethic which is on the 
side of birth, life and fulfilment to the issue of abortion.  This is most explicit in a  
significant footnote to one of her articles in which she says:
 'This must not be interpreted as a pro-life or anti-abortion stance. If the various 
species are to thrive, not every individual in every species can be fulfilled. In a 
closed ecological system with limits on natural resources, difficult decisions must 
be made to ensure the continuation, growth, and fulfilment of the many forms of 
life (not just one form and not all of its individuals).'278 
277 Ibid. p142.
278 Ibid. p143 note 5.
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4.5 Assessment of God as Mother.
McFague's views on this subject have naturally received a mixed response as 
they  feed  into  a  (still  ongoing)  debate  within  the  churches  and  the  academy279. 
Elizabeth  Johnson  has  described  McFague's  exposition  of  'Mother'  as  the  finest 
presentation of this model280.  As we shall see shortly, other scholars have built upon 
McFague's  work and expounded its  effectiveness  in  achieving the  kinds  of  pastoral 
outcomes she seeks.
However a number of scholars have challenged McFague or rejected McFague's 
views on a number of points – generally points of methodology.  Here we will leave 
aside arguments that 'mother' is not a scriptural term (or that it appears there only as a 
simile not a metaphor), or that Father is a proper name which precludes all others, and 
other  arguments  intended  to  preclude  the  use  of  any and  all  feminine  imagery  for 
God.281 These arguments are well countered by Dell'Olio's  article 'Why not God the 
Mother?' and the reader is referred there for a detailed defence282.  Arguments relating to 
pan(en)theism are treated in the next chapter of this work.  Here interest is in arguments  
that engage with McFague's particular account of the model or the way in which she has 
made use of her particular methodology.  However before moving on it should be noted 
that Dell'Olio's arguments demonstrate only that Mother (and other female metaphors) 
can  co-exist with Father; they do not warrant the replacement of one with the other. 
Indeed this threat of replacement (and along with that the loss of large sections of the 
279 For an example of the continued relevance of the debate see The Daily Mail 3rd October 2006 
Headline “Outcry as clergy say calling God 'He' or 'Lord' encourages wife-beating” available online at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-408190/Outcry-clergy-say-calling-God-He-Lord-encourages-
wife-beating.html as accessed 14 September 2012
280 Quoted in S Shrein Quilting and Braiding 
281 For a presentation of these arguments see for example Kimel (ed) Speaking the Christian God and 
Gary Heirion  'American Protestants Confront God the Mother' in Lutheran Forum vol 30 no 1 1996 
pp36-38
282 A.J. Dell'Ollio 'Why not God the Mother?' Faith and Philosophy 15 (Apr) 1998 pp193-209
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Christian tradition and systematic theologies associated with or deriving from the Father 
model) seems to be what lies behind a large number of the objections to McFague's and 
similar proposals.  McFague's reading of traditional models is questioned by many of 
her respondents.  For example. Ring, reviewing Models of God, says 
'To  write,  however,  as  if  the  monarchical  model  were  solely  responsible  for 
forming the individualistic, dualistic, exclusivist imagination characteristic of so 
many Christians is to overstate the case.  Consequently, McFague depreciates her 
own work both by caricaturing the monarchical model and by inflating it to such 
proportions  that  the  minor  but  persistent  themes  of  the  tradition  are 
unacknowledged.   This  is  disappointing  to  those aware  of  the  richness  of  the 
tradition  and  no service  to  those  who are  unaware...Readers  can  hope  that  in 
future writings, McFague will devote more space to developing her own theology 
and less in confronting a past theological perspective.  The latter ... detracts both 
from the excellence of her work and the wider acceptance that her work might 
otherwise gain.' 283
I would concur with Ring, and see this more radical streak in McFague as a 
reason  for  the  somewhat  slow  uptake  of  her  ideas  within  mainstream  theological 
communities.   However  in  many  passages  McFague  appears  less  antipathetic  to 
traditional imagery, especially when describing Jesus' use of the term Father.  In such 
passages she says she seeks a new interpretative context for the Father model rather than 
its replacement.  Since it is possible to interpret traditional language and imagery in 
such a way as to be in keeping with McFague's models of Mother, Lover and Friend 
(see for example the interpretations of the monarchical model offered by Louw284) and 
283 Nancy C Ring 'Models of God (review) Journal of the American Academy of Religion 57 (3) 1989 
pp656-661 pp660-661.
284 Daniel J Louw 'Diagnostic Criteria for an Assessment of God-Images in Pastoral Counselling' in 
Ralph Bisschops and James Francis (eds.) Metaphor, Canon and Community:Jewish, Christian and 
Islamic Approaches Bern: Peter Lang 1999 pp132-161 – Louw finds McFague's models very helpful 
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that doing so would also be consistent with McFague's overarching approach of using 
multiple models, it seems that McFague's more moderate streak is the one more in line 
with her methodology and aims overall.
Criticisms of McFague's expositions of her models, where such exist, tend to 
focus on what the model does not say rather than what it does say.  For example Cobb 
says,
'Although McFague believes that there is a personal power in the Universe that is 
on the side of life and its fulfillment, her primary emphasis throughout is on how 
what happens in the world affects God, not on how God acts in the world ... She 
does not go as far toward describing or imaging how the power that is on the side 
of life supports life and enables it to reach fulfillment.  Other metaphors would 
help here.'285
The last sentence is crucial here.  McFague is explicit that her models are partial 
and are not  meant  to each be capable of  bearing the weight  of  a whole systematic 
theology, never mind solve all theological problems. As Cobb also notes, she is aware of 
the  limitations  of  her  models  and  this  is  allowed  for  within  her  method  and  her 
understating of theology as a communal, collaborative endeavour.  Therefore omissions 
from her models of this sort are not a serious problem for them.
What  are  more  serious  are  questions  of  the  consistency  of  the  models 
themselves.  It has already been noted that the relationship between models is an area 
that  requires  further  study  and  we  will  return  to  this  again  in  the  next  chapter. 
Discrepancies  between  models  are  potentially  problematic  but  not  insurmountable. 
However Herion draws attention to an  internal inconsistency present  in the Mother 
when applied to various pastoral situations, often preferring them to monarchical ones.  However he 
also commends a reworking of traditional themes of the 'Almighty' and 'All-knowing', interpretations 
that are driven by criteria consistent with the pastoral applications of  McFague's models. 
285 J B J Cobb 'Models of God (Review)' Religious Studies Review 16 1990 pp40-42 pp41-42
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model itself:
'If God the Mother is 'relevant' then does she believe in abortion?  If so, Christians 
will have to wrestle with the implications of what it means to be children of a 
divine parent such as this.'286
McFague does treat this issue287 by asserting that to say God is on the side of life 
in general is not to say that God is on the side of every individual life.  Indeed the divine 
Parent knows that for life as a whole to flourish, some part of it will very likely have to 
be sacrificed.  Whilst there is both a logic and a painful truth in this ethical standpoint, 
there is still a chilling edge to an assertion such as this.  It is possible that a creative (and 
brave!) theologian may actually be able to square this circle somewhat by exploring the 
links between such an apparently utilitarian and 'unmotherly' ethical stance towards her 
child on the part of God the Mother and the psychological processes and experiences 
involved in abortion.
  
All of this does at least direct our attention to the relationship between a model 
and its accompanying ethic.  This is a methodological question that has been picked up 
on by at least two theologians in dialogue with McFague's work.
Zeigler (in Kimel ed 1992) criticises McFague for what he terms her 'role model 
theology'.  This process he sees as one in which we
'begin with some human value or activity and define God by elevating that value 
or activity to divinity. Doing so is making God in our own image, concocting the 
God we want.'288
The objection raised by Ziegler here is that McFague derives her ethic from her 
286 Gary Herion 'American Protestants Confront God the Mother' Lutheran Forum vol 30 no 1 1996 
pp36-38 p 37.  This article is discussing 'God the Mother' in general rather than McFague's particular 
account, but his point is relevant to McFague's views.
287 'God the Mother' in Motherhood: Experience, Institution, Theology. Concilium 6 1986 p138-143
288 Zeigler 1993 p2 
205
model largely by using the model of God as a role model for human behaviour.  Thus 
God is constrained to act in a way that is appropriate for humans to emulate and human 
beings  are  expected to  behave in  a  similar  way to  God.   The danger  with such an 
approach is that it is particularly open to charges of projectionism and of our creating 
God in our image or 'trying to be like God' after the example of Adam and Eve and the 
tree of knowledge; charges which McFague's account of her methodology is already 
vulnerable to.   
 To be fair to McFague she is aware of other ways of deriving ethics from the 
implications of models (for example in her concern that the model of God as Mother 
could imply a helpless dependence on Her on the part of Her children289).  We should 
remember that McFague is committed to using her models to bring about human action 
rather  than  intending  to  present  the  action  of  God  and  this,  rather  than  any 
methodological move is likely behind her use of God as a role model (a theme which is 
not without precedent in the tradition).
However a different way of deriving ethic from model is outlined by Lerner290. 
Lerner argues that biblical metaphors such as 'king' were not intended to be understood 
metaphorically, rather they were taken literally (see 1 Sam 12:12 which argues against 
there being a king in Israel on the grounds that God is already king). Now Lerner's use 
of 'literal' is potentially unhelpful in our context here since we have understood the term 
differently (see Chapter 2) and requires clarification.  What he means by literal and 
metaphorical is clear however when he goes on to argue that, just as the use of 'rose' as a 
metaphor for beauty commits us to the belief that roses are beautiful so a metaphorical 
understanding  of  God  the  king  commits  us  to  the  belief  that  human  kingship  has 
289 This confirms our observations in earlier chapters that the process of interpreting metaphors is not an 
automatic, intuitive one but one that requires careful crafting and direction from their author. 
290 Berel Dov Lerner 'Oppressive metaphor and the Liberating Literal Sense' in  Ralph Bisschops and 
James Francis (eds.) Metaphor, Canon and Community:Jewish, Christian and Islamic Approaches.  
pp233-241 Lerner is engaging in this article particularly with the work of Mary Daly but his 
arguments are equally relevant to McFague's work.
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positive qualities that we may also ascribe to God.  In contrast the biblical text above is 
intending to make quite the opposite point – that in the light of God's kingship, it is 
'intolerably presumptuous ... for any human being to assume that role'.291  Therefore this 
biblical text is not to be understood as a metaphor.  Rather, God is being held to possess  
only those basic  'legal  prerogatives'  required to exercise kingship and nothing more 
about his particular qualities (qualities that we might associate with particular human 
kings) is being asserted.
It is not necessary to follow Lerner's usage and call such an understanding a 
‘literal’ one in the sense used in previous analysis here. On McFague's terms, such a 
usage remains metaphorical.  Yet he still makes a number of valuable points. Firstly he 
offers  an interpretation  of  a  traditional  metaphor that  has  the  potential  to  avoid the 
problems of patriarchy and oppression that concern McFague regarding the image of 
King.    Secondly, a further valuable contribution is that he presents a different way of 
working from model to ethic, one that may be productive in reinterpreting traditional 
metaphors to allow them to co-exist more coherently with new metaphors.  
Lerner's understanding begins from the model of God (in this case ‘as King’) 
and  takes  its  direct  implications  seriously.   The  model  then  is  used  to  interpret 
experience and describe the ethical ordering of the world, rather than experience being 
used to interpret the model.  Therefore it is God who defines the nature of kingship or 
fatherhood and God's  example  is  the  standard  by which  human  modelling  of  these 
divine characteristics is judged.
Now  Lerner's  case  fails  to  convince  completely  in  that  the  origins  of  the 
categories in which God is described are derived from human experience and of human 
occupancy of these roles.  Further human attempts to emulate the ethical character of 
God and/or model their occupancy of roles on God's behaviour have a long standing 
291 Lerner p 236
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place within the Judeo-Christian tradition.  It does not follow for example that since 
God loves, and my love of a person is only ever a poor imitation of that love, that I 
should not love because it is God's role alone to love truly.  Rather the model of God as 
love can be understood simultaneously in Lerner's 'literal' sense (that God's love is the 
determining description of what the Christian means when (s)he talks of love) and also 
in McFague's 'role model' sense (that our understanding of the meaning of 'God is love', 
and our recognition of defining narrative example of this love, derives from our deepest 
human experience of love and that the Christian should strive to conform their loving to 
become like the love of God).
In  short,  while  Lerner  and  Zeigler  do  not  show  McFague's  method  to  be 
illegitimate they do suggest that an outworking of a model is flawed if  it  is  simply 
designed to provide a role model for human ethical behaviour without incorporating the 
discontinuity between God and humanity by allowing God to behave differently from 
people (or rather by requiring human activity to be the asymmetrical consequence of the 
action of God).  McFague may have set  the balance too far towards the role model 
approach in her presentations and consequently lost some of the important metaphorical 
tension she identifies as being at the heart of that tradition – the 'is and is not' similarity 
in difference between God and the world.
   The image of 'mother', from which the model develops, adequately meets the 
requirements of a good image.  The resulting model is familiar and accessible to most 
people since most (but by no means all)  have experiences of either being a mother, 
having received maternal love or witnessing it in others.  Motherhood is a basic image 
in  that  it  is  close  to  being  a  universally  familiar  phenomenon  (at  least  from  the 
perspective that  everyone has had (biologically)  a mother)  and translates fairly well 
across divides of culture, background and class.  It also has significant structure and 
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connects as McFague observes to other basic images of life such as food, blood and 
nurture.
There  is,  however,  slightly  more  doubt  about  the  familiarity  of  the  image 
because of the counter-cultural nature of the manner in which it is applied by McFague. 
She is concerned as we saw that the use of the female metaphor should not lead to the 
divinisation of the stereotypically feminine.292  Consequently much of the work done by 
her presentation of God as Mother is in fact done not by the image (whose most 'natural' 
connotations in a still patriarchal society are not those that the model wishes to promote) 
but by new, added, independent elements, namely the concepts of  agape and justice. 
McFague's discussions of these concepts are powerful and of benefit to theology in and 
of themselves but it is questionable whether they actually depend upon the image of 
mother or whether they could just as well stand alone.293
It may be that McFague is expecting rather too much when she hopes to use a 
source  domain  (mother)  itself  heavily  affected  by  patriarchal  assumptions  to  cast 
corrective  light  on  a  target  domain  (God)  also  similarly  affected,  and  expects  this 
combination  to  be  able  to  lessen  the  effect  of  these  assumptions  on  both  domains. 
Certainly the degree of qualification and conceptual intervention that is required moves 
her  model  some distance from the sort  of  intuitive  process  of  'suddenly recognised 
insight' that she desires.294
292 There is also the counter-intuitive issue of God being the mother of her own body to contend with. 
We will pick this up again in the next chapter.
293 In one sense, though, this observation on the important role of concepts in making images explicable 
and relevant, or mediating between images and models, supports McFague's methodological 
statements on this issue that we looked at in chapter 2.  However it also supports David Tracy's 
concern that images are not themselves precise, structured or comprehensive enough to treat 
theological matters adequately given the complex nature of these concerns.  See Tracey Religion and 
Intellectual Life 5 Spring 1988
294 However the following anecdote, told by Margo G Houts in 'Is God also our Mother?' Perspectives 
June/July 1997 pp8-12 p8  shows how the use of such metaphors in a still patriarchal context can 
require such constructive work if they are to function in the way intended:  'The bumper sticker read, 
'Trust in God, She will provide.' It was plastered on a weathered, red Volkswagen Bug, idling at a 
traffic stop in Santa Barbara, California, in 1975. I have never forgotten the initial jolt that bumper 
sticker gave me, nor the sinking, visceral feeling that God had somehow just been insulted, 
compromised, diminished. It was the first time I had encountered gender inclusive language for God, a 
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Traditional Christian understandings of God have often faced this problem by 
using  composite  models  such  as  servant-king  in  order  to  both  transform  human 
understandings  of  human roles  and practice  and also  lessen  the  risk  of  undesirable 
connotations of models being projected onto the divine.  The question for McFague in 
light  of  this  is  whether  her  examples  of  this  process,  the  composites  mother-judge, 
mother-gardener and mother-home-maker, are adequate to the same task.
Certainly, mother-judge, is able to do this (and it is likely no coincidence that it 
is McFague's preferred composite in much of her writing on the ethic of Mother God). 
Here  the  potential  contradiction  between  the  two  images  lessens  the  problems  that 
'judge' would otherwise cause for feminists (problems associated with the dispassionate 
nature of the judicial image and the after-the-fact and individualistic nature of judicial 
justice  perhaps,  not  to  mention  the  disproportionately   male  composition  of  most 
judiciaries around the world).  Likewise it also lessens the dangers of reading mother as 
a feminine term since it combines the female mother with arguably one of the most 
traditionally masculine and patriarchal professions. 
These  composite  images  also  help  to  lessen  the  seriousness  of  the  objection 
McFague is herself aware of, namely that maternal imagery implies that we are children 
and therefore, to more or less of an extent, helpless.  (This may be another reason why 
McFague  takes  a  role  model  approach,  to  avoid  such  language  of  dependency and 
helplessness, although in the ecological case in particular, some language that revealed 
the vulnerability of creation, its ‘helplessness’ in the face of human activity, could in 
fact be a positive). 
One difficulty of maternal imagery is that although it is capable of modelling the 
ontological dependence of all creation on God (after the fashion of mother and nursing 
child) and also of modelling a mature, responsive relationship of human beings to their 
God I had always known as he.'
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source  (after  the  image  of  mother  and  adult  offspring)  it  struggles  to  model  both 
together.  
Taken together as a composite system of models and concepts the mother-judge-
gardener-agape-justice  model  certainly  fares  well  in  the  criteria  of  usefulness  in 
promoting the fulfilment of all life since it seeks to specifically place this concern at the 
centre of theological discussion of the nature of God, justice and love.  It also fares well 
in McFague's other primary aims of being a good translation of the root-metaphor of 
radical, inclusive, transforming love since it articulates these well.  Of the four criteria 
we  outlined  for  this  condition  (is  it  relevant  to  its  context,  does  it  aid  the 
comprehensiveness of the paradigm, is it better able to interpret anomalies, is it fruitful 
for  the  continued  interpretation  of  experience)  the  model  of  God as  mother  scores 
highly, with the two qualifications in mind that a) it is not always or even mainly the 
model of mother itself that is meeting these criteria but models and concepts associated 
with it and b) the natural role for humanity under this model is as dependent child which 
arguably lessens the model's relevance to an 'ecological, nuclear age'.
The  model  does  not  fare  quite  so  well  when  considered  in  relation  to  its 
coherence with its own root metaphor on two counts.  On the question of its location 
relative  to  this  metaphor  it  is  certainly  adequate  since,  in  combination  with  the 
'motherly' concept of agape it is a very close translation of the root.  With its emphasis 
on establishing justice for all and the motherly desire to 'call back' her offspring it is 
also transformative and embodies the tension of the relationship expressed in the root-
metaphor.  However the weaknesses come in its relationships with the basic images of 
the tradition and other models within the tradition.  
The model of God as Mother does offer the possibility of creative engagement 
with  the  wider  concerns  of  the  Christian  theological  tradition  and  community  by 
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providing a context for the reinterpretation of traditional models of the parenthood of 
God,  judgement,  justice  and  sin.   However  the  main  weakness  of  McFague's 
presentation, in the view of the present author and by the criteria set out at the end of 
Chapter 3.8, is that its engagement with the tradition is almost exclusively critical.  It 
must be asked therefore whether a more constructive reading of the tradition is possible 
and whether such a reading might support McFague’s aims.  
One example of such an approach would be to further unpack the 'motherly' 
assertion that 'it is good that you exist'.  While it may well be the case that the role of  
creation  has  often  been  downplayed  in  much  historic  theology  in  return  for  a 
concentration on the fall,  redemption and eschatology,  this  basic  assertion that 'it  is 
good'  is  found  in  the  very  text  (Genesis  1)  that  McFague  criticises  for  its  male 
understanding of creation.  This makes the point that it is not only a model that sees 
creation as the child (or even self-born body) of God that can give value to that creation. 
Nor  is  it  the  case  that  traditional  accounts  of  this  creation  regard  the  world  in  an 
unhelpful way in a nuclear, environmental context.  Indeed the model of gardener also 
derives from this same passage.  In other words the traditional passage deconstructed by 
McFague actually supports very well a key assertion of metaphorical theology: that the 
world 'is good'.
These examples also demonstrate the relative lack of engagement with the basic 
images  of  the  tradition  in  McFague's  presentation.   Although  her  search  for  fresh 
imagery is of course necessary for her aim to reform the tradition, it seems that there is a 
considerable  opportunity  for  exploring  the  connections  between  these  images  and 
biblical and traditional images, narratives and themes that has been missed.  More to the 
point,  the  images  of  mother,  gardener  and judge,  in  company with  the  majority  of 
images McFague uses are in fact all to be found in many places within the Bible but 
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McFague does not seek to connect her understanding of them with these narratives, an 
omission that seems a little strange given her remarks on the function of the Bible as 
classic text.
If there are some concerns about the coherence of McFague's presentation of 
God as Mother with its root-metaphor, there are more substantial concerns to be raised 
over certain aspects of the coherence of this presentation more generally.  These are 
focussed  upon  its  methodological  consistency,  its  status  as  specifically  Christian 
theology (partly in the light of the above criticisms), and upon the precise nature of the 
ethic that is being advocated.  
Firstly then, there is the observation that McFague seeks to present models that 
bring God and the world into close relationship and is  critical  of  presentations  that 
emphasise radical separation.  However the very basis of metaphorical theology is the 
assertion of the radical other-ness of God.  It is not at all clear that McFague's project as 
a whole and this model in particular can deal entirely adequately with the, admittedly 
extremely complex, question of relating the immanence and transcendence of God.
Secondly, it is also not clear that McFague's presentation of God as Mother is to 
be most convincingly regarded as a model of God rather than a model of ideal human 
activity.  This is partly because of the lack of an analysis in terms of either the biblical 
narrative  of  salvation-history  or  an  account  from  McFague  of  any  contemporary 
religious experience of what God is actually being held to do to establish justice or 'be 
involved in home economics' (thus leaving McFague open to charges of projectionism). 
The failure of the model to be a model of God is also partly due to her failure to observe 
the symmetry of the model in the move to ethical interpretation.  The natural place of 
human beings in the model is the place of the child, a place McFague finds undesirable.  
However she argues, with little justification, that we should 'move inside' the model and 
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thus take on the role of 'universal parenthood'.295  But while much Christian teaching 
does indeed involve the attempt to image ourselves after the God in whose image we are 
made, a strength of models such as the king-subject model is that these include the role 
of humanity within the model's structure without one having to take the role of God and 
act, it seems, as God to the world.
This  'acting  as  God'  is  also  a  problem  for  the  ethic  that  is  introduced  by 
McFague in general terms but not worked out in its implications.  McFague's pro-life 
quotation,  with  which  we finished section  4.4,  is  an  example  of  the  sort  of  highly 
'difficult decision' that is indeed necessary in a world of limited resources.  McFague, 
while advancing the view that non-human life is to be valued for its own sake in such 
decisions, offers little help in determining how or by whom such decisions should be 
made and the remarks that she does make are potentially concerning since they would 
seem to run the danger of Stalin-esque interpretation.  This is partly because, as critics 
have observed296, it is difficult to determine in practice the consequences of an attempt 
to love all things to fulfilment.  What, for example, might this mean for a response to a 
disease such as Ebola or AIDS?  Hard decisions to be made according to some form of 
scale of values.  Not all of creation can be loved in the sense that the existence and 
flourishing of some parts of it cannot be sensibly affirmed, not least by those, often the 
poorest and most vulnerable members of the human race, for whom the existence of 
these entities is a cause of immense suffering.  
McFague is right to point out that we have tremendous power over nature, but 
rather than seeing this power as something to be renounced, it could be argued that it is 
more realistic and potentially productive to offer a Christian critique of the way that this 
power is used.  Every action we take has an environmental consequence for example 
295  Models of God p150
296  A particularly thorough presentation of this argument is provided by Carroll, B J 'Models of God or 
Models of us?: On the Theology of Sallie McFague' Encounter 52 (Spring) 1991 pp183-196
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and it is better that this is done mindfully and consciously than it is to pretend that we 
have given up this power, when in fact it is unlikely that we can ever do so, or even 
should  do so.   It  is  perhaps  a  shame that  McFague does  not  expand her  image of 
gardening, because here is a biblical description both of God's activity and ours which 
implies  that  not  only hard  work,  but  hard  choices  are  to  be  made.  The process  of 
weeding  is  fundamentally  about  making  decisions  about  what  lives  and  what  dies. 
Having the grave responsibility of this power pointed out at the level of the world as a 
whole is likely to make us profoundly uncomfortable but this is not necessarily a bad 
thing, lest this model too run the risk of seeming to promote a eugenics or dictatorial  
approach.    
But in the light of these things it has been asked if McFague's view of nature is  
too utopian rather than being in touch with the nature of the neighbourhood as she 
would claim.  Noting this problem, James Fowler regards the lack of eschatology in 
McFague as a serious omission297.   Following Fowler it can be argued that eschatology, 
while not necessarily downplaying the role of divine and human agency in creating a 
more just society in the here and now, is, when applied to the universe as a whole, the 
result of  not wishing to affirm all that is in its being.  Eschatology results from the 
tension between the desire  to affirm creation and the suffering that is  observed and 
experienced within it.298  While McFague does not intend this one model to meet all 
theological ends, this absence of critique of the 'nature of nature' and resulting lack of 
eschatology is  a  serious omission.   Is  all  nature really lovable?  Is  love always the 
ethically correct response? 
297 James W Fowler Faith development and pastoral care Philadelphia: Fortress Press 1986. 
298 Teilhard de Chardin was well aware of the need for eschatology and it is surprising that McFague, 
deeply influenced by him, does not pick up on it.   In an interesting and enlightening passage 
(Metaphorical Theology p136)  McFague compares eschatology and science fiction, but seems to miss 
the point that science fiction combines the active human component (science) with the rejection of the 
nature of things (fiction).  It could be said that the loss of eschatology is a danger when liberation 
theology is done (in an albeit well-meaning manner) by those in a position of relative affluence and 
influence.
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In this  section we have seen that McFague's model of God as Mother,  when 
considered with its associated and supporting models and concepts, meets most of her 
criteria for a good model well.  However several objections of varying seriousness have 
been raised, most of these relating to the lack of integration between the model and the 
Christian tradition and scriptures but also with regard to the effectiveness of the model 
more generally,  especially in its ethical applicability.   This suggests some degree of 
weakness in McFague's criteria themselves and hence her method.  This is not to be 
deemed fatal, simply an area of weakness that may bear more scrutiny and perhaps be 
open to strengthening through further work.  Therefore these observations will remain a 
line of investigation throughout what follows. 
These things being said however, it is still the case that McFague's presentation 
of the model of God as Mother results in many insights that are of value to theology 
especially  in  relation  to  more  inclusive,  contextually  relevant  and  powerful 
understandings  of  justice  and  agape in  relation  to  God.   It  therefore  is  ultimately 
successful as a resource for reforming the Christian tradition as she wishes it to be.
4.6 The meaning and love of God as Lover.
The model of God as lover may be regarded as essentially a remythologising of 
the  second  person of  the  Trinity.   Thus  it  is  the  most  Christocentric  of  McFague's 
models. This model brings together the concepts of eros, sin, healing and salvation, but 
modifying traditional presentations of these concepts just as might be expected.  Again 
much of the work is in fact being done by these reinterpreted concepts.   This is evident 
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from the fact that McFague rarely returns to this image itself in her later work and yet 
the understandings of sin, incarnation and salvation found in its presentation remain 
central to her thinking.
Despite  the  Christocentric  nature  of  this  model  it  remains  located  within 
McFague's radical monotheism as a model of the One God in relationship to the whole 
creation understood as God's body.  This distinguishes McFague's use of lover from 
other uses in the Christian tradition and scriptures.  McFague's reading of the use of 
intimate  and  erotic  language  in  these  sources  is  ambivalent,  even  as  she  finds  the 
tradition to be ambivalent itself on the issue.  Initially she says:
'Christians do not speak of God as lover, or at any rate, only a fringe group of 
medieval mystics do'.299
But shortly after she says:
     'Is it any surprise then that the Christian tradition in its attempt to sum up the goal  
of human existence has done so in lover's  language? From Augustine through 
Thomas and to the Westminster' Confession, the 'end of man' was to 'know' and 
'enjoy' God forever.'300 
In essence, her reading of the tradition seems to be summed up when she says:
'...the Judeo-Christian tradition, if wary of the lover model and preferring to keep 
it well within the safe boundaries of marriage, has nonetheless not been able to 
eliminate it entirely.'301
This  is  because  of  the centrality of  the  lover  relationship  in  human life  and 
experience as,
'...the most intimate of all human relationships, as the one that to the majority of 
299 Models of God p125
300 Ibid. p128
301 Ibid. p124
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people is the most central and precious, the one giving the most joy (as well as the 
most pain)...Could a relationship be of such crucial importance in our existence 
and be irrelevant in our relationship with God?'302 
Basic to the image and model of God as Lover are desire and need.  The desire 
of lover to beloved is in some respects similar to those of motherhood since they both 
desire the fulfilment of the being of their object.   However the difference between the 
agape and eros is that eros finds intrinsic value within the beloved, desires to be united 
with this discovered value and consequently experiences need in relation to the beloved. 
Whereas the Mother gives without expectation of response, the Lover needs a response 
for her own fulfilment.
This  suggests  a  vision  of  God  importantly  different  from  traditional, 
dispassionate and static ones and owning rather more to contemporary process thought 
and other forms of panentheism.
'Certainly a radically transcendent, triumphalist view of God, of God as either the 
unmoved mover  or the absolute  monarch,  cannot  conceive of  God as needing 
anything, let alone an intimate relationship with her creatures. But our model of 
God as  mother-creator  and as  lover  to  the beloved world puts  need in  a  very 
different  light.  As  many have  pointed  out,  neither  the  covenantal  God of  the 
Hebrew Scriptures  who  pleaded  with  Israel  to  be  his  faithful  partner  nor  the 
compassionate God of Jesus of Nazareth who healed the sick and cast out demons 
is an unmoved mover or an absolute monarch entirely outside the circle of need. 
Need, of course, implies change and growth, and though some societies, like that 
of  ancient  Greece,  find  change  and  growth  inferior  to  immutability  and 
motionlessness, our society does not.  Change, growth, and development are all 
positive attributes for contemporary human beings; they are also characteristics of 
302 Ibid. p126
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an evolutionary view of the universe. Hence on the principle that we image God 
according  to  what  we  find  most  desirable  in  ourselves  and  what  we  find 
constitutive of our world there is reason to include change as a divine attribute.'303
This need for personal relationship, however, is not to be seen as making the 
model individualistic.  Properly understood, the object of the erotic love of God, 'the 
beloved', is not human beings individually and one by one but the whole creation, again 
understood as God's Body.  The desire is for the unification of the whole creation with 
God and  in  God.   Since  we are  the  only  (known)  species  capable  of  actively  and 
consciously working to this end, this implies that we have a particular duty of response. 
For McFague this response is not about creating individual loving relationships to a God 
beyond the world but rather the response :
'is directed toward God's body, the world'
'The response that God as lover needs is from us not as individuals but as parts of 
the beloved world; God as lover is interested not in rescuing certain individuals 
from the world but in saving, making whole, the entire beloved cosmos that has 
become  estranged  and  fragmented,  sickened  by  unhealthy  practices,  and 
threatened by death and extinction. God as lover finds all species of flora and 
fauna valuable and attractive, she finds the entire, intricate evolutionary complex 
infinitely precious and wondrous; God as lover finds himself needing the help of 
those very ones among the beloved - of us human beings - who have been largely 
responsible for much of the estrangement that has occurred. We are needed lest 
the lover lose her beloved; we are needed so that the lover may be reunited with 
his beloved. The model of God as lover, then, implies that God needs us to help 
save the world!'304.
303 Ibid. p134
304 Ibid. p135
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This passage identifies the activity of God, from the perspective of this model, as 
saving.  However, as has begun to be explored, the meaning of salvation is modified by 
the theme of a love which needs unification with the valued object of its desire.  Thus 
salvation and its accompanying ethic becomes 'healing'.   
4.7 The ethic of God as Lover.
If the activity of God the Lover is  saving, understood principally as healing, 
healing implies diagnosis as its first step and so McFague presents an account of sin and 
suffering understood in the light of this model.
Firstly, McFague stresses that though sin is to be taken seriously, it does not, in 
terms of the intrinsic value of things, ruin creation.  In other words, sin does not mean 
that the world becomes a place that is so marred that salvation must become the escape 
from the world of some elected individuals.  The whole creation, as God's beloved, 
remains loved and valued, and this for what it is, rather than in spite of what it is.
Evil  is  seen  principally  from  two  perspectives.   Firstly  it  is  held  to  be  a 
consequence of the complexity in a limited creation where the success of one being or 
species often comes at the price of another.  This is the 'tragic aspect' of our 'organic  
solidarity'.305   Secondly it is seen as a result of human freedom.  In particular, in a 
nuclear context, it is seen as the decision to use a natural feature of creation (nuclear 
fission or fusion) for destructive purposes.  This McFague sees as the ultimate example 
of the desire to 'be like God', having  power over the existence of life itself.
This human aspect of evil is sin, but under the model of God as lover sin is  
differently understood from its traditional presentation under the king-subject model. 
That is, sin is not imaged as rebellion against a transcendent power or authority but as 
305 Ibid. pp137-138
220
the refusal of right (i.e. loving) relationship.  It is
'The turning away ... from interdependence, from all other beings, including the 
matrix of being from whom all life comes.'306
Thus sin is modelled as a wounding of the interdependent creation and salvation 
is modelled as healing.  This healing has three aspects, two active and one, the 'last 
resort', is passive.
The passive response is  identification (by God and consequently by us) with 
suffering, a sharing in the pain of the wounded.  The active responses are defence, or 
prevention of further wounding and the active healing, or restoring of harmony, within 
broken or distorted relationships.  These relationships are not limited to those between 
people but include all interdependent relationships within creation.307
Since, on this understanding, our sins are not individual acts committed against 
an external authority, it is not sufficient for salvation to be achieved by one individual 
winning forgiveness for all.  
Since,
'The sins we must deal with are not the sort that can be atoned for and forgotten; 
they are daily, present refusals, by all of us some of the time and some of us all of 
the time, to acknowledge the radical relationality and interdependence of all God's 
beloved with one another ... Likewise, the evil we must deal with, epitomized in 
our systemic structures of oppression due to race, class, and gender, as well as the 
deterioration of the ecosphere and the monstrous escalation of nuclear weaponry, 
will not disappear through God's having 'conquered' it in battle.' 308
Therefore,
306 Ibid. p139
307 Ibid. p137
308 Ibid. p145
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    'Salvation is not a once-for-all objective service that someone else does for us. 
Rather, it is the ongoing healing of the divided body of our world which we, with 
God,  work at together.'309
Salvation is  therefore not  only a  work of  God (although McFague attributes 
especially the revelation that all is loved and valued for itself to a work of God as a 
conclusion that we could not have reached on our own).  Salvation is work towards 
healing in which the whole creation participates, especially that part of creation that can 
actively and consciously respond to God as Lover.
McFague links this understanding of the nature of salvation to her understanding 
of Jesus, traditionally the Saviour.  Soteriology has traditionally shaped Christology and 
so McFague's reinterpretation of the nature, means and participants in the process of 
salvation can be expected to affect  her  understanding of the nature of  Jesus Christ. 
Although her Christology will be discussed in much more detail in the next chapter, 
since she is most explicit on the issue while expounding the Body of God model, her 
remarks while proposing the Lover model are also significant.
McFague makes it clear that while Jesus is to be regarded as a paradigmatic 
revelation of the love of God, the very idea that a life can be revelatory itself opens up 
the possibility of other lives and other traditions being similarly revealing.  The fact that 
an ontologically unique or distinct, vicarious saviour is neither necessary or desirable to 
her argument as she presents it, allows McFague to propose a universal incarnation in 
which God is seen as entering into both suffering and healing and indeed the whole of 
creation, and this over-against a particular incarnation of God in the person of Jesus of 
Nazareth.
4.8 Assessment of God as Lover.
309 Ibid. p143
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Many of the remarks made in relation to God as Mother apply also to God as 
Lover.  Again we can see that the image has many of the characteristics which warrant 
its experimental use.  The only caveat here is that experiences and associations relating 
to the image of 'lover' are more varied and not necessarily as unambiguously positive as 
McFague may like.  For example, for many people the term 'lover' will have relatively 
weak  links  with  steadfast  faithfulness  or  permanence  of  relationship  in  comparison 
with, for example, more traditional images of husband and wife. This  said,  the  model 
certainly offers the right sort of ‘metaphorical tension’ – a combination of familiarity 
and difference as well as inclusiveness to suit McFague's project.  However it could be 
argued that, in a slightly different sense, the model is impersonal because God is held to 
be  lover  of  the  world and  not  of  individuals within  it.   This  is  of  course  because 
McFague wishes to stress God's love for creation and wishes to avoid individualism.  It 
should be noted though that McFague's later work, and especially Life Abundant, moved 
to  a  position  which  is  much  more  accepting  of  individual  relationships  with  God 
without losing the universal and ethical imperatives of this relationship.
For example in that work McFague quotes Miroslav Volf with approval:
'For me theology springs from a divine passion: that is the open wound of God 
in one's own life and in the tormented men, women and children of this world....But for 
me theology also springs from God's love for life, the love for life which we experience 
in  the presence of the life-giving Spirit,  and which enables  us to  move beyond our 
resignation,  and  begin  to  love  life  here  and  now.   These  are  also  Christ's  two 
experiences of God, and because of that they are the foundation of Christian Theology 
too:  God's delight and God's pain.' 310  
310 Miroslav Volf 'Theology, Meaning and Power' in Volf et al (eds.) The Future of Theology: Essays in  
Honor of Jürgen Moltmann Grand Rapids, Mich: Eerdmans 1996 p 112 quoted in McFague Life  
Abundant p51.  Original emphasis.    
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McFague is quick to reinforce the universal aspect of this experiential insight, of 
course, and continues:
'...experience  is  the  place  where  Christian  faith  is  manifested...a  central  and 
commanding insight into God's love...[but] this insight is not limited to the individual's 
well-being – it is an insight concerning the relationship between God and the world, one 
of such significance that one's orientation and behaviour must change.'311
There  is  of  course  no  necessary  contradiction  between  God's  love  for  the 
individual and also love for the creation of which the individual is a part.
Again the effects of composite images can be seen, this time Lover-Healer. The 
model is consistent in relating these to each other, as well as relating this composite 
with the Mother-Judge composite already examined.  Indeed it is a particular strength of 
this  model  that  it  supplements the previous models  well,  especially in providing an 
account of love in which a response is called forth and valued without losing the idea of 
grace.
The model is to be praised for precisely these reasons since it enables not only 
fruitful new insights for systematic theology, but also possible re-conceptions of the 
theology of eros, sexuality and loving partnerships.  In addition, the focus on salvation 
as concern for the unity of the here and now is certainly more likely to lead to ethical 
concern for the environment than a theology that sees matter as disposable in the light 
of a spiritual soteriology based on escape from the physical world.  
Once again however, the greater part of the creative work is being done by the 
influence  of  the image on the  conceptual  level,  this  time in  offering  a  constructive 
account of  eros  that does not reduce it to self-love or the utilisation of another.  As 
argued  earlier,  this  type  of  'exegesis'  of  terminology  is  a  particular  strength  of 
McFague's work, but it does call into question whether in fact metaphorical theology 
311 Life Abundant p52
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can  work  primarily  on  the  level  of  the  model  as  McFague  argues.   Indeed  it  is 
questionable just how far the image of 'lover' is, in fact, being used as a model.  Few 
concrete features of the relationship between lovers are being mapped onto the God-
world relationship in McFague's presentation.  Rather the image is being used to inform 
conceptual understandings of eros, value and salvation and these are in turn being used 
to create an understanding of God and the world.
Again in similarity to our analysis of God as Mother, it has to be said that the 
Christian warrants of this model are, on this presentation, weak.  Again the constraint 
that a model be 'mindful of the basic images of the paradigm' and 'well located relative 
to its root-metaphor' prove too weak on their own to secure the status of the model as 
Christian.  However this is not so much a criticism of the model itself but of the way in 
which  McFague  applies  it.   Opinions  will  differ  as  to  the  value  and  status  of  the 
doctrines  that  McFague  seeks  to  overturn  or  replace;  that  is  not  the  concern  here. 
However it does seem unlikely that her model offers sufficient explanatory scope and 
power on its own to entirely replace all the meaning of the traditional doctrines of the 
incarnation, salvation, eschatology and Christology.  Again the power of Christianity to 
speak to a broad, and therefore more inclusive, range of concerns is being limited.  
But it is not the case that the model needs to be presented in a way so hostile to 
orthodox Christian teaching.  In fact in many cases, a more charitable (and, arguably, 
faithful) interpretation of the scriptures and traditions would integrate well with and be 
enriched by McFague's model.
One example of this is the conception of sin and salvation.  Prioritising right 
relationships over individual acts of rebellion is not inconsistent with a view of the cross 
that includes (though is not limited to) a salvific action on the part of God vis a vis not 
only the  individual  but  the  whole  creation  in  its  relationship  to  God.   Biblical  and 
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traditional warrants for such a position would not be hard to find (e.g. Romans 8:22 
(NRSV)- 'We know that the whole creation has been groaning in labour pains until now; 
and not only the creation, but we ourselves, who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan 
inwardly while  we wait  for adoption,  the redemption of our bodies').   Such a  view 
would  ground  a  'turning-back'  to  interdependence  with  all  being  and  a  restored 
relationship with the 'matrix from which all life comes'.
Likewise, if we focus on McFague's reading of Jesus as Christ we see that an 
interpretation  of  his  life  as  revelatory  as  other  lives  can  be  does  not  preclude  an 
incarnational Christology and nor does a high Christology necessarily imply that human 
agency has no role in bringing the Kingdom to fulfilment in the here and now.
On each of these fronts it seems that McFague's constructive theology is more 
directly a consequence of her models (and is also of greater theological value) than her 
destructive critique of the tradition which, since it does not appear to be based upon the 
logical or necessary consequences of the models themselves, must be based on other, 
external concerns and aims.
Two further problems that again rear their heads are the ethical difficulties of 
attempting to love the whole creation and the lack of eschatological focus.  The latter is 
a minor problem for this model and probably stems from a desire to avoid too utopian a 
presentation of what is possible in the world.  However it is an interesting feature of 
McFague's  account  of  salvation  as  healing  that  it  is  consistently  presented  as  a 
'restoring' of a world that has been 'broken' or 'wounded', and it cannot be that McFague 
is intending to imply that there was a time or state when the creation was not wounded 
to which she seeks a return.  Consequently this is a strange anachronism within her 
theology.  Why image a past 'golden age' rather than a future goal?
The imagery of healing also works against her goal of encouraging love for the 
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whole creation and highlights the difficulties of removing the anthropocentric values of 
ethics.  As well as wounding, healing can also imply disease, but disease is, from the 
point  of  view  of  the  infecting  organism,  a  success,  a  flourishing,  a  fulfilment  of 
potential that can only come at the expense of the host.  Healing in such a case is the 
prioritising of one form of life over many others.
The similarities in findings when considering the models of Mother and Lover 
are  beginning to  be  indicative  of  certain  methodological  flaws  in  McFague's  work, 
despite her offering many insights that are themselves fruitful and of benefit to theology 
and  human  understanding  more  widely.   It  will  now be  asked  if  the  same pattern 
continues with McFague's third model, the model of God as Friend.
4.9 The meaning and love of God as Friend.
McFague first expounded a model of God as Friend in Metaphorical Theology. 
However  here  focus  will  be  on  her  more  developed  and  thorough  presentation  in 
Models of God.  The former explored very similar themes, with the main differences 
being that  Models of God is much more focussed on interpreting the model so as to 
maximise its ethical impact and is much more critical  of the Christian tradition.   In 
contrast, the argument in  Metaphorical Theology is more concerned to root the model 
within scripture and tradition and in addressing questions of faith and religious practice 
such as what the nature of the authority of a friend may be, and the implications of the 
model for worship.
McFague  says  that  'Friends  are  unnecessary'.312  That  is,  friendship  is  not 
312 Models of God p157
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required for basic survival,  though it  is  likely that it  is  necessary for happiness and 
human fulfilment.  Consequently, friendship involves a degree of free association and 
response different from the relationship between mother and child or between lovers.
'The  basis  of  friendship  is  freedom,  and  that  is  part  of  its  power:  all  other 
relationships are ringed with duty or utility or desire.'313
The nature and role of friendship is not clear from the term's common usage or 
from studies on the subject.  McFague gives the examples of 'It's nothing serious: they 
are  just  friends'  and  'She  had  many  acquaintances  but  few  friends'  to  show  the 
ambiguities in our understanding of the importance of friendship.
'Being a friend means many different things to different people in different times 
and places.'314
For McFague, philia,  the love between friends,  means forming a bond of trust 
that arises not so much from mutual delight in each other but rather from sharing a 
common vision.
'Friendship  here,  unlike  friendship  between  God  and  certain  mystics,  is  not 
between two facing each other but between two facing the common vision which 
is the basis of the friendship.  The importance of common vision in divine-human 
friendship  cannot  be  overstated,  for  it  frees  friendship  from the  self-absorbed 
individualism of its classical roots.'315
This reorientation of the image of friends is crucial to McFague's presentation of 
philia.   Because  of  this  shift,  the  model  of  God  as  Friend  not  only  means  God's 
presence,  fellowship  and  support  but  also  an  adult  sharing  of  a  mutual  vision.   A 
friendly relationship with the divine is thus taken to model the less dependent aspects of 
313 Ibid. p162
314 Ibid. p161
315 Ibid. p163
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the relationship between the world (and especially ourselves as that part of the world 
which is capable of sharing a vision) than were the natural implications of the other two 
models.  The model of the Friend therefore complements the other models and corrects 
an overemphasis on our dependence upon God for the transformation of the world.  This 
is vital for McFague's project which aims to warrant and inspire human action on behalf 
of the world in the face of nuclear and environmental threats.
McFague is explicit  that the model of God the Friend is intended to at  least 
partly replace the model of God the Holy Spirit316.  This traditional model McFague 
regards as too dualistic, amorphous, ephemeral and bland to be relevant to the modern 
age317.  Perhaps paradoxically, McFague prefers the term Friend to Spirit because she 
holds it to be less anthropomorphic.  This appears to be mainly because friend is an 
embodied rather than disembodied, non-material image.
Rather  than the ephemeral  Spirit  who calls  individuals into relationship with 
God, McFague offers the image of God the Friend who calls all to join with her vision 
of the world and thus become 'friends of the Friend of World'.318 
4.10  The ethic of God as Friend.
The ethical imperatives resulting from the friend model begin with solidarity, the 
standing alongside others in their need, suffering and struggle.  This is, in effect, an 
inviting of others to join the circle of friendship in which God is a partner.  As McFague 
says:
'... commitment to a common vision is not limited to two.'319
316 Models of God p181
317 Ibid. p170
318 Ibid. p172
319 Ibid. p163
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This common vision is not, though, to be mistaken for like-mindedness.  The 
communities  of  friends  that  McFague is  envisaging are  not  simply communities  of 
similarity but are intended to include those who are in many ways different, yet still 
share the common commitment to the transformational vision of the Kingdom.  This 
presentation is explicitly aimed at combating xenophobia and including difference and 
flows particularly from the image of the 'host at table', which McFague connects to the 
image of friend in the following way.
From  her  discussion  of  friendship  she  derives  a  picture  of  the  activity  of 
sustaining which, in this usage, is primarily the sustaining that comes from fellowship. 
However McFague also notes that companionship means, literally, 'together at bread.'320 
This  she  connects  to  Jesus'  table  fellowship  with  the  outcast  and the  sinner  and to 
customs of hospitality to the stranger especially in ancient cultures.  This culture was 
one  of  interdependence  since  today's  guest  could  be  tomorrow's  host  and  one  of 
inclusiveness since hospitality was offered to the stranger 
'Friendship is, then, potentially the most inclusive of our loves ... its other can be 
anyone.'321
Thus the God who sustains,  and the community of friends who share in this 
sustaining  work,  are  the  God and community who welcome all,  and especially  the 
marginalised, to share in a meal of fellowship and joy.  Further, since to provide food 
(and, by extension, other basic necessities) to another is to bless their existence and wish 
their fulfilment, the model of Friend is united with the models of Mother and Lover in 
their commitment to the affirmation of the existence of all and to the care of all.  
Finally, to stand side by side with God as friend leads to prayer.
'We ask God, as one would a friend, to be present in the joy of our shared meals 
320 Ibid. p158
321 Ibid. p164
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and in the sufferings of the strangers; to give us courage and stamina for the work 
we do together; to forgive us for lack of fidelity to the common vision and lack of 
trust in divine trustfulness. Finally, we ask God the friend to support, forgive, and 
comfort  us  as  we  struggle  together  to  save  our  beleaguered  planet  ...  Just  as 
betrayal is the sin of friendship in which one hands over the friend to the enemy, 
so intercessory prayer is the rite of friendship in which one hands over the friend 
to God.'322
4.11 Assessment of God as Friend.
Whereas the model of God as Lover has drawn virtually no responses from the 
academic community,  and the model  of God as Mother  has drawn a wide range of 
positive and negative responses,  a  small  number of  scholars  have engaged with the 
model of God as Friend, and they have largely been positive323.  In particular Kathryn 
Guthrie assesses the usefulness of the friend model in pastoral work with those suffering 
with addictions of various kinds324.  Guthrie follows John Bradshaw's analysis of the 
roots of addiction, identifying 'toxic shame' as this root.  
'Toxic  shame  ...  is  a  feeling  in  one's  core  that  one  is  not  OK,  that  there  is  
something  fundamentally  wrong  with  one's  person.   One  is  not  acceptable, 
certainly not lovable, but essentially flawed.  This is the conviction at the core of 
one's identity.'325
322 Ibid.179-80
323 See for example the assessment of N J Ramsey 'Feminist Perspectives on Pastoral Care' in Pastoral  
Psychology 40 (2) 1992 pp245-252  Ramsey asserts, though without backing up her assertion, that this 
model has proved useful in a number of pastoral situations including with female survivors of incest. 
(p252)
324 Kathryn Guthrie 'Models of God: Empowerment, Intimacy, Hope' in The Journal of Pastoral Care  
vol 47 no. 1 1993 pp 26-34
325 Guthrie p27
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To assist  their  recovery,  Guthrie argues, sufferers need models of God which 
meet the following criteria:
1) that the model reflect a belief that God is compassionate, loving and gracious;
2) that the model reflect a belief that God is intimately involved in the struggle of 
human recovery and discovery of who one is, and affirms human vulnerability;
3) that the model reflect a belief that God is a 'power with, ' rather than a 'power 
over';
4) that the model reflect a belief that God offers the possibility of real change and 
hope  for  a  future  different  from the  past  and  that  human  choices  shape  that 
difference.326
Whilst calling for more study on the relationship between models of God and 
addiction and recovery in relation to social and church communities and also to prayer 
and spiritual reflection, Guthrie finds McFague's model useful, judging it to,
'clearly offer compassion for a person in recovery.  Such a God/friend can offer 
empowerment toward hope for a future radically different from the past.  It also 
offers a sense of intimacy not found in traditional process theology.'327
Meanwhile, McWilliams discusses the model from an evangelical standpoint328. 
Although, as might be expected, he calls into question McFague's stance on the status of 
the biblical text, it is interesting that he does not see this objection as enough to rule out 
McFague's  method  and  models.   In  fact  his  presentation  of  her  case  is  largely  a 
sympathetic one.  He argues, 
'Evangelicals  who  encounter  McFague's  proposals  should  be  willing  to 
326 Guthrie p28
327 Guthrie p33
328 Warren McWilliams 'God the Friend: A Test Case in Metaphorical Theology' Perspectives in 
Religious Studies 16 1989 pp109-120
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acknowledge that our basic models for God are not based exclusively on proof-
texts  or  counting  references  in  a  concordance...  The  numerous  scriptural 
references to God as father and the relative paucity of references to God as mother 
would not in itself settle the question of the most appropriate model for God.'329 
McWilliams offers three areas though in which he considers the model to be 
weak.  The first is that although McFague allows for friends to be unequal in status, it is  
'not always clear how God transcends his friends'.  McWilliams feels that McFague's 
proposals would get a wider reception from evangelicals if  they were better  able to 
balance immanence and transcendence.
Secondly he criticises the lack of exegetical support she provides for her model. 
However he feels that such support could be given and cites Terence Fretheim's The 
Suffering of God as an example of where such exegesis, reaching a similar position to 
McFague, has been done. 
Thirdly, while McWilliams notes that McFague is addressing herself to the 
economic Trinity rather than the eternal Trinity he is uncomfortable with such a 
distinction saying 'Evangelicals would ordinarily hold to a clear connection between the 
eternal and economic trinities.'330
However he goes on to say that 'What you see is what God really is; God's 
revelation as triune reflects his inner nature'331  so it is clear that there are extensive 
methodological  differences  between his  position and McFague's.   It  is  still  the case 
though that here is a further example of the need for McFague's models to be related 
constructively to traditional ones if they are to gain wider acceptance, especially when a 
particular model shows a certain likeness to a traditional model or in some sense is a 
translation or transformation of one.  That McWilliams provides examples of how this 
329 McWilliams p118
330 p119
331 p119
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work might be done and the benefits of it further strengthens this argument.
By far the most thorough discussion of this model is provided by Lambert.332 
Lambert is writing primarily for members of the Evangelical Covenant Church, one of a 
number of current  and historical Christian movements  to call  themselves Friends of 
God.   Before  discussing  McFague's  presentation  of  the  model,  Lambert  charts  the 
historic  use  of  the  image  in  theology  and  hymnody  and  this  is  helpful  in  better 
establishing the traditional warrants of the model.  Lambert concludes this historical 
survey by lamenting the fact that 'the intimate and assuring relational possibilities of 
'friend' language have remained unarticulated in a comprehensive doctrine of God.'333
Lambert  then goes on to  offer  a  theology of  mission based upon McFague's 
model  of  Friend.   This model  is  remarkable because although including a  powerful 
discussion  of  the  ability  of  friendship  to  overcome the  existential  alienation  of  the 
individual,  Lambert also is one of the few scholars to take up the universalism and 
creation-directed  nature  of  McFague's  models  (the  majority  of  treatments  tend  to 
overlook or pay only lip-service to this universal context – God as Mother, Lover and 
Friend  of the World).  Lambert is probably more successful than McFague in holding 
together  the  personal  and  the  universal  aspects  and  provides  an  answer  to  Ring's 
objection to McFague that she 'strip[s] the personal of its relational component'.334
Lambert's work is a valuable supplement to McFague's on a number of counts, 
for example her understanding of truth under this model being one of 
'authenticity  in  relationship  ...[which]  can  never  be  mistaken for  one  or  more 
propositions,  and  revelation  can  neither  be  identified  with  nor  confined  to  a 
332 Jean C Lambert 'Befriending in God's Name: A preface to a missionary theology of God as Friend' 
Covenant Quarterly 46 1988 pp37-68
333 p43
334 Ring p660.  Ring goes on to say 'Why cannot there be a personal, as distinct from individualistic, 
relationship between God and the person?  There exists a whole literature that insists that one's 
personal relationship with God is truncated if it does not evolve into a life inclusive of all.'
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Lambert  goes  on  to  apply  the  friend  model  constructively  to  thirteen  major 
traditional theological categories, including the persons of the Trinity, sin, worship and 
hope.  This is an instructive example of how McFague's metaphors may be made to 
work transformationally with the tradition rather than against it.
Considering McFague's presentation of God as Friend we again see the same 
features as in our above discussions.  A number of points are of particular interest.
In  the  first  place,  once  more  we  meet  the  use  of  composite  models  to 
complement and correct each other.  In this case it is the friend-host composite.  The 
same process, though in a less worked-through form, is at  work in the relationships 
between the models of Mother, Lover and Friend themselves.
Again  the  greater  part  of  novel  and  valuable  work  is  being  done  at  the 
conceptual level and this is particularly illustrated by this model.  The actual application 
of the model is much more in keeping with McFague's proposed method of exploring 
the translation of 'associated commonplaces' from one domain to the other.  However 
this is only possible once considerable conceptual work has been done on the concept of 
friendship.  This springs from the model's main weakness, the fact that, as McFague 
admits, it is not clear what the associated commonplaces of friendship are.
Finally the same problems of relating to the tradition  are seen again.  These are 
highlighted  by  the  difference  in  presentation  between  Metaphorical  Theology  and 
Models of God.  It must be asked, especially in the light of the foregoing, why isn't 
McFague's pneumatology based around a Spirit-friend composite?  Why does she not 
use her model of friend to reform an existing element of the tradition by supplementing 
and qualifying  it  as  she  does  for  her  own models?   Just  as  McFague connects  her 
models to traditional concepts such as philia, and in doing so transforms understanding 
335 Lambert p55
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of the concept, so the same process could be applied to traditional doctrines, models and 
images.   McFague  expends  considerable  effort  in  'redeeming'  eros and  philia in 
particular  from  their  potentially  individualistic  and  exclusive  interpretations.   It  is 
strange that the same is not done for the doctrine of the Spirit.  Once again the gains  
made by the model of God as friend may not compensate for the resultant narrowing of 
the range of questions that can be addressed by this theology. This narrowing is caused 
by  the  loss  of  traditional  models,  and  the  friend  model  would  not  necessarily  be 
incompatible with these models. 
4.12 Conclusions.
So in the course of this chapter we have seen these three of McFague's proposed 
new models for God in relationship perform well in the main according to the criteria 
derived from her theoretical work.  They are indeed coherent on their own terms and 
consistent with her aims.  They remain a relevant theological resource for the reform of 
the Christian tradition and endure the scrutiny of her respondents.  But at the same time, 
the qualifications to this view provided in previous chapters have been borne out once 
more and attention has been directed back to her method and theory.  Where it was seen 
in  previous  chapters  that  challenges  to  some areas  of  her  method may invite  some 
modification, the exploration of these particular models here has further supported this 
assertion. 
The discussions in this chapter, including the attempts to evaluate the success of 
these  models  in  practice,  suggest  several  areas  where  this  strengthening  may  be 
beneficial to further enhance the ability of new models to meet McFague's aims.  These 
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areas are, firstly, that it is a methodological mistake to compare models as being 'better' 
than another for a time and that rather we should think of models as being better for one 
aspect of a task in a given context.    This is because no one model can address all of the 
complexities  of  the  abundant  life  in  an  ecological,  nuclear  (and  hence,  extremely 
complicated)  age.  Secondly,  that  conceptual  work  is  more  important  than  McFague 
allows and further that the formation of concepts is more readily a collaborative process 
in which multiple models and insights may be brought to bear than is the formation of 
images or even composite models.   Thirdly, our observations here have shed a critical 
light on McFague's criteria for what it means to say that a model is 'Christian'.   
These conclusions can be derived thus:
It is difficult to assess whether a model will produce ethically better results in an 
'age' given the complexities of the world.  It is more realistic to say that certain images 
make better models in a given context for conceptualising certain tasks.  
We have seen that the replacement of one model by another is a process of gain 
and loss, as McFague herself stresses.  However we have also seen that many differ 
from McFague in their assessment of the  value of what is lost.  We have commented 
here especially on the near-total loss of eschatology and with it the loss of metaphorical 
theology's ability to critique the fundamental ordering of the world as opposed to its 
contingent arrangement at any particular time.  For example, while McFague's account 
is  able  to  offer  hope in  the  face of  the suffering caused by ecological  damage and 
economic  exploitation,  it  cannot  offer  a  coherent  response  to  the  basic  constraints 
caused by the fact that world has a greater capacity to produce life than it has to sustain 
it  and  that  certain  forms  of  life  necessarily  depend  for  their  existence  upon  the 
destruction or suffering of others.      
Also, the losses in terms of powerful models that have long been part of the 
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Christian tradition, such as the loss of any ontological understanding of the incarnation, 
are also very significant and it is doubtful that the resulting loss of explanatory power 
and fit with Christian experience is entirely compensated for by the insights resulting 
from the models that replace them.
Given this, it would seem that attention should be given to the task of particular 
models, that is, which aspects of experience they relate to and what ethical results they 
are  trying  to  achieve.   This  focus  would  allow  for  the  requirements  of  particular 
contexts but would not require a model to accomplish all tasks in a given context.  For 
example, particular models with eschatological implications or particular models of sin 
and salvation, would be useful for helping a critique of those aspects of creation that are 
outside potential human control, while other models, such as McFague's, may be more 
appropriate to the task of motivating human action on those things which are within our 
control.   The  point  is  that  both are  necessary  for  Christian  theology  to  be  more 
comprehensive.  McFague's presentations of her models (whatever her methodological 
statements in other places) are in terms of an 'either or' approach to using models, rather 
than 'both and'.
McFague's  own  presentation  illustrates  how  small  and  seemingly  exclusive 
clusters of models may in fact be related together.  However, the use of multiple models 
raises again the difficult question of how models relate to each other and how such a 
project would retain its cohesion, but this chapter has also directed attention again to the 
role of the 'concept' and its ability to unite models in tension.  It is possible that an 
answer may lie here.
We have seen at each stage of the assessments above that the particular value of 
McFague's models is the way in which they help to reform and refine concepts, such as 
agape, justice and healing.  These concepts are also informed by traditional models and 
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images.  Concepts, then, are the meeting place between new models and existing ones 
and it is at this level that metaphorical theology makes its most valuable contribution to 
Christian theology.  At the conceptual level, the need for conceptual coherence requires 
the constructive engagement of models with each other.  At this level the new models 
are engaging with the traditional ones indirectly, in a way that does not assume that one 
model  must  prevail  over  and against  another  but  that  both  can  interact  to  form an 
enriched and more comprehensive concept with greater explanatory power.   Thus it is 
at the level of the concept that theology can most easily become the type of collegial, 
collaborative enterprise McFague wishes it to be.  The conceptual level is also that at 
which McFague's project becomes reforming rather than revolutionary since it is here 
that she is working creatively with material that can be identified as Christian.
The findings of this chapter have begun to call into question McFague's criteria 
for models to be considered Christian.  Indeed it must be asked whether in fact a model, 
in  and of itself,  can be considered Christian at  all.   What if,  instead of looking for 
coherence with a root metaphor as sufficient condition for the Christian status, we were 
to take McFague's other attempt at answering this question and focus on the Christian 
community as a diverse, fluid, sociologically defined entity?  If this was combined with 
a new focus on task ,this may produce a different understanding.
Seen in this way, to say that a model is Christian would be to say for example, 
that the model is used by a Christian community in a way that is consonant with their 
characteristic practices.  
However, a desire for the fulfilment of all (for example) would be consistent 
with the goals of most Christian communities but this desire alone is not sufficient to 
define these communities uniquely as Christian.  Instead, Christian communities,  could 
perhaps  be  uniquely  defined  by  their  creative  and  constructive  engagement  with 
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particular  narratives  provided  necessarily  (though  it  does  not  have  to  be  held, 
sufficiently) by scripture and inherited and evolving reflections upon it.  Understood in 
this way the question would not be whether or not a particular model is itself 'Christian' 
but how and why that model might be taken up and used by a Christian community and, 
as part of that, how it might relate to the communities inherited and evolving narrative 
reflections.
These arguments will be explored further in the next chapter as consideration is 
given to McFague's most extended exposition of a model, the model of the World as 
God's Body, with the above comments in mind.  Particular focus will be on two of the 
book's major themes, Christology and Eschatology, since these are two areas in which 
this chapter has been particularly critical of McFague.
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Chapter 5 – The World as God's Body.
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5.1 Introduction.
In the previous chapter a number of questions and issues were raised concerning 
the application of McFague's methodology to concrete models of God in relationship. 
Attention was drawn to the role and importance of concepts in her models as was done 
previously when her theory was examined.  Again the value of McFague's work was 
suggested to be largely at the conceptual level.  This differs from McFague's own view 
in that, in the light of her respondents, these concepts were found to be integral to the 
process  of  exploring a  model  and metaphor,  rather  than being a  secondary level  of 
reflection upon them.  That is, most of the meaning McFague draws from the model was 
to be found in an exploration of its  associated concepts and not in the less abstract 
structure of the model itself.  
In the previous chapter it was questioned whether McFague's models are indeed 
acting as 'metaphorical models' as she has defined them, in the sense that they do not 
generally involve the mapping of 'associated commonplaces' from one domain to the 
other.  A question was also raised concerning the adequacy of McFague's criterion for 
the  acceptance  of  models  as  Christian.   That  criterion  was  the  strength  of  their 
relationship to a particular root-metaphor. Finally concerns were raised over the loss of 
traditional doctrines (and especially their explanatory power and scope) resulting from 
her presentation of her models and the resulting impact this may have on her ability to 
be  reforming  within  the  tradition.   This  was  especially  the  case  in  the  areas  of 
Christology and Eschatology, and this was argued on the grounds that such loss is not 
logically required by her models and that  such loss may result  in a decrease in  the 
overall explanatory scope and inclusiveness of the tradition.
This  chapter  examines  McFague's  presentation of  the  model  of  the world as 
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God's Body, as presented in her book The Body of God and associated articles, with 
these questions in mind.336   It  then looks at McFague's most recently published work 
for any changes to her positions in these key areas in the most recent phase of her work, 
to see whether she has modified her theology in the light of her respondents on these 
questions. 
 
5.2 Criteria for the World as God's Body.
Concerns  were  raised  about  the  criteria  McFague used in  Models  of  God to 
evaluate her models, especially in relation to evaluating the Christian status of models. 
It  is  therefore  significant  to  note  that  in  The Body of  God,  McFague expanded her 
presentation of these criteria.  While McFague does not intend the following list to be 
exhaustive it is significant that she says:
'A sampling of some of these reasons [for accepting a model] includes our own 
embodied, cultural experience; the testimony of significant communities to which 
we  belong;  the  view  of  reality  current  in  our  time  and  the  usefulness  of  a 
perspective, model, or construct for humane living.'337
Here  the  'testimony of  the  significant  community'  she  is  interested  in  is  the 
Judeo-Christian theological tradition, including the Scriptures.  This is because it is the 
tradition that has shaped not only McFague's own understanding but also the cultural 
understanding of the Western world in which she writes.  She also believes that this 
tradition, 
336 It should be noted that McFague is far from the only writer to have presented a model of the world as 
in some sense God's body, however a detailed comparison with the extensive and varied literature 
around this area would fall outside our focus here.  Instead, attention will be drawn only to the 
particularly distinctive features of McFague's account in this regard.
337 Sallie McFague, The Body of God London: SCM Press 1993 p85
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'With radical revision ... can be [a] prophetic means of liberating the oppressed.'338
This 'radical revision' is of course important to McFague and she regards this as 
the key difference between her own approach and that of 'narrative theology',  citing 
Lindbeck as a representative figure of this school.339  This distinction is substantiated by 
Reynolds who has compared the theologies of McFague and Lindbeck in detail  and 
concluded that the principal differences between them are not so much methodological 
as in their evaluations of the past and potential future performances of the tradition.340 
We have already seen that McFague's reading of the tradition and its ability to promote 
environmental sustainability is less than positive, but also that this reading is open to 
challenge.
A further notable feature of  The Body of God is that McFague began to move 
away from a focus on 'root-metaphor' as the unifying factor of Christian doctrine and 
towards an understanding of Christian identity rooted within a particular context and 
community; that is towards a more sociological rather than theoretical understanding of 
the status of a model as Christian.  Indeed, in it, she describes any attempt to locate the 
'essence' of a tradition as 'futile'.341 Given the difficulties already observed in separating 
McFague’s ‘root-metaphor of the Christian paradigm’ from such a ‘timeless essence’, it 
is likely that this desire to avoid defining a Christian essence is her reason for moving 
away from a focus on root-metaphor.
Instead McFague takes some central Christian themes, especially the doctrines 
of the incarnation and the resurrection of the body and develops her model in the light 
of a reinterpretation of these, as we shall see.  However this is not a move on her part 
towards  finding  continuity  with  Christianity  at  the  level  of  particular  models.  Her 
338Ibid. p87
339See The Body of God p240 n60
340Terrence Reynolds 'Parting Company At Last: Lindbeck and McFague in Substantive Theological 
Dialogue' Concordia Theological Quarterly 63 Ap 1999 pp 97-118.
341 The Body of God p240 n 61
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understanding of these doctrines and her engagement with them is, as we shall see, still 
highly conceptual.   
This move, away from a root metaphor functioning to all intents and purposes as 
an 'essence' and towards a broader interpretation of the tradition, results in a heightened 
concern  with  biblical  texts  and  traditional  theological  writers  and  themes  when 
compared with previous works.342  The Body of  God is  also in  some respects  more 
'orthodox', especially on the subject of pneumatology than previous works as we shall 
see.  However, this change of criteria also results in less clarity on the issue of what is  
and is not Christian for McFague.  For example, little guidance is given as to what 
constitutes a valid interpretation of the Christian tradition and what does not.  As will be 
seen  when looking at  Christology below,  while  Christianity  provides  a  direction  of 
ethical concern for her model of Jesus, again the result is a narrower Christianity, one 
less able to address concerns that are not McFague’s immediate ones.  This change in 
criteria may been seen as a move in the right direction, because it offers the potential for 
a broader engagement and richer dialogue between McFague's models and the tradition 
they aim to reform, however it does not fully rectify the situation because it does not  
fully locate her work relative to this tradition.  It thereby threatens this aspect of the 
coherence of her project.
Her remaining criteria, those of fit with experience and of pragmatic concern for 
ethical living, remain very much as before, but the criterion for fit with 'the view of 
reality  current  in  our  time'  finds  fresh  expression  in  this  period  of  her  work  in  a 
significant way.  This criterion has in mind what McFague calls 'post-modern science', 
especially  evolutionary  biology  and  big-bang  cosmology.   These  provide  important 
motifs and also set important limits within her theology.
342 A trend continued further in her later presentation of these ideas in 'The World as God's Body' 
Concillium 2002/2 pp50-56
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Firstly, McFague presents an understanding of the 'common creation story' of 
contemporary cosmology interpreted  so  as  to  stress  both  the  emergence  of  genuine 
novelty (and thus a focus on radical particularity and diversity of 'bodies' within the 
universe) and the common origin of all things in a particular 'event' (such as the ‘big 
bang’) within which everything that is was once united (thus reopening the way to a 
recovered sacramentality on the basis of the original unity of all things).  
Secondly she presents a reading of evolutionary theory that stresses the mutual 
interdependence  of  all  things  living  and  non-living,  after  an  organic  rather  than 
mechanistic model, but an account that also reserves causal explanation to 'local causes' 
and defies any attempt to identify any purposeful agency or guided planning behind this 
process.   She  is  insistent  that  any  discernment  of  direction  or  purpose  into  the 
evolutionary  process  can  only  be  done  after  the  fact,  'metaphorically',  that  is  as  a 
'reading  into'  the  story  that  cannot  be  warranted  by  the  scientific  data  or  theories 
themselves.  Her reading of this account stresses the importance of life in and for itself, 
but does not imply that life or any particular species is the goal of evolution.  It also, she 
believes, prioritises life and embodiment over will, mind, control or purpose.
'The 'wonderful life' that has evolved, in all its unbelievable diversity and complex 
interdependencies,   is  what  is  important  ...  not  that  its  diversity  and 
interconnectedness were willed by some  principle or divine power other than the 
play of chance and law.'343
The range of topics covered in McFague's work, from evolutionary biology, to 
contemporary  cosmology,  through  epistemology,  economics,  biblical  criticism  and 
systematic theology is truly vast and itself illustrates the complexity that lies behind the 
search for a recontextualised theology.  It is a particular strength of McFague's work that 
she is  careful  to  build on well  established foundations  and avoid placing too much 
343 The Body of God pp45-6
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weight  on  particular  details  or  controversial  or  marginal  positions  in  the  fields  she 
covers while side-stepping the very many important and contentious questions that these 
throw up where these questions are peripheral and would detract from her central thesis. 
It  is  not  the  particular accounts (for  example  of  evolutionary process  or  economic 
theory) on which McFague draws that provide the novelty and value of her work but the 
fact that she draws from them at all. Consequently the details of these 'extra-theological' 
sources or debates in these areas need not be considered here.  Instead, discussions will 
be confined to the theological use that McFague makes of her sources, particularly in 
light of the four concerns above.
5.3 The meaning of World as God's Body.
Here,  and  in  the  following  two  sections,  the  main  themes  of  McFague's 
presentation are briefly outlined, with the focus being on allowing McFague's ideas to 
speak for themselves and make the points and emphases that she wishes to make.  An 
assessment of these ideas follows in section 5.6.
In the face of ecological and nuclear threats,  McFague argues,  the particular 
contribution of Christianity is that it is the religion of incarnation and thus of the body. 
Therefore 'body' should be elevated to the same ranks of revered metaphors as 'father' 
and  'king'.   However,  rather  than  the  spiritualisation  associated  with  much  of  the 
traditional use of body, such as with reference to the spiritual food of the Eucharist, 
McFague wishes to use the metaphor of God's embodiment to direct attention to the 
physical bodies, living and even non-living that make up our universe.
'It forces us too think about human bodies that are hungry, thirsty, overworked 
unhoused,  sick,  mutilated,  imprisoned,  raped,  murdered.  A focus  on  the  body 
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prohibits us from spiritualizing human pain, from centering on existential anxiety, 
from substituting  otherworldly salvation  for  this-worldly oppression.  Whatever 
else salvation can  and ought to mean, it does involve, says the body model, first 
and foremost, the well-being of the body. A theology that works within the context 
of  the  body  model  claims  that  bodies  matter,  that  they  are  indeed  the  main 
attraction.'344
This focus McFague regards as revolutionary and prophetic in our culture.
'A society that allows thousands of homeless people to roam the streets with no 
protection for their bodies; that spends, on the average, more for the last week of a 
dying elderly person's hospital  care than for the medical needs of the first ten 
years of a child's life; that refuses in international congresses to join other nations 
in  protecting  biodiversity  and  limiting  chemicals  that  contribute  to  global 
warming: this society hates the body, human bodies, and all other animal and plant 
bodies that make up the body of our planet.'345
This act of looking at the body is itself done from a body.  We as observers are 
actually embodied participants in what we observe.  This means that bodies matter in 
the process of observation as well as being what is observed, (in other words bodies are 
both the object and subject in the observation process).  McFague also wishes to stress 
strongly the embodied nature, and thus the radical particularity, of what is observed; that 
is the act of observation is an act of granting autonomous status and value to other 
(body) as and for what it is.  It is in Iris Murdoch's phrase 'the realisation that something 
other than oneself is real.'  This 'attention epistemology' is a loving act, the 'loving eye' 
that we discussed in chapter 3.
'An attention epistemology is central to embodied knowing and doing, for it takes 
344 Ibid. p18
345 Ibid. p24
249
with utmost seriousness the differences that separate all  beings: the individual, 
unique site from which each is in itself and for itself. Embodiment means paying 
attention to differences, and we can learn this lesson best perhaps when we gauge 
our response to a being very unlike ourselves, not only to another human being 
(who may be different in skin color or sex or economic status), but to a being who 
is indifferent to us and whose existence we cannot absorb into our own—such as a 
kestrel (or turtle or tree). If we were to give such a being our attention, we would 
most probably act differently than we presently do toward it.'346
A focus on bodies and consequently on the physical needs of bodies results in a 
focus on the concepts of space and place.  McFague uses the concept of space to expand 
on the concepts of diversity and unity she derived from the common creation story, and 
to add an ethical imperative.
'First, space is a levelling, democratic notion that places us on a par with all other 
life-forms. ... The category of space reminds us not only that each and every life-
form needs space for its own physical needs, but also that we all exist together in 
one space, our finite planet or, in terms of our model, within the nurturing matrix 
of God's body. We are all enclosed together in the womblike space of our circular 
planet, the indispensable space from which we derive our nourishment ... Each 
and every life-form needs its own particular space and habitat in which to grow 
and flourish ... Yet all these differences and special needs must be satisfied within 
one overarching space, the body of our planet.'347
When considered in relation to one particular species, and especially the human 
species, space becomes place.  This idea of place has two fold meaning.  Firstly 'our 
proper place' in relation to others and the environment becomes the focus of justice and 
346 The Body of God p50
347 Ibid. pp100-101
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righteousness and a failure to keep to our place becomes the definition of sin under this 
model.  Secondly, 'our place' becomes 'our home', the concept of place then not only 
carries a negative meaning, that is a limit on human ambition and activity, but also a 
positive meaning, that is a sense of identification with and belonging to the space that 
we occupy.  These two are linked because the attitude one has to a space to which one 
belongs can be expected to be quite different from the attitude one might have to the 
space one simply occupies.
But consider more specifically the model of the world as not only  a  body but 
God's body. There are two aspects of this that require particular elucidation.
Firstly, the stress placed upon unity and diversity also has an impact upon the 
type of body used to model the body of God.  McFague introduces her discussions on 
the body of God with a stress on the diversity of bodies that make up the world and 
several  moves  that  combine  to  reorientate  theology  away  from  an  anthropocentric 
perspective and towards one that sees our bodies as one with many bodies, including, 
but very much not limited to, diverse human bodies.  These other bodies are  to be 
considered valuable in and for themselves.  Thus the body of God is not to be regarded 
as a human body, or indeed any specific body.  In fact it is quite unlike any body since it 
is a diverse 'body of bodies'.  In a passage that recalls her discussions of metaphor itself  
she writes:
'The organic model  that  emerges ...  is  not the orderly,  limited,  clearly defined 
classic one based on the human (male) body, with its unity of the one ideal life-
form ... Rather, it is wild, strange, and unconventional (from the perspective of the 
classic model), for in place of one, ideal body, it includes all the bodies that were, 
are, and shall be here on this planet and throughout the universe—from the slimy 
bodies of primitive worms to supernovas and black holes, from the elegant bodies 
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of tigers and seals to coral reefs, viruses, and birch trees. And since this body 
includes everything that is, what characterizes it above all else is diversity, not 
sameness.' 348
In making this move McFague trades some of the clarity that might be gained by 
modelling  the  world  after  a  particular  concrete  body,  in  favour  of  a  more  abstract 
concept of ‘body’, in order to avoid what she sees as the pitfalls of elevating any one 
body, and particularly the 'perfect', male, human body to the status of archetypal body. 
She does not wish a particular body to be allowed to stand as representative of all bodies 
because this would not be inclusive.  It is precisely the nature of bodies as unique and 
individual  that  necessitates  for  her  an  abstract  category  of  ‘body’ with  which  to 
represent them because no one body is sufficiently like all other bodies to stand as the 
typical case.
However,  in  a  later  (2002)  presentation,  McFague  greatly  strengthens  the 
coherence of this model by adding the observation, not of course novel, that bodies, 
including our own, are themselves diverse as well as united, and that this balance is 
crucial.  This returns the image of the body to a more intuitive, if still unspecific one. 
She says:
'In an organism or body, the whole flourishes  only when all the different parts 
function well;  in fact, the 'whole' is nothing but each and every individual part 
doing  its  particular  thing  successfully.   Nothing  is  more  unified  than  a  well 
functioning  body  but,  also,  nothing  relies  more  on  complex,  diverse 
individuality.'349
Of more significance is the relationship that McFague sees this model providing 
348 Ibid. p47
349' The World as God's Body' p52.  The words 'nothing but' should be taken as rhetorical emphasis and 
not a reductionist view of bodies which would be quite against McFague's general position.
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between God's  transcendence and immanence.   In the model of the World as God's 
body, God is not seen as being equivalent to the world only (which would be pantheism 
– a complete collapse of transcendence).  As the world is modelled as the Body of God, 
God is not in turn being modelled as simply a body.  Rather God is being modelled as 
embodied spirit.  This is in contrast to many presentations of divine action that have 
explored a model of God relating to the world as the mind relates to the body.  
This model, much debated particularly at the time McFague wrote Body of God, 
has been shown to have considerable difficulties, many of which concentrate around the 
fact that the relationships between mind and body, and indeed the nature of mind itself, 
are far from clear and settled questions.350  (Polkinghorne351 argues for example that the 
structure of the universe is 'nothing like' the structure of the brain and Peterson that the 
mind/body understanding of God and the world would necessarily imply that God is an 
emergent property of the world.352) 
McFague's presentation avoids these objections by focusing on spirit rather than 
mind.  This focus is also part of McFague's feminist project since 'mind' prioritises will, 
intention and control while spirit speaks of empowering and enlivening.  For example, 
when applied to evolution, the model of God as spirit, as opposed to mind, 
'does not claim that the divine mind is the cause of what evolutionary theory tells 
us can only have local causes; rather it suggests that we think of these local causes 
as enlivened and empowered by the breath of God.'353
McFague's hope in presenting the God-world relationship in this way is that 
'since, as we recall, our tendency is not only to model God in our image but to 
model  ourselves on the models with which we imagine God, the metaphor of 
350 For a good summary of this debate see Gregory Peterson 'Minds and Bodies: Human and Divine' 
Zygon vol. 32, no. 2 (June 1997) pp189-206
351 John Polkinghorne The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker  Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press 1996
352' Whither Panentheism' Zygon, vol. 36, no. 3 (September 2001) pp395-406
353 The Body of God p145
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breath rather than mind might help us to support, rather than control, life in all its 
forms. Thus, in a spirit theology, we might see ourselves as united with all other 
living creatures through the breath that moves through all parts of the body, rather 
than as the demilords who order and control nature.'354
God, then, is both spirit (transcendent) and the body of the world (immanent). 
This  is  a deft  move on McFague's  part,  but  it  raises  the concern (for McFague)  of 
dualism.  Spirit  is  a category that she rejected in Models of God as we saw in the 
previous chapter.  In The Body of God a doctrine of spirit, including the Holy Spirit, is 
recovered.  However McFague is well aware of the dualistic overtones of this language 
and seeks to present an understanding of spirit that is grounded in material reality.  On 
this understanding,
'Spirit is a wide-ranging, multidimensional term with many meanings built upon 
its physical base as the breath of life. We speak of a person's spirit, their vigor, 
courage, or strength; of team spirit, the collective energy of people at play; of the 
spirit of '76 or the spirit of Tienanmen Square, the vitality, grit, and resolution of a 
people banding together in a common cause to oppose oppression; of a spirited 
horse or the spirit of a sacred grove — animals, trees mountains can also have 
spirit.  All of these connotations are possible because of the primary meaning of 
spirit as the breath of life.'355
For McFague, this understanding of spirit not only avoids dualism by rooting 
spirit  in  the  material,  but  also,  for  the  same  reason,  provides  an  account  of 
transcendence  that  is  accessed  through  the  immanent  and  everyday.   This  is  an 
immanent transcendence.
Finally it is important to understand that both spirit and body are metaphors, it is 
354 Ibid.
355 The Body of God p143
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not that God  is spirit and that the world is metaphorically his/her body, but that both 
terms are equally metaphorical.
5.4 Christology and the Body.
Simply presenting the world as God's body does not itself imply any particular 
ethic.   Neither  does  evolutionary  biology.   Thus  McFague  turns  to  the  'Christic 
Paradigm', a reading of the Christian narrative and especially the gospel narratives of 
Jesus, to provide both a scope and a shape to the body model.  However she does so in a 
way that has considerable consequences for traditional Christology.
         'McFague is explicit that her focus on incarnation, God's embodiment, is intended 
to meet two priorities.  The first is to,
'relativise the incarnation in relation to Jesus of Nazareth and the second is to 
maximize it in relation to the cosmos. In other words, the proposal is to consider 
Jesus  as  paradigmatic  of  what  we  find  everywhere:  everything  that  is  is  the 
sacrament of God (the universe as God's body).'356
The first priority, relativising the incarnation in relation to Christ, is intended to 
address what she calls the 'scandal of uniqueness', the idea that,
'claims that God is embodied in one place and one place only: in the man Jesus of 
Nazareth. He and he alone is 'the image of the invisible God' (Col. 1:15). The 
source, power, and goal of the universe is known through and only through a first-
century Mediterranean carpenter. The creator and redeemer of the fifteen-billion-
year history of the universe with its hundred billion galaxies (and their billions of 
stars and planets) is available only in a thirty-year span of one human being's life 
356 The Body of God p162
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on planet earth.'357
However she does add,
'Here and there we find [God's] presence erupting in special ways.  Jesus is one 
such place for Christians.'358
Her second priority, to maximise the Incarnation in relation to the cosmos, is 
very much shaped by the traditional character of the incarnation in Christ.  That is, the 
universal  incarnation  is  given  its  shape  and  scope,  its  structure  and  detail,  by  the 
qualities exhibited by Jesus, (or more accurately, McFague's reading of Jesus).  This 
reading of Jesus is not substantially different from that which informs all her works and 
that  has been considered previously,  so this ground will not be covered again here. 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  scope  of  the  body  is  universal  and  yet  its  distinctive 
characteristic is that it is especially and explicitly inclusive of the poor and needy, and 
its shape is a bias towards the outcast and the oppressed based on the key themes of 
Jesus' ministry: destabilising parables, table fellowship and healing.359
 What is important is that McFague takes the universality and inclusiveness she 
finds in Jesus and extends it to be inclusive of nature, of all bodies, as well as human 
ones.  In this scheme, nature is seen as the 'new poor'.  However this statement requires 
two important qualifications.  Firstly the status of nature as poor does not mean that 'the 
poor' as traditionally understood are replaced, only that they are joined by nature, or that 
part of nature that is oppressed, as the ethical focus of Christianity.  Secondly:
'Nature as the new poor does not mean that we should sentimentalize nature or 
slip into such absurdities as speaking of 'oppressed mosquitoes or rocks'.  Rather, 
357 Ibid. 159
358 Ibid. p162
359 For a fuller exploration of how the body McFague proposes can be better shaped to include a fuller 
range of human bodies, and especially those with a disability, see Deborah Creamer 'Including all 
bodies in the Body of God' Journal of Religion, Disability and Health Vol 9 Issue 4 January 2006 pp 
55-69 
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nature as the new poor means that we have made nature poor.  It is a comment not 
about the workings of natural selection but about human sin.  It is a cold hard look 
at what one part of nature, we human beings, have done to the rest of it … Nature 
is  not  necessarily and as  such poor;  it  is  so only because of  one species,  our 
own.'360
Despite saying that this is not a comment on natural selection, McFague does see 
this bias to the poor as not only a 'scandal' by conventional human standards but also by 
evolutionary ones.   Now evolution,  she  says,  can  be  cultural  and social  as  well  as 
biological  and in  this  sense we may choose to side with outcasts  and see this  as a 
continuous part of our evolution.361  However this inclusivity goes beyond the utilitarian 
base  that  could  be  justified  by  this  evolutionary  view;  a  view  that  would  see  us 
exhibiting  solidarity  only with  those  weaker  bodies  that  we  needed to  survive  and 
flourish.  Ultimately she says,
'At  this  point,  I  believe  we  have  no  choice  but  to  admit  that  the  radical 
inclusiveness that  is  at  the heart  of  Christian faith,  especially inclusion of the 
oppressed, is not compatible with evolution, even cultural evolution. For as we 
have seen, its view of sinful human nature deepens the notion of the ecological 
sinner:  the  bloated  self  refusing  to  share.  Hence,  even  the  best  of  cultural 
evolution, from a Christian perspective, is lacking, for we 'naturally' construct our 
worlds to benefit ourselves, including only those who are useful to us.'362 
McFague also sees Christianity as offering another distinctive contribution to the 
suffering of creation.  This is the image of the Cosmic Christ – the risen Jesus, which is 
the Body of God interpreted Christologically.  This not only means that the 'character' of 
360 Models of God. pp165-6
361 The Body of God p148, Super, Natural Christians p17
362 Ibid. p173
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the world as God's body is an identification with the pain of the oppressed, suffering and 
outcast, but it also begins to unite transcendent and immanent ideas of salvation. 
'The metaphor of the Cosmic Christ suggests that the cosmos is moving  toward 
salvation and that this salvation is taking place in creation.'363
The addition of the resurrection and the Cosmic Christ to the common creation 
story evidently raises  the  question  of  eschatology and so  this  subject  must  now be 
considered.
5.5 Eschatology and the Body.
McFague's eschatology in  The Body of God begins in the light of the common 
creation story with the observation that, 
'we have been decentered as the point and goal of creation and recentered as God's 
partners in helping creation to grow and prosper in our tiny part of God's body.'364 
This is a move that is welcomed by James Moore who points out that McFague's 
reading  of  cosmology as  decentering  is  fundamentally  different  from that  of  many 
cosmologists  including  Tipler  and  even  Paul  Davies  who  see  teleology rather  than 
organic equality as lying behind nature.  Moore finds their readings to be patriarchal.365  
However other writers, while not necessarily wishing to make humanity the goal 
and purpose of the universe, find a flaw in the extreme nature of the idea of universal 
equality when applied directly to ethics.  For example Grizzle and Barrett say,
'Our particular concern is that in their rush to do away with 'hierarchical' thinking 
and 'dualisms'  of  all  kinds,  eco-feminists  seem to champion an almost  blanket 
363 Ibid. p180
364 Ibid. p197
365 James Moore 'Cosmology and the Reemergence of Patriarchy' Zygon 30 no. 4 Dec 1995 pp613-634
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notion that all components of creation are equal.'366 
They also say, 
'Clearly, God pronounces that creation is 'good' repeatedly in Genesis 1. And we 
in no way intend to trivialize these passages. However, they should not be taken 
to mean that everything about creation is to be valued and protected and simply 
declared 'good' in an unqualified way. For instance, should we strive to protect the 
AIDS or Ebola viruses so they do not go extinct? Are all species really equal and 
'good'?'367
If further evidence of these ethical difficulties is needed, practical examples of 
the difficulties of balancing the competing needs of different organisms, even when a 
theological commitment to environmental equality rather than human-centeredness is 
present, the reader is referred to Cooper's 1995 case studies.368
However ethics are at the heart of McFague's eschatology as with the rest of her 
theology.  We see this in an important passage, in which she defines eschatology as she 
understands it.
'Eschatology can mean many things. Often in the Christian tradition it has been 
concerned with death and the afterlife, with ‘last things’ such as judgment, hell 
and heaven, the second coming. But it  can also mean the breaking in  of new 
possibilities, of hope for a new creation. It can mean living from a vision for a 
different present based upon a new future. The future serves as both a goad and a 
goal, a goad with which to criticize the reigning paradigm and a goal to encourage 
366 Raymond E Grizzle and Christopher B Barrett  'The One Body of Christian Environmentalism' 
Zygon 33 no.2 June 1998 p241. They also provide here a summary of other attempts to theologically 
motivate environmentalism by using more traditional theological motifs and categories.  It is 
significant that such projects are possible since this calls into question the radical rejection, rather than 
reinterpretation of such traditional elements in McFague's work.
367 Ibid. p240
368 Nigel S Cooper 'Wildlife Conservation in Churchyards: a case study in ethical judgements.' 
Biodiversity and Conservation 4 1995 pp916-928
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us to bring into being a new one. We do not have a Utopia, an ideal community to 
which we can point where the new vision is being realized, where things are the 
way they ought  to  be;  but  we can  have  an  ‘Atopia,’ an imagined world both 
prophetic and alluring from which we can judge what is wrong with the paradigm 
that has created the present crisis on our planet.'369
It is clear then, that when considering eschatology, McFague presses her focus 
on ethics for the here and now particularly strongly.  This results in a strong ethical 
vision towards which human beings are able, and expected, to work, with the qualifier 
that we are partners with the creator and saviour of the world rather than bearing the 
entire burden ourselves.  However as significant as what McFague does say in these 
passages is what she does not say.  It is clear that she seeks a vision of the future which 
is not in any way causally discontinuous with the present.  That is, her eschatology does 
not include any divine actions that fall outside the processes recognised by science or 
are unable to be affected by human beings.  Other eschatologies, dependent upon the 
intervention of God in an act of New Creation in some way discontinuous with the 
present creation, could be seen to lessen the imperative for urgent human action. It is 
likely that McFague avoids them for precisely this reason.  However this move does 
limit the scope of what her eschatology can critique.  Specifically, only those things 
which can potentially be changed by human effort and cooperation can be critiqued by 
her account of eschatology.  The ability of more traditional eschatologies to critique the 
very nature of the underlying structures of creation, structures that we are powerless to 
change, is lost from her presentation.  McFague's models may then be arguably less well 
equipped to give voice to those human experiences of powerlessness and alienation, or 
cry for justice, in the face of situations that cannot be changed by human will or effort – 
such as in the face of death.  McFague herself may well argue, we might imagine, that  
369 Ibid. pp198-9
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this is a price worth paying, given the urgent need she feels to effect change in the areas 
in which human action can make a difference.
McFague's theology does touch on the underlying structures of nature in places, 
for  example when she contrasts  the Christian bias to  the poor and outcast  with the 
workings of natural selection, but in the general case, an ability to critique the inner 
workings  of  nature  is  exchanged  for  an  ability  to  expound  a  direction  for  a 
contemporary ethical vision.  This is a prime example of a problem already identified in 
her work, namely a narrowing of the ability of the Christian tradition to address the full 
range of human experience and concern.  Traditional models, and the concerns that they 
address, are replaced (not supplemented) by models which have only been constructed 
to treat particular ethical issues and address particular, limited contexts.  Because this 
results in a Christianity that is narrower and therefore excludes certain concerns, it can 
be questioned whether this is fully consistent with her stated desire to provide a more 
inclusive  Christian  tradition.   It  verges  upon a  hegemony of  new models  over  and 
against the old. 
There is a connected problem which McFague is aware of and this is that the 
ethical  vision  she  advocates  may  not  be  achievable  in  reality.   She  imagines  that 
someone might ask,
'The decay of our planet is probably inevitable, so we might as well just accept it.  
What real chance do we have of turning things around?'370
Clearly McFague cannot place too much weight or emphasis upon the action of 
God in turning things around.   She does say,
'We are not the creators or saviors of creation, only the partners of the creator and 
savior. God, in the Christian paradigm, is on the side of the oppressed to liberate, 
heal and include them. That is God's main activity -  and ours – in relation to 
370 The Body of God p207
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creation.  God,  our  embodied  God,  also  suffers  with  all  suffering  bodies.  And 
beyond even suffering we live with the hope against hope that defeat and death 
are  not  the  last  word,  but  that  even  the  least  body in  the  universe,  the  most 
insignificant, most vulnerable, most outcast one will participate in the resurrection 
of the body.'371
However she also says,
'One has to get up in the morning and look in the mirror. It may come to nothing 
more than that.  But one does have to get up in the morning and keep going. How 
to do that? Throughout the centuries Christians have typically done so by being 
deeply rooted, personally and daily rooted, in God.'372 
Thus McFague connects God and spirituality to her eschatology without making 
the latter entirely or primarily an action of God in which we are not involved.
Now,  considered  over  cosmic  time-scales  and  in  relation  to  contemporary 
cosmology,  the  death  of  the  planet,  and probably the  universe  as  a  whole,  appears 
inevitable.  Whether this has any practical impact upon life as it is lived now is open to 
debate but the closest McFague comes to addressing this problem constructively is to 
say that as the world comes from God, it also grows towards God.  However such far-
future speculation is a long way from McFague's desire to focus on the here and now 
and the present features and challenges of our environment.
Connecting together the strands of McFague's Christology and Eschatology, she 
seems in  much of  her  presentation  to  treat  Christ  as  simply paradigmatic  of  God's 
universal  incarnation,  and  therefore  has  been  criticised  for  'Christifying  creation'.373 
371 Ibid. pp201-2
372 Ibid. p208
373 David A Scott in Kinmel (ed.) op. cit. pp237-256 p253
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However  there  is  an  ambiguity  in  her  Christology  that  perhaps  arises  from  her 
awareness of the ambiguities of suffering inherent in the evolutionary process.  In one 
passage she describes the resurrection as 'freeing' Christ from his body 'to be present in 
and to all bodies'.374  This would seem to suggest a role for the cosmic Christ beyond 
that of illustrative paradigm, but this role is not expounded in any detail.  It also hints at 
an element of discontinuity in the God-world relationship brought about through the 
resurrection, in line with more traditional theology, but, perhaps because McFague is 
keen to locate redemption entirely within the present world and human action, again this 
discontinuity remains to be unpacked.
McWilliams has provided an extensive analysis of these features of McFague's 
work, aided by a comparison with Moltmann's use of 'Cosmic Christ' Christology.375  
He notes that Moltmann argues,
'If we were to confine the meaning of the resurrection within narrower 
boundaries ... whether existentially in the faith of the individual or historically in 
the hope of humanity, Christology would remain bogged down in the unreconciled 
nature of this world ... It is only a cosmic Christology which completes and 
perfects the existential and historical Christology.'376
McWilliams follows Moltmann not only in seeing a more traditional eschatology 
as necessary in the face of the ambiguities of evolution,377 but as both a guard against 
despair and as a motivation.  It is the answer to McFague's search for a reason to 'get out 
of  bed  in  the  morning'.   Far  from resulting  in  a  disinterested  or  negligent  attitude 
374 Body of God p179
375 Warren McWilliams 'Christic Paradigm and Cosmic Christ: Ecological Christology in the Theologies 
of Sallie McFague and Jürgen Moltmann' Perspectives in Religious Studies (Journal of the NABPR) 
25 1998 pp341-355
376 Jürgen Moltmann The Coming God: Christian Eschatology Minn: Fortress Press 1996 p261 cited in 
McWilliams p347
377 'A Christus evolutor without a Christus redemptor is nothing other than a cruel Christus selector, a 
historical world-judge without compassion for the weak, and a breeder of life uninterested in the 
victims.' Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ: Christology in Messianic Dimensions trans. M Kohl 
Minn: Fortress Press 1990 p296 quoted in McWilliams p352
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towards creation, an understanding of Christology that relates Cosmic Christ to both 
creation and redemption as well as to the life and teaching of Jesus of Nazareth may 
help fill in the gaps left by McFague's ambiguities in this area.
This would support McWilliams' contention that 'Mature evangelical theology 
has  not  so  much  been  anti-nature  or  anti-ecology  as  neglectful  of  the  theological 
resources in its heritage for a green theology.'378
It is arguable though, that while McFague's work is helpful in providing  new 
resources for such a theology, she too has overlooked some of the resources present in 
her heritage. 
5.6 Assessment of the 'God's Body' model.
McFague's account is valuable in a number of regards.  Particularly praiseworthy 
is  her  attempt  to  take  seriously  the  statements  of  contemporary  science  without 
committing a theology entirely to any one particular presentation of this.  Secondly the 
ethical imperatives produced by such a theology are surely to be welcomed and the 
focus on bodies and the material is an important and timely contribution to a tradition 
that has a chequered history in these areas.  Thirdly, McFague is very likely correct in 
asserting  that  the  modelling  of  the  world  after  organic  rather  than  mechanistic 
metaphors is both appropriate and fruitful.
The objections and questions raised here, then, focus on two key issues.  Firstly, 
accepting a model of the world as  a body, we should ask whether McFague's ethic is 
dependent upon the world being specifically God's body.  Secondly, we should consider 
further the question of the Christian status of the model.  
378 McWilliams p354
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In relation to the observations in previous discussions concerning the role of 
concepts vs models, again it can be seen that the strengths of McFague's presentation 
are at the conceptual level.  On this occasion, this is very much linked to her desire to 
avoid modelling the world after any specific body; and this out of concern that neither 
the particularity and diversity of bodies in the world be lost from view, or that one body 
become idealised and deified over and above others.  This means that the 'body' referred 
to in the model ‘the world as God’s body’ is an abstract concept of body, separated from 
its imagistic base and separated from the physical properties of particular bodies.  It is 
not  a  case  of  mapping  ‘associated  commonplaces’ as  using  a  model  would  be  in 
McFague’s  understanding,  since this  abstract  body has  very few defined features to 
map.  Again it is an exploration of the concepts associated with being ‘embodied’ and 
‘embodying’. 
In the light of this we can see that, in relation to ongoing questions concerning 
the way models are applied, The Body of God is largely an exploration of the theme of 
embodiment  and  the  kinds  and  needs  of  bodies,  rather  than  the  explication  of  a 
correspondence model of the world and its relationship to God.  This is particularly 
evident in McFague's article 'The Earth is a Body: Seeking a new paradigm'379 in which 
the earth is modelled as 'a body' rather than explicitly 'God's body' and yet much of what 
McFague seeks to achieve is possible on the basis of this more general category. 
Indeed the main point of direct correspondence McFague envisages through the 
model  is  the  relationship  between  spirit  and  body,  standing  as  a  metaphor  for  the 
immanence  and  transcendence  of  God.   However  despite  the  advantages  of  this 
approach that were seen above, this aspect is perhaps the least coherent and consistent 
part of McFague's presentation.  It is undermined especially by the very contemporary 
scientific and non-dualistic approach that McFague draws upon.  However widely she 
379 'The Earth is a Body: Seeking a New Paradigm' Voices Across Boundaries 2004 Fall pp11-13
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draws upon images for the idea of spirit, from physical breath to psychological states of 
inspiration or courage, each example is, in human experience and understanding, an 
example in which the spirit is dependent upon the body.380  Further, although McFague 
does  not  address  this  point  herself,  the  common  creation  story  can  arguably  most 
naturally be read to suggest that spirit evolved out of matter.  This may be understood to 
imply that spirit is a higher level emergent property of matter.381  This would not be a 
problem  for  McFague's  anthropology  or  indeed  her  theology  at  any  other  point. 
However it does not correspond well to, in fact it is in direct opposition to, her theology 
of God as the source of all being. In her particular model of the world as God's body, the 
spirit is not the  source of the body.  Instead, on this presentation, it appears that the 
opposite is true.  The combination of ‘the world as God’s body’ and ‘God as spirit’ 
suggests that God becomes transcendent out of the world at some point after it began. 
This  radical  process  theology is  not,  however,  the  standpoint  McFague is  trying  to 
support.382
McFague,  in  common  with  other  panentheists  also  faces  problems  over  the 
questions  of  evil  and  suffering.   B  J  Carroll  argues  that  McFague's  metaphorical 
identification of God and the world must imply a degree of resemblance between God 
and the world, quoting McFague to this effect.383  Carroll goes on to quote extensively 
from  Annie  Dillard.   Dillard  employs  an  attention  epistemology  very  much  like 
McFague's in order to discern the properties of the god reflected in nature.  But Carroll 
380 A point made briefly in Southgate et al (eds.) God Humanity and the Cosmos: A Textbook in Science 
and Religion Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1999 p216
381 This is the view taken, for example, by Warren Brown and Nancy Murphy in their articles, 
respectively 'Cognitive Contributions to Soul' and 'Nonreductive Physicalism: Philosophical Issues' in 
W Brown, N Murphy and H Malony (eds.) What happened to the Soul Minneapolis, MN: Ausberg 
Fortress 1998
382 McFague is doubtless aware of this difficulty to some degree since she remarks that God is 
'embodied, but not necessarily or totally' (The Body of God p150) but this move simply muddies the 
waters since it is not clear what it means to be embodied less than totally or what contribution this 
makes to the model under consideration.
383 B J Carroll 'Models of God or Models of Us' Encounter 52 (Spring) 1991 pp183-196 citing (p185) 
McFague Models of God p135 '[the world] will be like God ... all phenomena in reality have the 
potential for reflecting the deity.'  
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sees Dillard as doing so while paying particular attention to the evil and suffering innate 
within nature.  Carroll ends by concluding that, 'In nature the emphasis is on what is 
rather than what ought to be,'384 and argues that the same must therefore be true of God.
Carroll  acknowledges that McFague could argue that God  endures such evil, 
rather  than  causes it.   But,  I  would  argue,  while  a  distinction  between  personal 
experience and body can be appropriate for human beings (we experience our bodies 
acting beyond our control or in ways which do us harm or cause us pain) translating this 
distinction to God may well have undesired theological consequences.  It may imply 
that God is at the mercy of his/her ‘body’ in a similar sense to the way we find ourselves 
at the mercy of ours.   We may be left with the feeling that such a close identification 
between the world and God is undesirable theologically, especially if there are other 
ways  of  imaging  the  empathy  between  God  and  the  suffering  of  the  world.   For 
example,  traditional  models  such  as  that  of  the  incarnation  of  God  in  Jesus  might 
provide a starting point for reflection about God that is able to find God identifying 
with,  and  participating  in,  human  experiences  of  embodiment.   This  may enable  a 
conceptual theological exploration of the themes of embodiment, and yet still allow a 
separation between God and world to take into account the problem of evil.   
Moving on to another key concern of our project,  the judgement concerning 
‘what is and ought to be’ in nature is very significant because it draws attention back to 
the role of eschatology and its importance in assisting with the theological task of both 
affirming the value of, and yet at the same time critiquing, the 'way the world is'.
If the idea that the world is a body is useful (as it has been argued here to be), 
but the idea that the body in question is God's body contradicts the priority of God over 
the creation and the otherness of the creation from God, the question becomes whether 
much is lost from McFague's theology if the world is held to be simply a body in some 
384 Ibid. p194
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other relationship with God. 
Many commentators385 find an identification, albeit metaphorical, between God 
and the world to be contrary to the Judeo-Christian tradition which is often at pains 
(particularly  in  the  Old  Testament)  to  separate  God  from creation  in  contrast  with 
pantheistic religions.  However the precise God-world relationship envisaged by Old 
Testament writers is difficult  to pin down simply,  and McFague is not suggesting a 
simple  or  literal  identification  between the  two.   The objection  here  is  different.  It 
centres on McFague’s consistency between her own views on the priority of God as 
source of being and her view of the ontological dependence of the world on God.
Firstly then it should be asked, what role does the identification of the body of 
the world as specifically God's body play in McFague's theology?  Secondly,  would 
another identification of this body in relation to God be more consistent.
Despite the apparent centrality of the designation 'God's body', an analysis of the 
works themselves shows that, other than imaging God's immanence, this designation 
only plays three roles.  One is to universalise the action of God (this will be returned to 
again in the following section).  The second is to place the category of 'body' among the 
ranks of privileged metaphors that can refer to God.  The third is to underscore the value 
of the world by equating it with that which has ultimate value.  
While the use of the metaphor 'Body of God' for the world does help in meeting 
these three aims it is not the case that they can only be met by the use of this particular 
metaphor.  An alternative metaphor which demonstrates this will be considered shortly, 
but  first  the last  of  the three requires  closer  examination.   As just  stated,  McFague 
models the world as God's body to emphasise the value, the sacredness of the earth, as a 
move to ground an ethic of nature which is not based on the usefulness or benefits of 
385 E.g. See Ryan Klassen 'Metaphorical Theology: An Evangelical Appropriation' Quodlibet Journal 
Volume 7 Number 2  April - June 2005
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nature towards humanity but on the intrinsic value of the things themselves.  Indeed one 
suspects that this ethical imperative is her chief reason for using this model in the first 
place.  However it is therefore strange that at one level the use of this model undermines 
this aim entirely.  Ultimately what is being held to be valuable in this model is God and 
creation is only held to be valuable inasmuch as it is considered to be part of God.  But 
McFague's contention is that the world and the multitude of diverse bodies it comprises 
are themselves valuable, in and for themselves.  The model of the world as God's body 
could  be  seen  to  work  against the  ascribing  of  independent  value  to  the  world  by 
implying that for something to be valuable it must be in some sense be God.  Ironically, 
so long as it is not held to be the case that 'what is not God is not valuable' accounts 
which do not identify God and the world (even metaphorically) offer the better chance 
of valuing the world in and for itself rather than subsuming the value of the world into 
the value of God. McFague seeks a Christianity that truly expresses the value of the 
Other.  However surely this value can flow from God without what it flows to having to 
be held to be God.  Wouldn't this be in fact a more accurate mapping of the model of 
God as Mother?  That which a mother brings into being is not herself, though it is of 
herself  and related intrinsically to  her.   Her  child  has  value in  part  because  of  this 
relationship but also because of its own intrinsic value as an 'other' to her.  It is valued 
because it is other, not because (or not only because) it 'of her'.
Therefore the 'body' may be elevated to a sacred position, or be a subject of 
theological reflection and value, without embodying God within the world itself.  This 
may be done for example by reconsidering traditional metaphors such as 'This is my 
body'  or  'The  Body of  Christ'.   Further,  in  a  response to  McFague,  Pui-Lan Kwok 
observes how McFague has partially deployed traditional Christian categories such as 
incarnation but has not followed this through, for example in her use of the Bible.386 
386 Kwok Pui-Lan 'Response to Sallie McFague' in Hessel and Ruether (eds) Christianity and Ecology 
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Kwok demonstrates how the Judeo-Christian scriptures can be read in a way much more 
sympathetic to McFague's cause.  In particular he cites the 'cosmic' aspects of Paul's 
theology and the importance of 'the land'  for understanding the Bible.  Alternatively, 
other metaphors for God as embodied may be used. Therefore the principal functions of 
the Body of God model may be met in other ways or by other models.  
One such way is provided by James Hart. Hart's  suggestion  is  especially 
interesting because it was written as a response to McFague's Models of God.  His work 
is  based  on  a  phenomenological  approach  and  seeks  to  provide  an  illuminating 
'interpretive  paraphrase'  of  the  internal  logic  of  McFague's  approach.   Thus  he  is 
attempting to express McFague's meaning through his own representation of her models 
and it is significant that he makes the following changes.  Attempting to re-encapsulate 
McFague's understanding of the God-world relationship, he writes,
'Here the speculative analogical correlation is: God is to the natural world as a 
woman is to her pregnant body and the perspective of creaturely sensibility is to 
nature qua God's body as the third-party perspective is to the body of the pregnant 
woman. 
'First, the one whom I perceive to bear a baby in the womb is present to me as one 
whose life houses and produces another. For the third observing party the mother 
is present (appresented) and the child she is bearing is made present not through 
the  third  party's  empathic  perception  of  the  infant  Other  but  through  the 
perception  (apperception)  of  the  mothers  bodily  sensations  and  empathic 
perception  (appresentation)  ...  That  is,  here  the  mother  may  say,  I  have  a 
presentation of something through the contact of which I am contacted,  in the 
touching of whom I am touched; and yet my touching (contiguity) is not only a 
Cambridge Ma: Harvard University Press 2000 pp47-50
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perceiving of what is there but is creative of what is there.'387
In somewhat less technical language, the essence of Hart's proposal is to view 
God as a pregnant mother, with the world in utero but also with the human observer as 
an observing (external) third party.   Setting aside for a moment the obtuseness of this 
apparently 'exterior view from within the womb', God is in this model present to the 
world as a mother is present to the child in the womb (and vice versa) and human (or 
other perceiving) agents have the perspective of an external observer discerning the life 
that is 'housed and produced within' the mother. 
While Hart's presentation is potentially open to criticism for separating humanity 
from the rest of nature and for somewhat counter-intuitively seeming to suggest that our 
perception is  firstly of God and secondarily of nature,  it  remains a subtly reworked 
variant on the image of the world developing in utero with respect to God, retaining the 
possibility of human agents working with the Mother to bring creation to full birth.  
Now, McFague indicates awareness of models of this type, citing both Grace 
Jantzen and Arthur Peacocke388 but does not explore them herself.  This is because she 
interprets the image of the world as God's child to refer to a child already born and such 
an  image  as  Jantzen’s  and  Peacocke’s,  she  might  argue,  would  not  combine 
transcendence and immanence sufficiently for her.  However in her presentation she 
also equates the child with the Mother by saying that God gives birth to God's body, 
giving rise to the problems with preserving transcendence, or at least Otherness, already 
noted earlier.  
It would seem altogether more satisfactory to remain simply with an  in utero 
model  without  Hart's  change  of  perspective  between  'creaturely  sensibility'  and  the 
relationship between creation and God.  Thus the creaturely perspective would also be 
387 James Hart 'Models of God:Evangel-logic' Religion and Intellectual Life p29-44 p34,35
388 See The Body of God p255 n.27
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an internal perspective – that is an appresention both of the rest of the self (child) to and 
by itself and an apperception of the context (mother) which is present to it as both house 
and means of production, as a creative touching.
The  aim here  though  is  not  to  explore  various  in  utero  models  in  detail  or 
compare them with each other but simply to draw attention to the ways in which such 
models might also meet McFague's aims whilst avoiding some of the problems already 
mentioned.
Firstly,  these models grant a degree of autonomous identity and value to the 
world  without   making this  absolute.   This  helps  with  problems of  theodicy while 
retaining the sacramentality of the world. (God's child is expected to be like but not 
identical  to  God,  empathy  and  co-suffering  are  allowed  for  without  the  problems 
associated with an identification of agents, especially in relation to sin).389 It also avoids 
the confusions concerning whether the world is ontologically dependent on God or vice 
versa.  
Secondly, these models underscore the vulnerability of the creation in a way that 
seeing it as God's body does not.  Finally, though perhaps most tenuously, these models 
offer  a  possible  context  for  a  more  robust  eschatology with  the  image of  the child 
growing towards its birth into a new mode of existence.
Thus  there  are  alternative  models  which  can  meet  McFague's  aims,  perhaps 
better than her own model.  This important finding is significant for consideration of the 
Christian status of her theology because it separates to some extent on the one hand her 
ethical vision and concern with bodies and the material from, on the other, this specific 
model of the world as God’s body.  This is relevant because the application of this 
389 See Peterson 2001 p400 'When I sin, God does not sin as well.  Yet it would seem that the locative 
metaphor would say otherwise .  Whatever the part does, the whole would do as well.  If the world is 
enveloped in God, the world and its occupants stand to lose their true distinctiveness.'
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model results in the same kinds of losses to the tradition observed previously.  
Despite the fact  that  Body of God  is  a  more 'orthodox'  presentation than the 
works  that  immediately  preceded  it,  the  narrowing  of  focus  of  the  tradition  that  it 
implies are still significant.  In part, as we saw above, these restrictions are in the area of 
eschatology.  The vision that she offers in this area is essentially an ethical vision only 
and  not  one  that  offers  any specific  grounds  for  hope,  despite  assertions  that  God 
participates in the realisation of this vision and that the world is growing 'towards God'. 
But perhaps the most significant departure from traditional Christian theology is the 
reduction of the Incarnation to a special case of a general incarnation.
We  should  remember  that  McFague  grounds  her  own  methodology  in  the 
‘metaphorical tension’ she finds embodied in the person and work of Jesus and holds 
him  to  be  unsubstitutable for  Christianity  not  simply  illustrative  of  a  universal 
phenomenon.   In contrast here, her presentation of a universal embodiment of God 
threatens to reduce the concept of incarnation to near meaninglessness through over-
generalisation, in effect erasing its claim to be unsubstitutable.  Incarnation traditionally 
has a precise meaning – to indwell human flesh.  To expand the category of incarnation 
to include all entities within the universe is to lose most of the specificity and hence the 
meaning of the term.  Hence it threatens the status of the root-metaphor of Christianity 
which she defined by drawing the  particular relationship between God and world of 
which Jesus stands as a metaphor.  Since this account of Jesus defines the Christian 
paradigm to a significant extent in McFague’s view our concern is whether it is possible 
for  McFague  to  remain  within  the  Christian  tradition  in  her  own  terms  while 
maintaining these positions.   Perhaps this is another reason for her move away from a 
relationship with a root-metaphor as sufficient criterion for models to be regarded as 
Christian.
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Further, the tradition has not only had the image of incarnation with which to 
talk about God's immanence and presence.  It has also had the indwelling of the Spirit 
within individuals as well as incarnate in Christ, with these not being identical, although 
having some analogies and links with each other.  Again the model of the Church as the 
Body of Christ, and in some traditions the Eucharist as an embodiment of Christ, are 
other  forms  of  non-incarnational  embodiment  to  be  found  in  traditional  theologies. 
There are further images of the presence of God throughout creation which are again of 
a different type.  Incarnation cannot be reduced to presence.  Indeed there is much more 
to a theology of God's immanence than simply presence and absence.  
Therefore to limit the Incarnation to Jesus is not necessarily to deny any form of 
embodied presence at other times and places or any revelatory presence in other people. 
However  to  universalise  the  incarnation  is  to  lose  the  particularity  of  Jesus,  when 
preserving particularity in the face of over-generalisation is one of the things McFague 
herself is advocating.
Now it is true that McFague does not intend this (or any of her models) to be the 
only model.  She says 
'The model of the world as God's body is meant as a corrective to the tradition, not 
as a substitute for it.'390
And
'...the point is certainly not to claim our new vision has all the answers and to pit it 
against other positions.'391
However  the  methodology  she  employs,  and  particularly  her  sweeping 
reinterpretations  or  disposals  of  traditional  models  and  approaches,  does  not  seem 
entirely consistent with these statements. This may well be because, as we have seen, 
390 'The World as God's Body' p56 
391 The Body of God pp204-5
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McFague, especially in this phase of her work, does not apply any definite criterion or 
method to insure against these losses.  Thus it appears that the question of the internal 
consistency of McFague's work on these matters centres around the question of how a 
theology can be heuristic  and experimental,  adapting to  new contexts and including 
unheard or marginalised voices while still remaining within the Christian tradition.  This 
is  a  difficult  question,  which  touches  on  a  great  many  contested  issues  outside 
McFague's  own  work,  so  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  her  work  shows  a  degree  of 
weakness here.  However we shall see later in this chapter that her works, and especially 
the most recent, do in fact offer the possibility of beginning to reconcile some of these 
difficulties.  It will be shown that there are other currents in her theology, especially in 
its earliest and latest phases which, being incorporated into her methodology more fully, 
may answer many of the concerns raised here. 
5.7 The coherence of God's Body with Mother, Lover and Friend.
Briefly,  before  concluding  the  discussion  of  the  Body  of  God  model, 
consideration must  be given to the way in which this  model  relates to those in  the 
previous chapter, in the light of the findings above.
McFague uses the world as God's Body as the 'context' for her models of God as 
Mother, Lover and Friend.  In practice this means that God's Body is the partner or 
recipient in each of these models.  Thus God is the Mother of God's Body, the Lover of 
God's Body and the Friend of God's body.
McFague is aware both of the paradoxical nature of the first of these composite 
models and the dangers of divine narcissism inherent in the second two, but she makes 
this move anyway for the following reasons.  Firstly she is concerned to move away 
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from individualism and the exclusivity and privatisation of relationships with God that 
can result from the application of the Mother, Lover and Friend models primarily or 
solely to the individual.  Secondly, (and she is not explicit about this), such a move is 
required by that part of her ethic which prioritises the well being of the whole over the 
well being of specific individuals.392 Thirdly she wishes to apply the models to creation 
itself and hence underscore its value.
However again we can see that these points would be as well made if God was 
simply Mother, Lover and Friend of the world considered in and of itself rather than the 
world considered as God's Body.  This would avoid the objections McFague is aware of 
and also avoid the risk of, ironically, losing the world from the model at all, with the 
image become God as the Lover of God and so on.
5.8. McFague’s most recent thought.
Thus  far  the  discussions  in  preceding  chapters  have  followed  McFague's 
published work in a roughly chronological fashion, since for much of her career she 
herself moved from method to application in a reasonably straightforward way from 
Speaking in Parables  to  The Body of God.  We have seen that McFague's lifetime of 
work, while generally having progressed coherently as a single project, shows a degree 
of change in understanding and emphasis over time.  Therefore examination is needed 
of her most recent works, Life Abundant and  A New Climate for Theology to determine 
to what extent these demonstrate any change in position on the areas of concern and to 
392 We see this in her treatment of abortion where she says, 'the current battle over the right to abortion in 
the United States, when seen in light of our new paradigm, becomes an issue not of the sacredness of 
every human embryo, as it is in the individualistic, anthropocentric point of view, but of two other 
broader and deeper bodily concerns: the right of each child born to be wanted and to have the 
essentials for a healthy, satisfying life as well as the right of women to control their own bodies. The 
new paradigm widens the perspective on abortion from a narrow, absolutist one of human embryonic 
rights to the well-being of those born in addition to the well-being of those who must care for those 
born.' The Body of God p204
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see whether in them McFague has herself suggested any moves towards answering the 
objections considered to this point. Particular focus is needed on the question of the 
relationship between McFague's theology and the broader Christian tradition.
Whereas  McFague's  earlier  works  place  theological  method  under  the 
microscope, one of her later works, Life Abundant (2002), takes more of a 'wide-angle' 
approach.  Being perhaps her least technical work to that date, this book is also by far 
the most personal and gives the best overall view of McFague's developing personal 
motivations and theological beliefs, not only as a  theologian but as a Christian.  In it 
she charts her personal journey, within which life, work and faith intertwine and she 
also acknowledges the communal nature of this journey.  It seems then that in her later 
work,  McFague  has  decided  against  a  view  of  Christianity  as  defined  by  a  root-
metaphor  and  instead  presumes  the  idea  of  historical  and  communal  processes  of 
verification and reflection upon inherited narratives and concepts building on a biblical 
base.  This process will shortly be seen to be taken still further in her most recent work,  
A New Climate for Theology.  
One  advantage  of  this  moving  away  from  a  normative  root-metaphor  and 
towards community focused definitions of Christianity is that it allows more easily for a 
number  of  contextual  and  yet  authentic  Christianities  to  arise  in  and  for  different 
contexts (and we would add, for different tasks).
  McFague defines theology as: 
'reflection upon experiences of God's liberating love from various contexts and 
within the Christian community393.'
But she also notes the plurality of this community, saying,
'we stand in this place as all Christians of all ages have stood in their own places. 
The question,  'what  is  Christianity?'  attracts  a  wide  variety of  replies.   A Jehovah's 
393 Life Abundant p 52
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Witness, a Quaker, a Southern Baptist, a Latin American Roman Catholic liberationist, 
and an African-American  womanist  would all  answer the  question in  very different 
ways.'394
This  plurality  she  finds  mirrored  in  the  Bible  where  the  gospels  of  four 
communities, rather than one, are preserved.
Meanwhile  her  adoption  of  a  Christianity  held  together  by  participation  in 
communities with a biblical foundation but also an ongoing hermeneutical tradition is 
evident when she says,
'Because  revelation  –  insights  into  God'  love  –  occurs  in  our  ordinary 
experience, it is ongoing.  Revelation did not stop with the Bible; the experiences of the 
first  Christians  of  God's  love  manifest  in  Jesus  of  Nazareth  are  a  critical  norm for 
subsequent Christians, but revelation is not a deposit of biblical truths.'395
Later, she confronts the issue head on, asking:
'What makes a revelation of God's love Christian?
'...There is no one answer, but all answers share some identifiable characteristics 
that  come  from Scripture,  the  tradition  and  contemporary  resources.   This  answer 
contains  some basic  assumptions.   First,  fundamentalism is  not  an  option  since  all 
theology is contextual and metaphorical. No human interpretation, including the ones in 
the Bible, is absolute.  Second, radical relativism – anything goes – is not an option 
either, since there are some basic understandings from Scripture and the tradition about 
God and the world that characterize Christian interpretations.'396
She goes on to develop her view of the Bible using the metaphor 'constitution' 
such that
'it is the document without which one cannot understand Christianity...This is not 
394 Ibid. p40
395 Ibid. p53
396 Ibid. p57
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to say that Scripture tells us everything we need to know about Christianity, just as the 
constitution of the United States is only one document among many that we need to be 
acquainted  with  if  we  are  to  have  a  full  understanding  of  the  nation's  form  of 
democracy.  The New Testament as constitution means that it is a necessary document, 
but not the only one.  As founding literature, it is essential but not absolute.'397
She then moves on to discuss the criterion of fidelity to the Christian tradition, 
understood as a paradigm.  However, as will be clear from the following quote, she no 
longer sees a paradigm as being linked to an unchangeable root-metaphor.
'Christians also have 'the tradition'.  This tradition includes all the texts, in many 
genres, orthodox and otherwise, that make up the loosely defined phenomenon known 
as 'Christianity'.  It is, in Thomas Kuhn's term, a paradigm, a set of assumptions and 
practises that distinguish it from other world religions and gives it a distinctive nature.  I 
am not speaking of 'the essence of Christianity,' some foundational kernel or core that 
all must adhere to – in fact, just the opposite!  I am asking whether there are some 
historical  continuities,  some features  that  have  arisen  over  the  centuries  and  within 
different contexts, that distinguish the religion.  This is an empirical, not a foundational 
question.
'...What we call Christianity is composed of many theologies...which are loosely 
connected  by some common threads.   These  characteristics  have  been embodied  in 
different  root-metaphors...They  are  not  universals,  but  simply  some  more-or-less 
identifiable historical continuities that keep appearing in Christian theologies.'398  
These continuities she goes on to identify as a) belief in a God who is creator, 
redeemer and continuing spirit, who is love and who, while spoken of in impersonal 
terms at times, is usually anthropomorphic, b) a view of the world that assumes that 
397 Ibid. p59
398 Ibid. pp60-61
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worldly life  is  good,  c)  an  understanding  of  human  life  as  essentially  relational  in 
character and, most importantly, d) engagement with Jesus Christ as the 'Christic lens' 
through which God, the world and humanity are viewed, a lens whose distinguishing 
characteristic is his dual-dimensional love, for God and for others.
The final criterion that she advances for a Christian theology is a restatement of 
the criterion of relevance:
'A  working  theology,  a  theology  that  matters,  must  reconstruct  its  basic 
understanding of God and the world from and towards our world.
'...It is not enough...to merely translate scriptural or traditional understandings of 
God and the world into contemporary terms...They must be reworked, reconstructed, in 
the light of the novel situations of one's own time.'399 
This understanding would begin to answer many of the objections raised in the 
present study, but with one important caveat.  It is possible that, for all the importance 
of our current context and particularly the threats brought by climate change, McFague 
overestimates  the  novel  aspects  of  the  current  situation.   While  much  has  indeed 
changed, much of what it means to be human, and much of common human experience 
remains.    The particular novel features of our world that she identifies are not the only 
issues  of  concern  for  modern  people  and some of  the  remaining  concerns  have  an 
historical  continuity with the past.    Consequently there may be more of a role for 
traditional  formulations  to  play  than  McFague  allows  since  these  are  models  and 
concepts  that  have  endured  within  Christian  communities  in  relationship  with  these 
continuous aspects of human experience over time.
In addition to this change of stance, what is also immediately interesting about 
Life  Abundant is  that  McFague  appears  to  have  revised  her  view  on  what  can  be 
accomplished by the use of specific models and images.  The following comment in the 
399 Ibid. pp64,66
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preface is suggestive of this:
'I have written each of my books in an effort to make up for deficiencies in the last 
one. Life Abundant is no exception.  After completing Super, Natural Christians, 
subtitled How We Should Love Nature, I realized love was not enough.  I realized 
that  we  middle-class  North  American  Christians  are  destroying  nature,  not 
because we do not love it, but because of the way we live: our ordinary, taken-for-
granted high-consumer lifestyle. I realized that the matter of loving nature was a 
deep, complex, tricky question involving greed, indifference, and denial.
'So I have set about trying to rectify the inadequacies of my last book with yet 
another (inadequate) book. The thesis of this one is that American middle-class 
Christians need to live differently in order to love nature, and to live differently, 
we need to think differently...'400
The key point here is that it is clear that McFague has concluded that the link 
between a model of God and resultant ethical action is not straight forward.  Holding a 
particular view does not  automatically entail following a particular course of action in a 
simple, deterministic way.  As Life Abundant makes clear, there are many things that we 
need  to  think  differently  about  in  order  to  live  differently.   'Loving  nature'  is  not 
sufficient in itself.  Life Abundant therefore engages with a network of different models 
used  for  a  number  of  diverse  tasks  in  order  to  understand  and  re-imagine  our 
relationship  with  the  world.   As  well  as  models  for  God,  then,  this  work  includes 
detailed discussions on models of economics and anthropology for example.  This is 
consistent with the arguments already advanced concerning the need for models to be 
formulated for different tasks and to be related to each other.  It also seems to be a tacit  
recognition that a model of God is not itself a model of everything else in a straight-
400 Ibid. p xi
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forward way.
McFague's  latest  book is  A New Climate  for  Theology:  God,  the World  and  
Global Warming.  The recent nature of this publication prevents a discussion of this 
work being fully integrated throughout the preceding chapters.  However, since A New 
Climate appears to be largely a representation of McFague's body of work for a non-
academic  audience,  tailored  particularly to  the  issue  of  climate  change,  it  does  not 
appear  that  anything  contained  within  it  substantially  alters  the  discussions  or 
conclusions here.  It does however illustrate two things.  
Firstly it  demonstrates that McFague is  comfortable representing most of her 
central arguments even after up to 35 years of critique from the academic community, 
supporting our general verdict here that her theology is coherent, valid and makes a 
valuable contribution to contemporary theology.  Secondly, the process of constructive 
rather  than destructive engagement  with the Christian tradition can be seen to  have 
advanced still further in the direction already discussed.  A New Climate largely lacks 
formal discussion of theological method and instead serves as an example of McFague's 
methods  in  action.   The  feature  that  distinguishes  it,  at  least  quantitatively  if  not 
qualitatively, from the works that precede it is McFague's much greater efforts to engage 
creatively with both biblical texts and narratives and sources within the post-biblical 
tradition.  Three examples will suffice:
When discussing the 'ecological model of the church' McFague regards this as 
'returning to the oldest and deepest Christian theology'.401
She reflects upon the theology of St Paul, quoting 2 Corinthians 4:6 and saying,
'Our creeds tell us that Jesus was of one substance with God, and that is good 
news, but just as important, we learn that God is like Jesus – the mysterious, awesome 
God of the universe can be  known in Jesus...In Paul's understanding God does it all: 
401 A New Climate for Theology p33
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God creates us, God comes to us in Jesus, and God enlightens us so we recognise God 
in Jesus.'402
Finally,  in  discussing  the  hope  that  Christians  may  have  in  the  face  of 
environmental  problems she reflects  upon verses  from Isaiah 65 (NRSV) 'For  I  am 
about to create new heavens and a new earth...Before they call I will answer, while they 
are yet speaking I will hear.  The wolf and the lamb shall feed together, the lion shall eat 
straw like the ox...They shall not hurt or destroy on all my holy mountain, says the 
Lord.'  She says
'...we read in  the Isaiah passage that  in  the midst  of painting this  wonderful 
picture of life beyond our wildest dreams, God says, 'Before they call I will answer, 
while they are yet speaking I will hear.' 'While they are yet speaking' - we only have to 
ask for God to answer!  But we must ask with our whole being; a better world must 
come from our deepest desire.  And this means, of course, we must work at it; we must 
give our whole selves to it.'403
In  these  passages  McFague  should  not  be  understood  to  be  returning  to  a 
supernatural picture of God or to have changed her mind on the nature of religious 
language.  Rather she has directed her attention back to the primary context of religious 
language as a part of worship, the position from which  Metaphorical Theology  began 
and uses these texts from the position of a second naiveté, recovering the usefulness of 
the language while remaining aware of the limitations the language faces.  It is however 
interesting that  she has  taken this  more constructive approach to  engaging with the 
tradition in her most recent work without compromising or diluting her novel insights 
and models, her views on the status and workings of religious language or her ability to 
critique that tradition.  It is a step towards proving that such a constructive approach is 
402 Ibid. p39
403 Ibid. p144
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possible within her methodology and that this is the more effective way of meeting her 
own stated aims.
5.9 Conclusions.
This chapter supports the findings of earlier chapters.  Considered as a whole, 
the  model  of  the  world  as  God's  body is  coherent  and  consistent  with  McFague's 
method.  It offers original insights and addresses contemporary concerns.  It engages 
critically and creatively with the Christian tradition and offers a reinterpretation of it 
consistent with McFague's intentions and aims.
However some of the questions raised in previous chapters have again been seen 
to be relevant.  In this model again much of the work being done is at the conceptual 
level e.g. it is carried out in terms of the concepts of 'space', 'place' and 'spirit'.  Even 
'body' has become distant from intuitive images of bodies and has become much more 
abstract,  more  conceptual.   Once  more  the  actual  model,  if  a  model  is  strictly  
understood in terms of mapping associated commonplaces, does very little work in that 
particular way. Therefore again there is little use of the model as a model in the sense 
outlined in the earlier chapters.  This is not to say that the model does not produce 
results of value to theology, simply that it does not do so in exactly the way McFague 
proposes that it should.  There is indeed much that is of value in what McFague has 
constructed.  She achieves the large part of what she is seeking to achieve, that is, her 
exposition of the model is consistent with her aims, motivations and ethical focus and 
invites reform and re-engagement with traditional themes.  Yet much of this is achieved 
independently of a strict application of the model of the world as God's Body.
 The  other  consistent  criticism  of  McFague  has  been  directed  towards  the 
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relationship, or sometimes lack thereof, between her models and traditional Christian 
doctrines and themes.  In this chapter we have seen that she has herself moved away 
from the root-metaphor criterion for establishing a model as 'Christian' and towards an 
understanding of  tradition as a process of community interpretation.  We have also seen 
that  her  later  work  strengthened  her  commitment  to  this  position.  This  move  is  a 
welcome one in the light of many of her respondents criticisms and those in our project 
here.   However  she  does  not  offer  a  defined method for  guiding or  describing this 
process and so this question awaits future research.
As  a  consequence  perhaps  of  this  change,  McFague  has  worked  with  more 
traditional theological themes such as incarnation and resurrection in presenting this 
model compared to those studied in Chapter 4.   Consequently there is less narrowing of 
the  tradition  in  this  presentation.   However  the  degree  to  which  she  restructures 
Christology and Eschatology in particular may still somewhat restrict her ability to act 
as a reformer within the tradition by weakening the relationship between her theology 
and traditional ones.  
Detailed consideration has now been given both to McFague's method and to the 
models that she produces and interprets as a practical outworking of that method. A high 
level of coherence between the two has been identified and tested.  But questions have 
been raised concerning some details of both method and models.  In the following, final 
chapter it is asked whether there is a link between the questions asked about her method 
and  problems  explored  in  the  application  of  that  method  in  her  models  and  her 
interpretation of them.  Are the two connected by any common themes or causes?
 However,  despite  these  questions,  it  has  become clear  that  McFague offers 
much that is of significant value. She makes a considerable, original contribution to 
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theology.  Her models have been found in very large part to be consistent in themselves 
and coherent with her method and aims. Her method itself can therefore be seen to have 
endured  the  scrutiny  of  her  respondents  and  remained  a  relevant  contemporary 
theological resource. Additional research into answering the challenges raised here may 
strengthen this claim still  further and we have seen that her own more recent work 
offers potential starting points and directions for that research.   
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion.
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6.1 -Introduction.
The  preceding  chapters  have  assessed  the  coherence  and  consistency  of 
McFague's theology in order to assess its ongoing ability to contribute to the reform of 
the Christian tradition.  In order to explore this, the various stages of her work have 
been considered in the light of her respondents and in the light of selected, subsequent 
research.  
This enquiry began by examining the motivations and goals of her work and its 
basic  categories  of  thought  before  exploring  the  more  detailed  methodological 
assertions and assumptions that she makes.  This prepared the ground for an assessment 
of  her  models,  viewed  as  a  practical  outworking  of  her  theoretical  statements. 
Discussions of her method led to a number of conclusions.  The high level of symmetry 
in  form and content  and the high degree of  conceptual  unity in her  work has been 
demonstrated.  Investigation and analysis has supported the claim that, in the main, her 
assertions  on  the  nature  and practice  of  theology are  defensible  in  the  light  of  her 
respondents  and  in  the  light  of  subsequent  research.   However  a  number  of  small 
modifications have been suggested, particularly to her interactionist understanding of 
metaphors  and  to  the  relative  importance  of  the  conceptual  level  in  creating  new 
meaning. It appears that models, strictly understood, cannot provide this new meaning 
alone.  It has also been advanced here that the claim of McFague's models to refer to an 
ontological reality may be strengthened by a distinction between the validation and the 
warranting of models of God.  To this end, our explorations of the issue have supported 
the idea that religious language could still potentially be warranted as referential even if 
it could not always be empirically validated.   This is, God-talk can be rationally held to 
refer to an ontological reality even while its correspondence to the nature of this reality 
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cannot be objectively proved.   
Our enquiry and McFague's own work both engage with 'the Christian tradition'. 
However it has emerged, that this relationship is a cause for concern if she is to be seen 
as reforming fully within the Christian tradition rather than creating a separate belief 
system.  Indeed a fuller integration of her models with traditional ones would strengthen 
her work's already impressive contribution to the debate within this tradition at the same 
time  as  building  on  her  desire  to  see  herself  as  ultimately  a  realist,  contra  some 
accusations from her respondents. 
These  minor  concerns  were  borne  out  in  the  consideration  of  her  suggested 
models.  These models were judged to perform very well in relation to her aims and 
suggested method, but with the caveat that much of the value here was again at the 
conceptual  level  –  it  was  the concepts derived  from  models  that  were creating new 
meaning, rather than the models themselves.  This small modification however does not 
threaten the overall coherence and value of her project, rather it offers the possibility of 
furthering her case by a natural extension of her work.
To  repeat,  the  criterion  that  McFague's  theology  be  well  located  relative  to 
Christian tradition is not one that has been imported from outside her theology.  Rather 
it has been held  throughout to be vital to establishing the coherence and consistency of 
a theology that she intends to be explicitly Christian throughout her work.  Metaphorical 
Theology as a practice is intended to be reforming  within Christianity, and this as an 
integral part of the coherent unity her project aims for, and in the large part succeeds in 
attaining.   
In the preceding chapters, changes in McFague's thought over time have been 
charted and she has been seen to build upon her previous work in a linear and consistent 
fashion and it is this which gives her work much of its coherence and consistency and 
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consequently enables it to have an enduring significance for theology today.  However it 
is once again on the particular issue of relating to the tradition, and so being a theology 
that can be maximally described as Christian, that McFague's views have been least 
consistent and have changed most over time.
This concluding chapter, then, will begin by summarising the points that have 
been raised over the course of the past five chapters. Despite the judgement emerging 
that in the main McFague's work has endured beyond her respondents critique, what 
follows here will particularly draw out those points at which McFague's work could, in 
the light of her respondents, benefit from further strengthening to achieve its aims even 
more fully.  At the same time, where the preceding chapters have suggested the direction 
from which this strengthening may come, this is highlighted. Finally these observations 
are  brought  together  to  see if  any common causes  might  be  seen to  underlie  these 
weaker points and whether any solutions towards their remedy might be suggested.  
6.2 Challenges for McFague in the light of her respondents.
Although McFague's work has endured the response of her critics and can still 
today be judged to make a very valuable contribution to the reformation of the Christian 
tradition, nevertheless, some challenges remain.  In what follows these are summarised. 
But  since these challenges are  not  judged to be terminal  threats  to her  project,  and 
sources of potential  strengthening have also been identified in the light of academic 
responses and subsequent research, these sources are also summarised at the same time.
The most intense critique of McFague in the literature and in preceding chapters 
has  focused  on  her  relationship  with  the  tradition.    The  first  chapter  considered 
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McFague's most basic aims – a move towards inclusion and abundant life and away 
from idolatry and irrelevance.  Thus her project is motivated by a desire for accessibility 
and  ethically  useful  outcomes  and  these  concerns  over-ride  others  (such  as  a  full 
systematic  integration  of  models  with  each other  for  example).   A key part  in  this  
strategy is her decision, looked at more closely in chapter 3, to focus on the Christian 
tradition and community, despite having at times a negative assessment of its historic 
and current value.  This decision is summed up in her statement that she is seeking to 
reform  the  tradition  and  not  instigate  a  revolution  to  bring  about  a  post-Christian 
religion or entirely new reading of Jesus.  This is no doubt in the main because the 
Christian tradition is the one to which she herself belongs and which she values highly, 
despite the aforementioned critique she levels at it.  It is also possible that participation 
in this pre-existing community gives her a ready-made, and, in her culture, dominant, 
community to address and so engagement with it would be appropriate given her aims 
and pragmatic approach.  Seen in this light, her desire to avoid 'idolatry' might primarily 
be a move to create a space within this tradition for her own models.  However the 
decision to locate herself here brings with it a number of constraints as McFague is well 
aware.  Had McFague been content simply to construct models of ultimate concern and 
ethical behaviour, as it were, in a vacuum, or as an independent, self-contained belief 
system, many of the objections emerging would not apply.
As things stand though, McFague's  thought faces a number of challenges, as 
many of her respondents have consistently suggested and as they have been explored 
here.  These challenges have focussed not only on debating the status of her models as 
Christian  but  also  on  difficulties  deciding  what  'Christian'  is.   In  her  earlier  work 
(especially Metaphorical Theology),  McFague reduces Christianity to a root-metaphor 
and  sees  all  expressions  or  translations  of  this  root  metaphor  as  therefore  being 
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Christian (see Chapter 3.4).  But several problems with this  position have emerged. 
Firstly,  it  does  not  differentiate  between that  which is  itself  Christian and that  with 
which Christians would agree but which is not itself specific to that faith.  Secondly, this 
position on its own does not manage to capture the paradoxes and complexities inherent 
within that tradition.  
Further,  recalling the  discussions  of  Chapter  1.4,  the  properties  of  metaphor, 
properties that McFague herself endorses and builds into her theology, themselves imply 
that any translation or expression of a  root-metaphor into another metaphor is going to 
result in a change of meaning to some degree. It is not immediately clear however by 
what criteria the nature of such change is to be guided and controlled.   McFague begins 
to  answer this  by means of  a  particular  reading of  Jesus  (which  was considered  in 
chapters 1 and 3).  This she uses to give a direction and ethical cohesion throughout her 
work.   Yet we have seen in chapter 5.8 that McFague does, in later works, introduce a 
different  understanding of the continuity of Christianity.  This sees the continuity as 
that of a community,  exhibiting similarity as well as change over time.  However, these 
different ideas,  continuity through root-metaphor and continuity through community, 
are not brought together in her work in a firmly defined way.   Before moving on from 
this tension, it is worth recalling the discussion in Chapter 4.12.  This suggested that 
narratives play an important role within faith communities. It is possible that narrative 
may provide a meeting place for these two definitions of Christianity, one focusing on 
the narrative of Jesus and the other on faith community. Both connect to McFague's 
long-standing  interest  in  faith-based  biography,  and  this  issue  will  be  returned  to 
below.404
McFague's relationship with the Christian tradition has also been criticised in 
preceding chapters, and widely in the literature, for the breadth of its attacks on that 
404 See particularly her first published work, Literature and the Christian Life.
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religion's major doctrinal elements.  Whilst on a number of issues McFague's critique is 
incisive and many will be sympathetic to it, the question has arisen whether a removal 
of major doctrinal elements from the tradition is warranted, necessary or desirable if her 
task is to be the reformation of Christianity rather than the replacement of it.  Indeed we 
have seen how in other passages McFague seems anyway to take a more conciliatory 
tone.  These passages suggest that her models are complementary to the tradition rather 
than substitutionary for it. The preceding chapters here have suggested that this more 
reforming stance in relation to the tradition is more congruent with her overall aims. 
A process  of  following  the  critical  literature  revealed  that  McFague's  more 
revolutionary approach, one that tended to predominate particularly in the earlier phases 
of  her  work,  seems to have been counter-productive.  This  element  of  her  work has 
likely reduced the acceptance of her valuable models with her intended audience.  This 
is to be regretted, since her aim is to reform the Christian tradition with practical and 
ethical consequences, but discussions of her models, which are well able to contribute to 
this aim, have been sidetracked into areas of systematic and doctrinal thought which 
were not her main areas of concern.  This view is supported by our findings in Chapters 
4 and 5 where it was evident that much of the response to her work of that period in the 
literature  focuses  on  either  a  defence  of  traditional  models  against  her  stronger 
statements,  or  as part  of  this,  a critique of  her  theoretical  statements.   Constructive 
engagements  with,  or buildings  upon, the actual  content  of her  models  is  relatively 
lacking in the literature by comparison.
This question of the relationship between McFague's models and traditional ones 
also seems to be the one on which the theoretical cohesion of McFague's project might 
be  most  open  to  strengthening.   In  Chapter  1  we  also  looked  at  McFague's 
understanding  of  language  about  God  in  terms  of  non-idolatry  and  explored  the 
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relationship between this and metaphor.  There we saw that it was helpful to understand 
speech  about  God  as  being  non-literal  in  the  sense  of  being  semantically  non-
autonomous.  That is, that all statements about God are statements in terms of other 
entities or domains of meaning and that no autonomous (and therefore determining) 
account of God can be given.  Chapters 1.4 and 1.7 argued that this does not imply that  
all talk of God starts from a blank canvass; that each model or metaphor for God exists 
as a separate and isolated entity and projects its features onto a domain that is otherwise 
empty of meaning.  Analysis of this issue suggested that the absence of a semantically 
autonomous account of the term 'God' does not imply that the domain 'God' has no 
content  for  the  hearer  and  is  simply  there  to  be  filled  from scratch  by  each  new 
metaphor as it is formed.
This issue arose again in Chapter 3.3 where it was explored in more detail.  This 
analysis  followed Reynolds  in  questioning whether,  for  McFague,  'God',  as  a  target 
domain in metaphor formation, really was empty of prior content.  It was suggested that 
in fact a certain number of background assumptions should, apparently contra McFague, 
be assumed to be present in the target domain both for metaphorical mapping to occur 
in a rational way and also to warrant the metaphor within a web of pre-existing belief.
These  observations  can  be  combined  with  those  in  Chapter  2.2,  following 
Bisschops,  concerning  target  domain  experience.   It  was  argued  that  religious 
experience is  held to  be experience  of  God,  however  much that  experience may be 
mediated through images derived from source related experience (experience of kings, 
rocks etc). 
Therefore the case has been made here that it  is in fact McFague's choice to 
participate in a pre-existing theological tradition that  most argues against her seeming 
assumption that 'God' is to be treated as a semantically empty domain in the process of 
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metaphor  formation.   As  she  is  clearly aware,  the  community which  she  addresses 
already  has  ideas  about  God  and  therefore  the  term ‘God’ already holds  meaning. 
Indeed it is some of this very meaning that she wishes to reform.  The significance of 
this pre-existing meaning in the light of the challenges McFague faces in integrating her 
thought fully with the tradition will be explored further below.
In  Chapter  1.4  it  was  argued  that  more  recent  research  into  the  nature  of 
metaphor,  particularly in  the  field  of  cognitive  linguistics,  has  changed  the  broadly 
accepted view of metaphor since McFague wrote on the subject.  Although most of her 
core views on metaphor endure well, this is not the case in one particular area, since the 
notion of the directionality (irreversibility) of metaphor405 has been questioned, in the 
ensuing debate.  If the interaction theory of the function of metaphor has been called 
into  question  in  subsequent  research,  this  suggests  that  McFague's  theology,  which 
places weight upon this view, may benefit from a degree of modification to assist it to 
remain a relevant resource for the reformation of the Christian tradition and to be judged 
all the more fully coherent in the light of her respondents.
Chapter 2 also introduced and analysed McFague's basic categories of image, 
model, concept and theory.  Over the course of our enquiry as a whole, the evidence 
emerging has pointed to the conceptual level having a greater importance and active 
role in McFague's work than she seems to have fully explored herself. McFague seems 
in her method and its application to limit herself to operating at the more limited and 
fragmentary level of image and model.  However, and especially over time, she has in 
fact appeared to have moved to explore the conceptual and theoretical aspects both of 
her models and of Christian theology more generally, but without naming this move.  It 
is possible that if one was to explore this move more mindfully (that is, with concepts 
treated as concepts and not as if they were models or images) that this might begin to 
405 Chapter 1.4 g)
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remedy these small weaknesses.  Chapter 2.4 suggested, for example, that it is at this 
conceptual level that she finds a degree of unity with the tradition, rather than finding a 
more conventional unity at the level of common images or models.  We also saw that 
Kaufmann  has  suggested  more  focus  on  the  conceptual  level  to  provide  additional 
complexity to her theological formulations.
In summary then, the criticisms emerging in the light of her respondents have 
focused  firstly  on  the  interaction  theory  of  metaphor  deployed  by McFague  (quite 
reasonably  at  the  time  of  this  aspect  of  her  work,  but  since  called  into  question). 
Secondly attention has been drawn to her slight underestimation of the importance of 
the conceptual level in constructing theologies and deriving ethics from them.  Thirdly 
it appears on occasion that her models stand isolated and disconnected from (or even in 
opposition to) both each other and the tradition from which they are intended to spring. 
While tension is part of the ethos of Metaphorical theology itself, it might better meet 
its stated aims with some modification in these weaker, but far from terminal, areas.    
6.3 Bringing the threads together.
This project has identified a number of points within McFague's work, in the 
light of her respondents, where further work might be fruitful.  It has also explored, at  
the end of the last chapter, how her most recent work suggests that she is herself aware 
of these issues and has responded to some of them accordingly.  It now needs to be 
asked whether these issues are in any way inter-related.
It is of course unlikely that several complex methodological areas like these can 
be related directly and in a reductionist way (i.e. with each being a direct and necessary 
consequence  of  another).   This  said,  there  does  seem  to  be  a  common  theme  of 
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oversimplification – and in particular of considering elements in isolation from their 
broader  context  at  a  number  of  different  levels  in  McFague's  thought.   Since  such 
simplification is, as McFague herself observes, an inherent property of models and of 
metaphors as she understands them, then this simplification is perhaps to be expected on 
the basis of her method, but it would also be consistent with that method to explore the 
issues further using the nature of metaphor as a starting point.
Recalling our discussions in Chapters 1 and 2, McFague follows Max Black in 
her understanding of metaphor, giving an interaction account of its workings. However, 
subsequent  research  had  called  this  into  question.   McFague's  model  of  metaphor 
considers  only  the  existence  of  two  semantic  domains,  source  and  target,  with 
information flowing relatively freely in both directions.  Thus a metaphor is seen as a 
'binding together in meaning' of two terms (along with the associated commonplaces of 
the source term).  Crucially it is assumed in McFague's account that the process of the 
transfer  of  meaning  itself  is  relatively 
trivial and intuitive and no allowance is 
made for the governing of this transfer 
by,  for  example,  literary  context  or 
speakers intention.  
By  comparison  the  approach 
preferred by DesCamp and Sweetser,406 
and  illustrated  in  this  diagram  of  the 
metaphor 'God the Father', contends that 
metaphor  formation  is  a  multi-stage 
process.  In this example, as the first stage, certain qualities are abstracted from the 
406 Mary Therese DesCamp and Eve E. Sweetser 'Metaphors for God: Why and How Do Our Choices 
Matter for Humans? The Application of Contemporary Cognitive Linguistics Research to the Debate 
on God and Metaphor' Pastoral Psychology, Vol. 53 No. 3 January 2005 pp203-238
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'Father' domain into a 'generic space' before forming a 'conceptual blend' with the 'God' 
domain.  But, it may be asked, what factors influence these stages?
Having rejected the contention that,  in  the case of taking 'God'  as the target 
domain, this  domain is semantically empty,  a further conclusion can now be drawn. 
Since  the  target  domain  can  influence  what  is  mapped  from the  source  domain,  it 
follows that what will be mapped by two different users of the same metaphor may not 
be the same if they have different understandings of the target domain.  That is, even if  
two speakers have the same understanding of what is meant by 'Father', the products of 
the metaphor 'God the Father'  will not be same for both if they hold different 'core 
beliefs' about God initially.
Similarly, it must be questioned whether all speakers should be expected to map 
source domains in identical ways independently of literary context.  For example does 
the metaphor of 'Father' map the same properties onto the domain in the image 'Father 
of the Prodigal Son' as it does in the phrase 'Father of Jesus Christ'?  If (as seems likely)  
the answer is no, to what extent are the properties of the target domain alone responsible 
for these different mappings and to what degrees are factors external to this (such as an 
history of interpretation and the literary context or personal experiences e.g. of 'fathers') 
coming into play?
It  appears  desirable  to  nuance  and  texture  metaphors  with  the  concrete  and 
particular, allowing the same metaphor to map differently in different contexts rather 
than to simply map generic associated commonplaces in a vacuum.  In contrast to this, 
McFague has been accused of
''tend[ing]  to  settle  for  images and phrases without  serious  attention to  their  textual 
embedment.'407
It is also likely that it is this dislocation of biblical and traditional models from 
407Walter Bruggemann 'The Collapse of History (Review)' Journal of Religion 76 (2) 1996 pp349-352 
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their historic and literary contexts that has at least in part led to her reading of these 
traditional models being widely divergent from those of many expounders of the text. 
However McFague is clearly aware of this issue. In the case of Jesus' use of 'Father' (see 
Chapter 3) she engages explicitly with these literary and historical contexts and does in 
fact allow for the possibility of a positive and constructive use of this traditional model 
of God. Therefore the suggestion here is simply that work remains to be done to allow 
the  surrounding interpretative  context  to  shape  the  models  more  consistently.   This 
would support the case for these models to be most naturally seen as reforming within 
the tradition.
Given McFague's background in academic English and literature,408 her concern 
for  the  context  of  theology itself  and her  feminist  stress  on  the  significance  of  the 
particular in the face of the general, it is perhaps surprising to suggest that she may 
overly generalise in aspects of her approach, especially to the biblical text.  However it 
must be remembered that it is precisely this process of generalisation that she has built 
into her method in the light of her understanding of metaphor and this should make the 
observation less surprising – it is a consistent part of a method which is aware of its own 
partial and generalising nature and one that is humbly advanced,  addressing as it does a 
very large range of issues and covering many academic disciplines.  
This is not of course an insurmountable problem for her method. As she herself 
says,  models need to be kept close to their imagistic roots.  By imagistic is meant the 
broader, methodological sense which was introduced in Chapter 2.2 – that category of 
concrete  and  particular  instances  that  supply  the  examples  on  which  a  model 
generalises, (rather than imagistic in the sense of picturable).  Therefore for a metaphor 
to remain connected to images in this sense is to deploy it within particular linguistic 
expressions  and  for  particular  and  limited  purposes,  that  is,  as  already  argued  in 
408 See her Literature and the Christian Life for example.  
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chapters 4.12 and 5.8, it should be deployed for particular and defined tasks. To repeat, 
the meaning of a model such as ‘God as Mother’ is best drawn out when the model is 
deployed  in  particular  sentences  with  a  particular  purpose,  not  when  the  model  is 
considered as a linguistic fragment, isolated from any context within a text or a situation 
in  life.   The  context  provides  the  meaning  of  a  statement  as  well  as  the  words 
themselves. In passing it is worth noting that perhaps the most natural context for this 
process to take place is within a narrative.  Perhaps narrative expressions would return 
the particularity to models by allowing them to draw definition from each other and 
their context.  This is not to argue against the deployment of models for theoretical and 
conceptual  tasks  such  as  McFague's,  rather  to  argue  that  both  approaches  may  be 
necessary together to fully explore a model’s meaning and relate it to other models.
We have seen how McFague's views on metaphor are integrated with the rest of 
her theology.   A considerable degree of cross-fertilisation has taken place, carrying her 
understanding and the language of metaphor into her understanding and language about, 
for example, Christology.  It is reasonable to ask the question, is this tendency to isolate 
the terms in her model of metaphor from their literary and interpretive context  also 
partially behind her tendency to isolate terms from their contexts in other areas?
Two stages in DesCamp and Sweetser's model suggest that the answered may be 
affirmative.  Firstly, allowing for the target domain to contain information not derived 
from the source domain allows for the tradition in which the new metaphor is to be 
placed to have a role in governing its content.  (The very minimal abstractions of the 
Christian  tradition  that  McFague  does  in  fact  use  in  this  way  have,  as  has  been 
suggested  here,  not  been  fully  sufficient  to  locate  her  models  securely  within  that 
tradition.) It may be admitted that it is useful to allow the source domain to specify the 
content of the metaphor almost exclusively when a new model is created.  This would 
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allow the new model to be given a maximally original and creative form.  However it 
would  still  seem to  be  the  case  that  a  more  sophisticated  and  nuanced  process  of 
conceptual blending with the pre-existing beliefs that comprise the interpretative context 
would be required if that metaphor were to be integrated into the systematic theologies 
of a particular tradition, to become reforming within it.  For example the metaphor of 
God as sacrificial  victim is  often held to be given its  particular power and location 
within  Christian  soteriology  only  by  its  conditioning  by  other  beliefs  about  the 
incarnation and resurrection of Jesus and beliefs about sacrifice that are current in the 
context of the interpreter.409. 
Secondly,  attention  has  been  drawn  to  the  role  of  concepts  in  metaphor 
formation.   We have seen  that,  somewhat  contra  McFague,  it  is  largely conceptual 
information that is transferred between domains as a metaphor is formed.  Even when 
this metaphor is expressed in imagistic terms, its meaning has been seen to be derived 
from concepts,  particularly in the form of abstracted qualities. Hence, it is also at the 
level of concept, as well as image and model, that seemingly diverse entities may be 
compared and may cast light upon each other.  However this may provide a viable 
explanation  for  the  dominance  of  the  conceptual  level  within  McFague's  theology, 
particularly where she explores the meaning of her new models of God.   We see this in  
McFague's  use  of  composite  models  as  discussed  in  Chapters  4  and  5.   In  these 
instances, models such as mother-homemaker or mother-judge are deployed together.  It 
is the partial overlap and tension that exists between the pairs of concepts (rather than 
images)  that  enables  them  to  act  as  composites.   It  is  possible  therefore,  that  if 
McFague's work were to be extended to include an analysis of the full importance of 
concepts  in  the  actual  process  of  the  formation  of  metaphors  (including  imagistic 
409 See Ian Bradley The Power of Sacrifice London: DLT 1995 for an overview of the various 
relationships between understandings of sacrifice and other theological themes through Judeo-
Christian history.
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metaphors)  that  this  may  lead  to  a  greater  understanding  of  the  function  of  the 
conceptual level in other places in her work.  
  The details of how this process might be done fall outside our present focus and 
await  future  research.   However,  as  already  suggested,  embedding  the  models  and 
metaphors in a narrative might be one fruitful way of beginning to draw them together, 
exploring their creative tensions and allowing them to interact with traditional motifs 
and narratives.  This is perhaps to redirect attention back to one of the primary sources 
of  McFague's  theology,  the  parables,  with  the  reminder  that  these  are  not  simply 
metaphors but metaphors in a narrative form and located in a narrative context (the 
gospels).410  
In  short  it  appears  that  in  those  instances  where  McFague's  project  may be 
weaker,  these  weaknesses  may  be  a  factor  of  the  inherent  risk  of  the  process  of 
metaphorical modelling itself. That is, it falls foul of an occasional tendency to over-
simplify a complex set of inter-relationships. To use McFague's own image, metaphors 
'screen out' important insights or factors that, had they been brought into play, would 
have  yielded  different  outcomes.    This  is,  therefore,  a  risk  that  McFague  herself 
acknowledges.  
6.4 Summary.
The key elements of  Sallie McFague's works remain coherent and relevant in 
the light of her respondents and in the face of her respondents and subsequent research. 
The foregoing discussions have drawn attention to a considerable degree of symmetry 
and cohesion between the form and theory of her work.  A high degree of consistency 
410 For a contemporary example of how theology might proceed in this way, the reader is referred to the 
work of Trevor Dennis and especially Speaking of God which includes an non-technical introduction 
to the method of God-talk through narrative.
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has been observed between the method she advocates and that which she actually uses 
in forming and assessing her models and that, by the standards she sets for them, they 
may be said to perform well.    As for the models themselves, an  examination of each of 
these has shown them to be well developed and fruitful heuristic aids to an exploration 
of the nature of God,  the nature of the world and the deepest emotions and relationships 
of humans within that world.  It has also been seen that in the large majority of cases,  
McFague's work may be defended in the light of subsequent research and on occasion 
her arguments may be strengthened by it.
However, on a small, but consistently re-occurring, number of points, there has 
been cause to question McFague's work, either following more recent developments in 
the field, or in response to her critics or simply on the basis of explorations of her own 
internal consistency.
Considering her work as a whole then, it can be concluded that McFague still 
makes  a  significant,  coherent  and  consistent  contribution  even  to  contemporary 
Christian  theology  following  many  years  of  debate  on  her  work  in  the  academic 
community.   This  contribution  is  particularly  valuable  both  in  suggesting  and 
expounding new metaphors and models and also by providing a theoretical framework 
in which further models may be created and assessed.  There are however two further 
tasks which await future researchers into her valuable work to further strengthen its 
ability to meet its aim of being reforming of the Christian tradition.    
One is the exploration of the possibility of expanding the imagistic base of these 
models  by  deploying  them  within  new  narratives  and  interpretative  contexts  and 
applying them to new tasks (and a reworking of traditional ones) and thus returning 
them to what McFague describes as their 'primary context'  - the language of worship, a 
process which McFague has herself begun in her most recent book.  
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The second task, in partnership with the first, is the integration of models new 
and  old,  including  their  integration  into  the  existing  tradition,  particularly  at  the 
conceptual level.  
McFague's  reforming  work  on  Christian  language  about  God,  perhaps  itself 
reformed  with  the  small  modifications  as  suggested  here,  stands  as  a  valuable  and 
significant  contribution  to  be  used in  future  theological  endeavours.   But,  correctly 
understood, it is to be regarded as a resource to be used with the broader sweep of 
Christian theology rather than forming a complete and separate theology in itself.  (This, 
after all, is her original stated intention in  Metaphorical Theology.)   In addition, the 
clear values and imperatives for theology consistently offered by her body of work offer 
an important voice in the conversation concerning how and for what purpose Christian 
theology should apply itself to understanding and re-imagining our world if it is to be 
relevant to the needs of our age.
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